Re: [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Date: 2017-04-18 22:46:01
Also in:
linux-security-module, lkml, netdev
On 19/04/2017 00:17, Kees Cook wrote:
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
Handle 33 filesystem-related LSM hooks for the Landlock filesystem event: LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_EVENT_FS. A Landlock event wrap LSM hooks for similar kernel object types (e.g. struct file, struct path...). Multiple LSM hooks can trigger the same Landlock event. Landlock handle nine coarse-grained actions: read, write, execute, new, get, remove, ioctl, lock and fcntl. Each of them abstract LSM hook access control in a way that can be extended in the future. The Landlock LSM hook registration is done after other LSM to only run actions from user-space, via eBPF programs, if the access was granted by major (privileged) LSMs. Changes since v5: * split hooks.[ch] into hooks.[ch] and hooks_fs.[ch] * add more documentation * cosmetic fixes Changes since v4: * add LSM hook abstraction called Landlock event * use the compiler type checking to verify hooks use by an event * handle all filesystem related LSM hooks (e.g. file_permission, mmap_file, sb_mount...) * register BPF programs for Landlock just after LSM hooks registration * move hooks registration after other LSMs * add failsafes to check if a hook is not used by the kernel * allow partial raw value access form the context (needed for programs generated by LLVM) Changes since v3: * split commit * add hooks dealing with struct inode and struct path pointers: inode_permission and inode_getattr * add abstraction over eBPF helper arguments thanks to wrapping structs Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: James Morris <redacted> Cc: Kees Cook <redacted> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 + security/landlock/Makefile | 4 +- security/landlock/hooks.c | 115 +++++++++ security/landlock/hooks.h | 177 ++++++++++++++ security/landlock/hooks_fs.c | 563 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/hooks_fs.h | 19 ++ security/landlock/init.c | 13 + security/security.c | 7 +- 8 files changed, 901 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_fs.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_fs.hdiff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index e29d4c62a3c8..884289166a0e 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h@@ -1920,5 +1920,10 @@ void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void); #else static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { }; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK +extern void __init landlock_add_hooks(void); +#else +static inline void __init landlock_add_hooks(void) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */ #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile index 7205f9a7a2ee..c0db504a6335 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Makefile +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +ccflags-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += -Werror=unused-functionWhy is this needed? If it can't be avoided, a comment should exist here explaining why.
This is useful to catch defined but unused hooks: error out if a HOOK_NEW_FS(foo) is not used with a HOOK_INIT_FS(foo) in the struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks.
quoted
[...]@@ -127,3 +132,11 @@ static struct bpf_prog_type_list bpf_landlock_type __ro_after_init = { .ops = &bpf_landlock_ops, .type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK, }; + +void __init landlock_add_hooks(void) +{ + pr_info("landlock: Version %u", LANDLOCK_VERSION); + landlock_add_hooks_fs(); + security_add_hooks(NULL, 0, "landlock"); + bpf_register_prog_type(&bpf_landlock_type);I'm confused by the separation of hook registration here. The call to security_add_hooks is with count=0 is especially weird. Why isn't this just a single call with security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), "landlock")?
Yes, this is ugly with the new security_add_hooks() with three arguments but I wanted to split the hooks definition in multiple files. The current security_add_hooks() use lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) which is not exported. Unfortunately, calling multiple security_add_hooks() with the same LSM name would register multiple names for the same LSM… Is it OK if I modify this function to not add duplicated entries?
quoted
+}diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d0e07f269b2d..a3e9f4625991 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c@@ -64,10 +64,15 @@ int __init security_init(void) loadpin_add_hooks(); /* - * Load all the remaining security modules. + * Load all remaining privileged security modules. */ do_security_initcalls(); + /* + * Load potentially-unprivileged security modules at the end. + */ + landlock_add_hooks();Oh, is this to make it last in the list? Is there a reason it has to be last?
Right, this is the intend. I'm not sure it is the only way to register hooks, though. For an unprivileged access-control, we don't want to give the ability to any process to do some checks, through an eBPF program, on kernel objects (e.g. files) if they should not be accessible (because of a following LSM hook check). Mickaël
Attachments
- signature.asc [application/pgp-signature] 488 bytes