Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] http: store credential when PKI auth is used
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From: brian m. carlson <hidden>
Date: 2021-03-12 01:42:19
On 2021-03-12 at 00:48:41, John Szakmeister wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
We already looked for the PKI credentials in the credential store, but failed to approve it on success. Meaning, the PKI certificate password was never stored and git would request it on every connection to the remote. Let's complete the chain by storing the certificate password on success. Likewise, we also need to reject the credential when there is a failure. Curl appears to report client-related certificate issues are reported with the CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM error. This includes not only a bad password, but potentially other client certificate related problems. Since we cannot get more information from curl, we'll go ahead and reject the credential upon receiving that error, just to be safe and avoid caching or saving a bad password. Signed-off-by: John Szakmeister <redacted> --- http.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)diff --git a/http.c b/http.c index f8ea28bb2e..12a8aaba48 100644 --- a/http.c +++ b/http.c@@ -1637,7 +1637,17 @@ static int handle_curl_result(struct slot_results *results) credential_approve(&http_auth); if (proxy_auth.password) credential_approve(&proxy_auth); + credential_approve(&cert_auth); return HTTP_OK; + } else if (results->curl_result == CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM) { + /* + * We can't tell from here whether it's a bad path, bad + * certificate, bad password, or something else wrong + * with the certificate. So we reject the credential to + * avoid caching or saving a bad password. + */ + credential_reject(&http_auth);
Is this supposed to be &cert_auth here? I'm not sure how a bad HTTP password would even have been tested in this case. -- brian m. carlson (he/him or they/them) Houston, Texas, US
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