Re: [RFC] Authenticate push via PGP signature, not SSH

Johannes Sixt [off-list ref] wrote:

Shawn O. Pearce schrieb:

quoted

I'm currently finishing a side-band-64k protocol extension to the
send-pack/receive-pack pair.  My next task after I flush those
RFC patches out to the list tonight will be to prototype at least
some of the auth1 extension I described.

I propose to make the syntax of the extension

server capability:  auth=<list of hash methods>:<challenge>
client response:    auth=<chosen hash method>

where <challenge> is a random sequence of non-blank ASCII text, not
necessarily of a fixed length, but perhaps of a minimum length.

Then we can extend the list of hash algorithms (that are used for
authentication purposes) if people think that SHA1 is not secure enough:

    auth=SHA1,SHA256:random-stuff-goes-here

I'm not a security expert, so take this with a grain of salt.

I'm not certain this is worth the extra complexity.

One reason I proposed "auth-1" as the extension name is so we could
introduce an "auth-2" and make changes in the future if we need to.

But I think there's little value in this authentication hash being
anything other than SHA-1.  Remember that the data itself in the
packfile following the authentication is only protected by SHA-1.
If SHA-1 is considered too weak to protect the ref update commands
then its likely also too weak to protect the file content following
behind those same commands.

Getting stronger authentication here than SHA-1 would probably
require changing the commit object name hash to something stronger
than SHA-1, and the tree object name hash, etc.  Remember that
signed tags are only using the SHA-1 of the commit and that's only
got the SHA-1 of the tree... ;-)

-- 
Shawn.