On Tue 2016-09-20 19:08:23, Mickaël Salaün wrote:

On 15/09/2016 11:19, Pavel Machek wrote:

quoted

Hi!

quoted

This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the
ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security
policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) called
Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones, to create
powerful security sandboxes comparable to the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the
OpenBSD Pledge. This kind of sandbox help to mitigate the security impact of
bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in userland applications.

The first RFC [1] was focused on extending seccomp while staying at the syscall
level. This brought a working PoC but with some (mitigated) ToCToU race
conditions due to the seccomp ptrace hole (now fixed) and the non-atomic
syscall argument evaluation (hence the LSM hooks).

Long and nice description follows. Should it go to Documentation/
somewhere?

Because some documentation would be useful...

Right, but I was looking for feedback before investing in documentation. :)

Heh. And I was hoping to learn what I'm reviewing. Too bad :-).

								Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html