Thanks, Bryan.

To give the code pullers a chance to review, can we not have a
`trusted-hooks: default` and `trusted-SHA: <some sha>` field in .git/.
I'm assuming githooks/ are source tracked here.

When developer tries to execute `git commit`, git can ask developer to
change `trusted-hooks` field to true or false. Let's say developer
sets it to true, git can record the SHA. If any latest pull has the
hooks changed, git can revert the `trusted-hook` to default.

This way there is not much hassle for developers to manually copy
hooks all the time. And at the same time, they are not running scripts
that they haven't reviewed.

Will this work?



On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 11:23 AM, Bryan Turner [off-list ref] wrote:

On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 11:12 AM, Satyakiran Duggina
[off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

I see that `git init` creates a .git directory and hooks are to be
placed in that directory and these hooks are not tracked by version
control. To achieve tracked hooks, either each developer has to copy
the hooks or use tools like overcommit, pre-commit, husky etc.

I'm wondering why hooks are not made external like .gitignore. I guess
it would be better to have two git configuration directories in a
repo, one hosting all the metadata managed by git and the other with
user configured data (hooks, ignore/exclude, repo config etc).

Hooks are not external because they're not trusted. It essentially
amounts to allowing someone to download an arbitrary script or program
onto your computer which you then execute. It's extremely unsafe, and
is intentionally not possible. To get hooks in your instance, you have
to _manually_ install them. This gives you a chance to _review_ them
before they start executing on your system. Any other approach and the
hooks become an attack vector.

quoted

Kindly let me know why the current design choice is made and if the
proposed change would introduce unseen issues.


Thanks,
Satya

Hope this helps!
Bryan Turner

-- 
Regards & Thanks
Satya Kiran Duggina