On Sat, Oct 17, 2015 at 5:58 PM, Tobias Markus [off-list ref] wrote:
One question remains though: Does this break userspace executables that
expect being able to create user namespaces without priviledge? Since
creating user namespaces without CAP_SYS_ADMIN was not possible before
Linux 3.8, programs should already expect a potential EPERM upon calling
clone. Since creating a user namespace without CAP_SYS_USER_NS would
also cause EPERM, we should be on the safe side.
In case of doubt, yes it will break existing software.
Hiding user namespaces behind CAP_SYS_USER_NS will not magically
make them secure.
--
Thanks,
//richard
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