Re: git format-patch --in-reply-to allows header injection. Intended?

Niklas Hambüchen [off-list ref] writes:

For example, if you pass "--in-reply-to=<msgid>\nTo: <other@example.com"
(notice lack of trailing `>`), then the generated email will actually
contain a
  To: [off-list ref]
header.

While I do not think of a reason to specify such a string to the
in-reply-to option (I'd rather edit the output in the editor if I
wanted to do anything fancy [*1*]), I do not think there is a reason
why you want to add a code to forbid such use, either.


[Footnote]

*1* For that matter, --in-reply-to option itself is superfluous.

On 04/09/14 23:36, Junio C Hamano wrote:

While I do not think of a reason to specify such a string to the
in-reply-to option (I'd rather edit the output in the editor if I
wanted to do anything fancy [*1*]), I do not think there is a reason
why you want to add a code to forbid such use, either.

My question was to find out whether I can pass untrusted user input to
--in-reply-to and expect that no header beyond "In-Reply-To" and
"References" is modified, but your answer makes clear that I cannot.

A possible alternative might have been that git verifies that the input
to --in-reply-to matches the format specified RFC2822 (section 3.6.4.).

Thanks!