[PATCH v4] virtio-net: Add validation for used length
From: Xie Yongji <hidden>
Date: 2021-05-31 16:43:15
This adds validation for used length (might come from an untrusted device) to avoid data corruption or loss. Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <redacted> --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
index 073fec4c0df1..ed969b65126e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
+++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c@@ -730,6 +730,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_small(struct net_device *dev, len -= vi->hdr_len; stats->bytes += len; + if (unlikely(len > GOOD_PACKET_LEN)) { + pr_debug("%s: rx error: len %u exceeds max size %d\n", + dev->name, len, GOOD_PACKET_LEN); + dev->stats.rx_length_errors++; + goto err_len; + } rcu_read_lock(); xdp_prog = rcu_dereference(rq->xdp_prog); if (xdp_prog) {
@@ -833,6 +839,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_small(struct net_device *dev, err_xdp: rcu_read_unlock(); stats->xdp_drops++; +err_len: stats->drops++; put_page(page); xdp_xmit:
@@ -886,6 +893,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable(struct net_device *dev, head_skb = NULL; stats->bytes += len - vi->hdr_len; + if (unlikely(len > truesize)) { + pr_debug("%s: rx error: len %u exceeds truesize %lu\n", + dev->name, len, (unsigned long)ctx); + dev->stats.rx_length_errors++; + goto err_skb; + } rcu_read_lock(); xdp_prog = rcu_dereference(rq->xdp_prog); if (xdp_prog) {
@@ -1012,13 +1025,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable(struct net_device *dev, } rcu_read_unlock(); - if (unlikely(len > truesize)) { - pr_debug("%s: rx error: len %u exceeds truesize %lu\n", - dev->name, len, (unsigned long)ctx); - dev->stats.rx_length_errors++; - goto err_skb; - } - head_skb = page_to_skb(vi, rq, page, offset, len, truesize, !xdp_prog, metasize, !!headroom); curr_skb = head_skb;
--
2.11.0