Re: [PATCH 2/2] http: use credential API to handle proxy authentication
From: Eric Sunshine <hidden>
Date: 2016-06-15 23:07:11
On Wednesday, November 4, 2015, Knut Franke [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Currently, the only way to pass proxy credentials to curl is by including them in the proxy URL. Usually, this means they will end up on disk unencrypted, one way or another (by inclusion in ~/.gitconfig, shell profile or history). Since proxy authentication often uses a domain user, credentials can be security sensitive; therefore, a safer way of passing credentials is desirable. If the configured proxy contains a username but not a password, query the credential API for one. Also, make sure we approve/reject proxy credentials properly. For consistency reasons, add parsing of http_proxy/https_proxy/all_proxy environment variables, which would otherwise be evaluated as a fallback by curl. Without this, we would have different semantics for git configuration and environment variables. Signed-off-by: Knut Franke <redacted> Helped-by: Junio C Hamano [off-list ref] Helped-by: Eric Sunshine [off-list ref] ---diff --git a/Documentation/config.txt b/Documentation/config.txt@@ -1593,9 +1593,13 @@ help.htmlPath:: http.proxy:: Override the HTTP proxy, normally configured using the 'http_proxy', - 'https_proxy', and 'all_proxy' environment variables (see - `curl(1)`). This can be overridden on a per-remote basis; see - remote.<name>.proxy + 'https_proxy', and 'all_proxy' environment variables (see `curl(1)`). In + addition to the syntax understood by curl, it is possible to specify a + proxy string with a user name but no password, in which case git will + attempt to acquire one in the same way it does for other credentials. See + linkgit:gitcredentials[7] for more information. The syntax thus is + '[protocol://][user[:password]@]proxyhost[:port]'. This can be overridden + on a per-remote basis; see remote.<name>.proxy
s/$/./ maybe?
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http.proxyAuthMethod:: Set the method with which to authenticate against the HTTP proxy. Thisdiff --git a/http.c b/http.c@@ -337,6 +342,24 @@ static void var_override(const char **var, char *value) static void init_curl_proxy_auth(CURL *result) { + if (proxy_auth.username) { + struct strbuf s = STRBUF_INIT; + if (!proxy_auth.password) + credential_fill(&proxy_auth); +#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071301 + curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXYUSERNAME, + proxy_auth.username); + curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXYPASSWORD, + proxy_auth.password);
The strbuf does not get released in this #if branch, but since no content was added, it doesn't need to be released, thus nothing is leaked. Good. Does the compiler warn about unused variable 's' in this #if branch?
+#else + strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&s, proxy_auth.username, 1); + strbuf_addch(&s, ':'); + strbuf_addstr_urlencode(&s, proxy_auth.password, 1); + curl_proxyuserpwd = strbuf_detach(&s, NULL); + curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROXYUSERPWD, curl_proxyuserpwd);
And this branch detaches content from the strbuf, and that memory is released later in http_cleanup(), so also nothing is leaked, thus all is good.
+#endif
+ }
+
var_override(&http_proxy_authmethod, getenv("GIT_HTTP_PROXY_AUTHMETHOD"));
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x070a07 /* CURLOPT_PROXYAUTH and CURLAUTH_ANY */