[PATCH 0/8] xen: harden frontends against malicious backends

STALE1855d

9 messages, 3 authors, 2021-05-21 · open the first message on its own page

[PATCH 0/8] xen: harden frontends against malicious backends

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Date: 2021-05-13 10:03:36

Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0
user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might
reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so
a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still
mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by
other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest).

Unfortunately many frontends in the Linux kernel are fully trusting
their respective backends. This series is starting to fix the most
important frontends: console, disk and network.

It was discussed to handle this as a security problem, but the topic
was discussed in public before, so it isn't a real secret.

Juergen Gross (8):
  xen: sync include/xen/interface/io/ring.h with Xen's newest version
  xen/blkfront: read response from backend only once
  xen/blkfront: don't take local copy of a request from the ring page
  xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
  xen/netfront: read response from backend only once
  xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page
  xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
  xen/hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value

 drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c    | 118 +++++++++-----
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c      | 184 ++++++++++++++-------
 drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c       |  15 +-
 include/xen/interface/io/ring.h | 278 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
 4 files changed, 369 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-)

-- 
2.26.2

[PATCH 5/8] xen/netfront: read response from backend only once

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Date: 2021-05-13 10:05:44

In order to avoid problems in case the backend is modifying a response
on the ring page while the frontend has already seen it, just read the
response into a local buffer in one go and then operate on that buffer
only.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
index 44275908d61a..f91e41ece554 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -399,13 +399,13 @@ static void xennet_tx_buf_gc(struct netfront_queue *queue)
 		rmb(); /* Ensure we see responses up to 'rp'. */
 
 		for (cons = queue->tx.rsp_cons; cons != prod; cons++) {
-			struct xen_netif_tx_response *txrsp;
+			struct xen_netif_tx_response txrsp;
 
-			txrsp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&queue->tx, cons);
-			if (txrsp->status == XEN_NETIF_RSP_NULL)
+			RING_COPY_RESPONSE(&queue->tx, cons, &txrsp);
+			if (txrsp.status == XEN_NETIF_RSP_NULL)
 				continue;
 
-			id  = txrsp->id;
+			id  = txrsp.id;
 			skb = queue->tx_skbs[id].skb;
 			if (unlikely(gnttab_query_foreign_access(
 				queue->grant_tx_ref[id]) != 0)) {
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ static int xennet_get_extras(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 			     RING_IDX rp)
 
 {
-	struct xen_netif_extra_info *extra;
+	struct xen_netif_extra_info extra;
 	struct device *dev = &queue->info->netdev->dev;
 	RING_IDX cons = queue->rx.rsp_cons;
 	int err = 0;
@@ -830,24 +830,22 @@ static int xennet_get_extras(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 			break;
 		}
 
-		extra = (struct xen_netif_extra_info *)
-			RING_GET_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, ++cons);
+		RING_COPY_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, ++cons, &extra);
 
-		if (unlikely(!extra->type ||
-			     extra->type >= XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX)) {
+		if (unlikely(!extra.type ||
+			     extra.type >= XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX)) {
 			if (net_ratelimit())
 				dev_warn(dev, "Invalid extra type: %d\n",
-					extra->type);
+					extra.type);
 			err = -EINVAL;
 		} else {
-			memcpy(&extras[extra->type - 1], extra,
-			       sizeof(*extra));
+			memcpy(&extras[extra.type - 1], &extra, sizeof(extra));
 		}
 
 		skb = xennet_get_rx_skb(queue, cons);
 		ref = xennet_get_rx_ref(queue, cons);
 		xennet_move_rx_slot(queue, skb, ref);
-	} while (extra->flags & XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_FLAG_MORE);
+	} while (extra.flags & XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_FLAG_MORE);
 
 	queue->rx.rsp_cons = cons;
 	return err;
@@ -905,7 +903,7 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 				struct sk_buff_head *list,
 				bool *need_xdp_flush)
 {
-	struct xen_netif_rx_response *rx = &rinfo->rx;
+	struct xen_netif_rx_response *rx = &rinfo->rx, rx_local;
 	int max = XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN + (rx->status <= RX_COPY_THRESHOLD);
 	RING_IDX cons = queue->rx.rsp_cons;
 	struct sk_buff *skb = xennet_get_rx_skb(queue, cons);
@@ -989,7 +987,8 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 			break;
 		}
 
