On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 02:47:31PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 07:15:44PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
quoted
Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. This interface
is very useful for enumerating the files mapped into a process when
the more verbose information in /proc/<pid>/maps is not needed.
This patch moves the folder out from behind CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
removes the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restrictions. Following the links requires
the ability to ptrace the process in question, so this doesn't allow
an attacker to do anything they couldn't already do before.
Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <redacted>
Cc +linux-api@
Looks good to me, thanks! Though I would really appreciate if someone
from security camp take a look as well.