[patch] vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption

Subsystems: the rest, virtio host (vhost), virtio host (vhost-scsi)

STALE4234d

2 messages, 2 authors, 2015-02-06 · open the first message on its own page

[patch] vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption

From: Dan Carpenter <hidden>
Date: 2015-02-05 07:37:33

This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.

I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid.  I have made that the limit
now.

In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <redacted>
---
Compile tested only.
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
index 3e265ef..4339222 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
@@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@ vhost_scsi_send_evt(struct vhost_scsi *vs,
 		 * lun[4-7] need to be zero according to virtio-scsi spec.
 		 */
 		evt->event.lun[0] = 0x01;
-		evt->event.lun[1] = tpg->tport_tpgt & 0xFF;
+		evt->event.lun[1] = tpg->tport_tpgt;
 		if (lun->unpacked_lun >= 256)
 			evt->event.lun[2] = lun->unpacked_lun >> 8 | 0x40 ;
 		evt->event.lun[3] = lun->unpacked_lun & 0xFF;
@@ -2149,12 +2149,12 @@ vhost_scsi_make_tpg(struct se_wwn *wwn,
 			struct vhost_scsi_tport, tport_wwn);
 
 	struct vhost_scsi_tpg *tpg;
-	unsigned long tpgt;
+	u16 tpgt;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (strstr(name, "tpgt_") != name)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	if (kstrtoul(name + 5, 10, &tpgt) || tpgt > UINT_MAX)
+	if (kstrtou16(name + 5, 10, &tpgt) || tpgt >= VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	tpg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct vhost_scsi_tpg), GFP_KERNEL);

Re: [patch] vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption

From: Nicholas A. Bellinger <hidden>
Date: 2015-02-06 18:48:16

On Thu, 2015-02-05 at 10:37 +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
quoted hunk
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.

I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid.  I have made that the limit
now.

In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <redacted>
---
Compile tested only.
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
index 3e265ef..4339222 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
@@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@ vhost_scsi_send_evt(struct vhost_scsi *vs,
 		 * lun[4-7] need to be zero according to virtio-scsi spec.
 		 */
 		evt->event.lun[0] = 0x01;
-		evt->event.lun[1] = tpg->tport_tpgt & 0xFF;
+		evt->event.lun[1] = tpg->tport_tpgt;
 		if (lun->unpacked_lun >= 256)
 			evt->event.lun[2] = lun->unpacked_lun >> 8 | 0x40 ;
 		evt->event.lun[3] = lun->unpacked_lun & 0xFF;
@@ -2149,12 +2149,12 @@ vhost_scsi_make_tpg(struct se_wwn *wwn,
 			struct vhost_scsi_tport, tport_wwn);
 
 	struct vhost_scsi_tpg *tpg;
-	unsigned long tpgt;
+	u16 tpgt;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (strstr(name, "tpgt_") != name)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	if (kstrtoul(name + 5, 10, &tpgt) || tpgt > UINT_MAX)
+	if (kstrtou16(name + 5, 10, &tpgt) || tpgt >= VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	tpg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct vhost_scsi_tpg), GFP_KERNEL);
Nice catch Dan.  Applied to target-pending/for-next.

--nab
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