Re: [PATCH v4 2/5] t5000: test tar files that overflow ustar headers
From: Jeff King <hidden>
Date: 2016-07-14 22:38:50
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 03:30:58PM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:
quoted
If we move to time_t everywhere, I think we'll need an extra TIME_T_IS_64BIT, but we can cross that bridge when we come to it. Likewise I think we'll need SIZE_T_IS_64BIT eventually (for real 32-bit systems; LLP64 systems like Windows will then be able to run the test).I guess I wrote essentially the same thing before refreshing my Inbox. I am a bit fuzzy between off_t and size_t; the former is for the size of things you see on the filesystem, while the latter is for you to give malloc(3). I would have thought that off_t is the type we would want at the end of the raw object header, denoting the size of a blob object when deflated, which could be larger than the size of a region of memory we can get from malloc(3), in which case we would use the streaming interface.
Yeah, your understanding is right (s/deflated/inflated/). I agree that
off_t is probably a better size for blobs. Traditionally git assumed any
object could fit in memory. The streaming interface helps that somewhat,
but I think there are cases where we still must load a blob (e.g., if it
is stored as a delta). In theory that never happens because of
core.bigfilethreshold, but you may get a packfile from somebody with a
higher threshold than you.
I wouldn't be surprised if there are other cases that aren't smart
enough to use the streaming interface yet, but the solution there is to
make them smarter. :)
So off_t is probably better. We do need to be careful, though, when
allocating objects. E.g., this:
off_t size;
struct git_istream *stream;
void *buf;
stream = open_istream(sha1, &type, &size, NULL);
buf = xmalloc(size);
while (1) {
/* read stream into buf */
}
is a security hole when size_t is less than off_t (it gets truncated in
the call to xmalloc, which allocates too few bytes). This is a toy
example, obviously, but it's something to watch out for.
-Peff