Thread (7 messages) flat view 7 messages, 2 authors, 2016-11-29

Re: [PATCH RFC] user-namespaced file capabilities - now with even more magic

From: Serge E. Hallyn <hidden>
Date: 2016-11-29 21:29:57
Also in: lkml
Subsystem: the rest · Maintainer: Linus Torvalds

Quoting Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) (mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org):
On 11/25/2016 06:50 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
quoted
On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 09:33:50AM +0100, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
quoted
Hi Serge,

On 11/24/2016 11:52 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
quoted
Quoting Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) (mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org):
[...]
quoted
quoted
Could we have a man-pages patch for this feature? Presumably for 
user_namespaces(7) or capabilities(7).
capabilities.7 doesn't actually mention anything about user namespaces
right now.  
True. There's really just this:

   Interaction with user namespaces
       For a discussion of  the  interaction  of  capabilities  and  user
       namespaces, see user_namespaces(7).
quoted
I'll come up with a patch for both I think.  Do you have a
deadline for a new release coming up?
No deadlines as such. The last couple of years, as a sort of 
experiment, I've fallen into the same release cycle as the kernel
(typically making a release in the week or so after the kernel release),
and I am even using a similar numbering scheme. Ideally, the man-pages
patch would go into the release that corresponds to the kernel release
that makes the change.
Cool - I'll write something up in the next few weeks.
Obviously, the sooner you write it, the sooner others may read--and
perhaps test--it.
Hi,

first draft

https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/man-pages.git/commit/?h=2016-11-29/nscaps
From 62578b7cb2e0cbb100d1b29000de5657e9d998c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <redacted>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 15:25:37 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Describe the new namespaced file capabilities.

---
 man7/user_namespaces.7 | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
diff --git a/man7/user_namespaces.7 b/man7/user_namespaces.7
index 0c99df0..b1dd027 100644
--- a/man7/user_namespaces.7
+++ b/man7/user_namespaces.7
@@ -208,6 +208,41 @@ further removed descendant user namespaces as well.
 .\"
 .\" ============================================================
 .\"
+.SS File capabilities in user namespaces
+Until v4.9, writing file capabilities required the writer to possess
+.BR CAP_SETFCAP
+targeted at the initial user namespace.  In v4.10 a new version (v3) of the
+file capability extended attribute was introduced, which targets the
+capabilities at a namespace root userid.  This means that a task executing the
+file will receive elevated privilege only if it is running in a namespace whose
+root is mapped to the specified target uid.  If a task does not have
+.BR CAP_SETFCAP
+toward the user namespace which owns the filesystem hosting the file, then it
+can only write file capabilities targeted at uids mapped in the task's own
+namespace.
+
+As a detailed example, assume a user namespace where uid 0 is mapped to host
+uid 100000.  Root in the container writes a file capability.  If the file
+capability xattr is v2, then a v3 capability xattr targeted to 100000 will be
+written.
+
+If instead a v3 capability xattr is written, then the kernel will verify that
+the writer is privileged with
+.BR CAP_SETFCAP
+over its own namespace and that the file owner's uid and gid are mapped into
+the current task's namespace.
+
+The capability target uid which is written to disk is mapped into the
+filesystem's user namespace.  Therefore, in the above example, if uid 0 in the
+namespace (100000 on the host) mounted the filesystem, the target uid value
+actually written will be converted back to 0 (the mapped value for host uid
+100000).  In this case the mount will be treated as foreign for any tasks in
+the initial user namespace, so that the file capability (as well as setuid and
+setgid bits) will be ignored, preventing a leak of privilege.
+
+.\"
+.\" ============================================================
+.\"
 .SS Effect of capabilities within a user namespace
 Having a capability inside a user namespace
 permits a process to perform operations (that require privilege)
-- 
2.7.4
Keyboard shortcuts
hback out one level
jnext message in thread
kprevious message in thread
ldrill in
Escclose help / fold thread tree
?toggle this help