Re: [syzbot] general protection fault in sock_from_file
From: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Date: 2021-08-31 11:27:01
Also in:
bpf, lkml, netdev
Possibly related (same subject, not in this thread)
- 2021-08-30 · Re: [syzbot] general protection fault in sock_from_file · Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
On 8/31/21 12:05 PM, Hao Xu wrote:
在 2021/8/31 下午5:42, Pavel Begunkov 写道:quoted
On 8/31/21 10:19 AM, Hao Xu wrote:quoted
在 2021/8/31 上午10:14, Jens Axboe 写道:quoted
On 8/30/21 2:45 PM, syzbot wrote:quoted
syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: HEAD commit: 93717cde744f Add linux-next specific files for 20210830 git tree: linux-next console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=15200fad300000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=c643ef5289990dd1 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f9704d1878e290eddf73 compiler: gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.1 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=111f5f9d300000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1651a415300000 IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: syzbot+f9704d1878e290eddf73@syzkaller.appspotmail.com general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f] CPU: 0 PID: 6548 Comm: syz-executor433 Not tainted 5.14.0-next-20210830-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:sock_from_file+0x20/0x90 net/socket.c:505 Code: f5 ff ff ff c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 53 48 89 fb e8 85 e9 62 fa 48 8d 7b 28 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 75 4f 45 31 e4 48 81 7b 28 80 f1 8a 8a 74 0c e8 58 e9 RSP: 0018:ffffc90002caf8e8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8713203b RDI: 0000000000000028 RBP: ffff888019fc0780 R08: ffffffff899aee40 R09: ffffffff81e21978 R10: 0000000000000027 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: 1ffff110033f80f9 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffff888019fc0780 FS: 00000000013b5300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004ae0f0 CR3: 000000001d355000 CR4: 00000000001506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: io_sendmsg+0x98/0x640 fs/io_uring.c:4681 io_issue_sqe+0x14de/0x6ba0 fs/io_uring.c:6578 __io_queue_sqe+0x90/0xb50 fs/io_uring.c:6864 io_req_task_submit+0xbf/0x1b0 fs/io_uring.c:2218 tctx_task_work+0x166/0x610 fs/io_uring.c:2143 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_signal include/linux/tracehook.h:212 [inline] handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:146 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x256/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:209 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:302 do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x43fd49Hao, this is due to: commit a8295b982c46d4a7c259a4cdd58a2681929068a9 Author: Hao Xu [off-list ref] Date: Fri Aug 27 17:46:09 2021 +0800 io_uring: fix failed linkchain code logic which causes some weirdly super long chains from that single sqe. Can you take a look, please?Sure, I'm working on this.Ah, saw it after sending a patch. It's nothing too curious, just a small error in logic. More interesting that we don't have a test case covering it, we should definitely add something.Saw your patch after coding my fix..😂 Since my email client doesn't receive your patch(only saw it in webpage https://lore.kernel.org/), I put my comment here:
Hmm, does it happen often? I'll CC you
quoted
fs/io_uring.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 473a977c7979..a531c7324ea8 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c@@ -6717,6 +6717,8 @@ static inline void io_queue_sqe(struct io_kiocb *req)if (likely(!(req->flags & (REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC | REQ_F_FAIL)))) { __io_queue_sqe(req); } else if (req->flags & REQ_F_FAIL) { + /* fail all, we don't submit */ + req->flags &= ~REQ_F_HARDLINK;maybe set REQ_F_LINK here?
if (unlikely((req->flags & REQ_F_FAIL) &&
!(req->flags & REQ_F_HARDLINK))) {
posted |= (req->link != NULL);
io_fail_links(req);
}
The problem is hardlink, normal will be failed. But there is indeed
a problem with both patches,
if (req->flags & (REQ_F_LINK | REQ_F_HARDLINK))
// kill linked
Will resend with some tests on top
quoted
io_req_complete_failed(req, req->result); } else { int ret = io_req_prep_async(req);
-- Pavel Begunkov