Patch "KVM: cpuid: Fix read/write out-of-bounds vulnerability in cpuid emulation" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree
From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: 2017-06-12 08:12:17
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
KVM: cpuid: Fix read/write out-of-bounds vulnerability in cpuid emulation
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
kvm-cpuid-fix-read-write-out-of-bounds-vulnerability-in-cpuid-emulation.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let [off-list ref] know about it.
From a3641631d14571242eec0d30c9faa786cbf52d44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wanpeng Li <redacted>
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 01:22:07 -0700
Subject: KVM: cpuid: Fix read/write out-of-bounds vulnerability in cpuid emulation
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From: Wanpeng Li <redacted>
commit a3641631d14571242eec0d30c9faa786cbf52d44 upstream.
If "i" is the last element in the vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[] array, it
potentially can be exploited the vulnerability. this will out-of-bounds
read and write. Luckily, the effect is small:
/* when no next entry is found, the current entry[i] is reselected */
for (j = i + 1; ; j = (j + 1) % nent) {
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *ej = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[j];
if (ej->function == e->function) {
It reads ej->maxphyaddr, which is user controlled. However...
ej->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT;
After cpuid_entries there is
int maxphyaddr;
struct x86_emulate_ctxt emulate_ctxt; /* 16-byte aligned */
So we have:
- cpuid_entries at offset 1B50 (6992)
- maxphyaddr at offset 27D0 (6992 + 3200 = 10192)
- padding at 27D4...27DF
- emulate_ctxt at 27E0
And it writes in the padding. Pfew, writing the ops field of emulate_ctxt
would have been much worse.
This patch fixes it by modding the index to avoid the out-of-bounds
access. Worst case, i == j and ej->function == e->function,
the loop can bail out.
Reported-by: Moguofang <redacted>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <redacted>
Cc: Guofang Mo <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c@@ -737,18 +737,20 @@ out: static int move_to_next_stateful_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int i) { struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i]; - int j, nent = vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent; + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *ej; + int j = i; + int nent = vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent; e->flags &= ~KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT; /* when no next entry is found, the current entry[i] is reselected */ - for (j = i + 1; ; j = (j + 1) % nent) { - struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *ej = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[j]; - if (ej->function == e->function) { - ej->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT; - return j; - } - } - return 0; /* silence gcc, even though control never reaches here */ + do { + j = (j + 1) % nent; + ej = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[j]; + } while (ej->function != e->function); + + ej->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT; + + return j; } /* find an entry with matching function, matching index (if needed), and that
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from wanpeng.li@hotmail.com are queue-4.4/kvm-async_pf-fix-rcu_irq_enter-with-irqs-enabled.patch queue-4.4/kvm-async_pf-avoid-async-pf-injection-when-in-guest-mode.patch queue-4.4/kvm-cpuid-fix-read-write-out-of-bounds-vulnerability-in-cpuid-emulation.patch