Re: [PATCH v4 3/6] x86/sev-es: Split up runtime #VC handler for correct state tracking
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: 2021-06-10 10:21:15
Also in:
linux-coco, lkml, virtualization
Bah, I suppose the trouble is that this SEV crap requires PARAVIRT? I should really get around to fixing noinstr validation with PARAVIRT on :-( On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 11:11:38AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
+static void vc_handle_from_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
static noinstr ...
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+{ + irqentry_state_t irq_state = irqentry_nmi_enter(regs); + instrumentation_begin(); + if (!vc_raw_handle_exception(regs, error_code)) { /* Show some debug info */ show_regs(regs);@@ -1434,7 +1400,59 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication) panic("Returned from Terminate-Request to Hypervisor\n"); } + instrumentation_end(); + irqentry_nmi_exit(regs, irq_state); +} + +static void vc_handle_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
static noinstr ...
+{
+ irqentry_state_t irq_state = irqentry_enter(regs);
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+
+ if (!vc_raw_handle_exception(regs, error_code)) {
+ /*
+ * Do not kill the machine if user-space triggered the
+ * exception. Send SIGBUS instead and let user-space deal with
+ * it.
+ */
+ force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_OBJERR, (void __user *)0);
+ }
+
+ instrumentation_end();
+ irqentry_exit(regs, irq_state);
+}+ linebreak
+/*
+ * Main #VC exception handler. It is called when the entry code was able to
+ * switch off the IST to a safe kernel stack.
+ *
+ * With the current implementation it is always possible to switch to a safe
+ * stack because #VC exceptions only happen at known places, like intercepted
+ * instructions or accesses to MMIO areas/IO ports. They can also happen with
+ * code instrumentation when the hypervisor intercepts #DB, but the critical
+ * paths are forbidden to be instrumented, so #DB exceptions currently also
+ * only happen in safe places.
+ */
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_SAFE_STACK(exc_vmm_communication)
+{
+ /*
+ * Handle #DB before calling into !noinstr code to avoid recursive #DB.
+ */
+ if (error_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + X86_TRAP_DB) {
+ vc_handle_trap_db(regs);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This is invoked through an interrupt gate, so IRQs are disabled. The
+ * code below might walk page-tables for user or kernel addresses, so
+ * keep the IRQs disabled to protect us against concurrent TLB flushes.
+ */
+
+ if (user_mode(regs))
+ vc_handle_from_user(regs, error_code);
+ else
+ vc_handle_from_kernel(regs, error_code);
}
#DB and MCE use idtentry_mce_db and split out in asm. When I look at
idtentry_vc, it appears to me that VC_SAFE_STACK already implies
from-user, or am I reading that wrong?
Ah, it appears you're muddling things up again by then also calling
safe_stack_ from exc_.
How about you don't do that and have exc_ call your new from_kernel
function, then we know that safe_stack_ is always from-user. Then also
maybe do:
s/VS_SAFE_STACK/VC_USER/
s/safe_stack_/noist_/
to match all the others (#DB/MCE).
Also, AFAICT, you don't actually need DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_IST, it doesn't
have an ASM counterpart.
So then you end up with something like:
DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC(exc_vc)
{
if (unlikely(on_vc_fallback_stack(regs))) {
instrumentation_begin();
panic("boohooo\n");
instrumentation_end();
}
vc_from_kernel();
}
DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_USER(exc_vc)
{
vc_from_user();
}
Which is, I'm thinking, much simpler, no?