[PATCH v2 2/2] ceph: fix out-of-bounds read in ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline()

The read offset is validated against i_size but never against
inline_len, and the two fields come from the MDS independently.  When
a read starts past the end of the inline data, the subtraction

	len = min_t(size_t, iinfo->inline_len - subreq->start, subreq->len);

underflows and min_t() ends up with subreq->len, so copy_to_iter()
reads past the end of the inline buffer straight into the user
buffer.  A malicious or buggy MDS reporting a short inline payload
together with an inflated i_size can thus leak kernel heap memory to
userspace.

Bail out with -ENODATA when the offset is not within the inline
data.

Fixes: 5b19f1eba459 ("ceph: make ceph_netfs_issue_op() handle inlined data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guanglei Zhu <redacted>
---

- set err = -ENODATA before bailing out on start >= inline_len, and
  correct the commit message: with err left at 0 the subreq completed
  with no progress, which netfs treats as EOF, not -ENODATA
  (reported by Alex Markuze)

 fs/ceph/addr.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c
index 3c7cf8a5e..dd33afca7 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/addr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c

@@ -321,6 +321,12 @@ static bool ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline(struct netfs_io_subrequest *subreq)
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	if (subreq->start >= iinfo->inline_len) {
+		ceph_mdsc_put_request(req);
+		err = -ENODATA;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	len = min_t(size_t, iinfo->inline_len - subreq->start, subreq->len);
 	err = copy_to_iter(iinfo->inline_data + subreq->start, len, &subreq->io_iter);
 	if (err == 0) {

-- 
2.43.0