Re: [PATCH 2/2] pipe: make pipe user buffer limit checks more precise

Hello Vegard,

On 08/17/2016 12:07 AM, Vegard Nossum wrote:

On 08/16/2016 01:14 PM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:

quoted

As currently implemented, when creating a new pipe or increasing
a pipe's capacity with fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ), the checks against
the limits in /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-{soft,hard} (added by
commit 759c01142a5d0) do not include the pages required for the
new pipe or increased capacity.  In the case of fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ),
this means that an unprivileged user can make a one-time capacity
increase that pushes the user consumption over the limits by up
to the value specified in /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size (which
defaults to 1 MiB, but might be set to a much higher value).

This patch remedies the problem by including the capacity required
for the new pipe or the pipe capacity increase in the check against
the limit.

There is a small chance that this change could break user-space,
since there are cases where pipe() and fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ) calls
that previously succeeded might fail. However, the chances are
small, since (a) the pipe-user-pages-{soft,hard} limits are new
(in 4.5), and the default soft/hard limits are high/unlimited.
Therefore, it seems warranted to make these limits operate more
precisely (and behave more like what users probably expect).

Using the test program shown in the previous patch, on an unpatched
kernel, we first set some limits:

     # echo 0 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-soft
     # echo 1000000000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
     # echo 10000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard    # 40.96 MB

Then show that we can set a pipe with capacity (100MB) that is
over the hard limit

     # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 100000000
     Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
         F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 134217728

Now set the capacity to 100MB twice. The second call fails (which is
probably surprising to most users, since it seems like a no-op):

     # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 100000000 0 100000000
     Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
         F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 134217728
     Loop 2: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
         Loop 2, pipe 0: F_SETPIPE_SZ failed: fcntl: Operation not permitted

With a patched kernel, setting a capacity over the limit fails at the
first attempt:

     # echo 0 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-soft
     # echo 1000000000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
     # echo 10000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard
     # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 100000000
         Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
             Loop 1, pipe 0: F_SETPIPE_SZ failed: fcntl: Operation not permitted

Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <redacted>
Cc: socketpair@gmail.com
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Jens Axboe <redacted>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <redacted>
---
  fs/pipe.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index a98ebca..397d8d9 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c

@@ -610,16 +610,20 @@ static void account_pipe_buffers(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
  	atomic_long_add(new - old, &pipe->user->pipe_bufs);
  }

-static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(struct user_struct *user)
+static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(struct user_struct *user,
+				       unsigned int nr_pages)
  {
  	return pipe_user_pages_soft &&
-	       atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) >= pipe_user_pages_soft;
+	       atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) + nr_pages >=
+			pipe_user_pages_soft;
  }

-static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(struct user_struct *user)
+static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(struct user_struct *user,
+				       unsigned int nr_pages)
  {
  	return pipe_user_pages_hard &&
-	       atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) >= pipe_user_pages_hard;
+	       atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) + nr_pages >=
+			pipe_user_pages_hard;
  }

  struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)

@@ -631,13 +635,13 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
  		unsigned long pipe_bufs = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
  		struct user_struct *user = get_current_user();

-		if (!too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user)) {
-			if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user))
-				pipe_bufs = 1;
+		if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user, PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS))

Why not pass pipe_bufs here instead of PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS?

Ahh yes. Using PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS here is equivalent, but pipe_bufs
would be better. I'll fix for the next iteration.
 

quoted

+			pipe_bufs = 1;
+
+		if (!too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user, pipe_bufs))
  			pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs,
  					     sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
  					     GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
-		}

  		if (pipe->bufs) {
  			init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);

Not your fault, but this function is a bit weird in that if the
too_many_pipe_buffers() calls fail, we'll return ENFILE to userspace?
Same if kcalloc() fails.

Yes, the error is a bit odd. I noticed this as I worked on these
patches, and at least documented the error for pipe(2). I'm not
sure whether we should care enough to change this now.

quoted

@@ -1132,8 +1136,8 @@ long pipe_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
  			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && size > pipe_max_size) {
  				ret = -EPERM;
  				goto out;
-			} else if ((too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
-				too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
+			} else if ((too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user, nr_pages) ||
+				too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user, nr_pages)) &&
  				!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
  				!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
  				ret = -EPERM;

Isn't there also a race where two or more concurrent pipe()/fnctl()
calls can together push us over the limits before the accounting is done?

I guess there is!

I think there really ought to be a check after doing the accounting if
we really want to be meticulous here.

Let me confirm what I understand from your comment: because of the race,
then a user could subvert the checks and allocate an arbitrary amount
of kernel memory for pipes. Right?

I'm not sure what you mean by "a check after doing the accounting". Is not the
only solution here some kind of lock around the check+accounting steps?

Thanks for fixing these and good catch!

You're welcome ;-).

Cheers,

Michael

-- 
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/