Patch "fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: 2017-06-26 07:01:19
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers
to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
fs-exec.c-account-for-argv-envp-pointers.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let [off-list ref] know about it.
From 98da7d08850fb8bdeb395d6368ed15753304aa0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <redacted>
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 15:08:57 -0700
Subject: fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers
From: Kees Cook <redacted>
commit 98da7d08850fb8bdeb395d6368ed15753304aa0c upstream.
When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit,
the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means
that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack
limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the
pointers to the strings.
For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721
single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB /
4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the
remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884).
The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space
entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in
pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional commenting from Kees]
Fixes: b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622001720.GA32173@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <redacted>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <redacted>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c@@ -215,8 +215,26 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct if (write) { unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start; + unsigned long ptr_size; struct rlimit *rlim; + /* + * Since the stack will hold pointers to the strings, we + * must account for them as well. + * + * The size calculation is the entire vma while each arg page is + * built, so each time we get here it's calculating how far it + * is currently (rather than each call being just the newly + * added size from the arg page). As a result, we need to + * always add the entire size of the pointers, so that on the + * last call to get_arg_page() we'll actually have the entire + * correct size. + */ + ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); + if (ptr_size > ULONG_MAX - size) + goto fail; + size += ptr_size; + acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE); /*
@@ -234,13 +252,15 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct * to work from. */ rlim = current->signal->rlim; - if (size > ACCESS_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) { - put_page(page); - return NULL; - } + if (size > READ_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) + goto fail; } return page; + +fail: + put_page(page); + return NULL; } static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from keescook@chromium.org are queue-4.9/fs-exec.c-account-for-argv-envp-pointers.patch