-		rx = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, cons + slots);
+		RING_COPY_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, cons + slots, &rx_local);
+		rx = &rx_local;
 		skb = xennet_get_rx_skb(queue, cons + slots);
 		ref = xennet_get_rx_ref(queue, cons + slots);
 		slots++;
@@ -1044,10 +1043,11 @@ static int xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 	struct sk_buff *nskb;
 
 	while ((nskb = __skb_dequeue(list))) {
-		struct xen_netif_rx_response *rx =
-			RING_GET_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, ++cons);
+		struct xen_netif_rx_response rx;
 		skb_frag_t *nfrag = &skb_shinfo(nskb)->frags[0];
 
+		RING_COPY_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, ++cons, &rx);
+
 		if (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
 			unsigned int pull_to = NETFRONT_SKB_CB(skb)->pull_to;
 
@@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ static int xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 
 		skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags,
 				skb_frag_page(nfrag),
-				rx->offset, rx->status, PAGE_SIZE);
+				rx.offset, rx.status, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 		skb_shinfo(nskb)->nr_frags = 0;
 		kfree_skb(nskb);
@@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
 	i = queue->rx.rsp_cons;
 	work_done = 0;
 	while ((i != rp) && (work_done < budget)) {
-		memcpy(rx, RING_GET_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, i), sizeof(*rx));
+		RING_COPY_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, i, rx);
 		memset(extras, 0, sizeof(rinfo.extras));
 
 		err = xennet_get_responses(queue, &rinfo, rp, &tmpq,
-- 
2.26.2

[PATCH 6/8] xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Date: 2021-05-13 10:05:51

In order to avoid a malicious backend being able to influence the local
processing of a request build the request locally first and then copy
it to the ring page. Any reading from the request needs to be done on
the local instance.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
index f91e41ece554..261c35be0147 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -435,7 +435,8 @@ struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq {
 	struct netfront_queue *queue;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	struct page *page;
-	struct xen_netif_tx_request *tx; /* Last request */
+	struct xen_netif_tx_request *tx;      /* Last request on ring page */
+	struct xen_netif_tx_request tx_local; /* Last request local copy*/
 	unsigned int size;
 };
 
@@ -463,30 +464,27 @@ static void xennet_tx_setup_grant(unsigned long gfn, unsigned int offset,
 	queue->grant_tx_page[id] = page;
 	queue->grant_tx_ref[id] = ref;
 
-	tx->id = id;
-	tx->gref = ref;
-	tx->offset = offset;
-	tx->size = len;
-	tx->flags = 0;
+	info->tx_local.id = id;
+	info->tx_local.gref = ref;
+	info->tx_local.offset = offset;
+	info->tx_local.size = len;
+	info->tx_local.flags = 0;
+
+	*tx = info->tx_local;
 
 	info->tx = tx;
-	info->size += tx->size;
+	info->size += info->tx_local.size;
 }
 
 static struct xen_netif_tx_request *xennet_make_first_txreq(
-	struct netfront_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb,
-	struct page *page, unsigned int offset, unsigned int len)
+	struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq *info,
+	unsigned int offset, unsigned int len)
 {
-	struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq info = {
-		.queue = queue,
-		.skb = skb,
-		.page = page,
-		.size = 0,
-	};
+	info->size = 0;
 
-	gnttab_for_one_grant(page, offset, len, xennet_tx_setup_grant, &info);
+	gnttab_for_one_grant(info->page, offset, len, xennet_tx_setup_grant, info);
 
-	return info.tx;
+	return info->tx;
 }
 
 static void xennet_make_one_txreq(unsigned long gfn, unsigned int offset,
@@ -499,35 +497,27 @@ static void xennet_make_one_txreq(unsigned long gfn, unsigned int offset,
 	xennet_tx_setup_grant(gfn, offset, len, data);
 }
 
-static struct xen_netif_tx_request *xennet_make_txreqs(
-	struct netfront_queue *queue, struct xen_netif_tx_request *tx,
-	struct sk_buff *skb, struct page *page,
+static void xennet_make_txreqs(
+	struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq *info,
+	struct page *page,
 	unsigned int offset, unsigned int len)
 {
-	struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq info = {
-		.queue = queue,
-		.skb = skb,
-		.tx = tx,
-	};
-
 	/* Skip unused frames from start of page */
 	page += offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	offset &= ~PAGE_MASK;
 
 	while (len) {
-		info.page = page;
-		info.size = 0;
+		info->page = page;
+		info->size = 0;
 
 		gnttab_foreach_grant_in_range(page, offset, len,
 					      xennet_make_one_txreq,
-					      &info);
+					      info);
 
 		page++;
 		offset = 0;
-		len -= info.size;
+		len -= info->size;
 	}
-
-	return info.tx;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -580,10 +570,14 @@ static int xennet_xdp_xmit_one(struct net_device *dev,
 {
 	struct netfront_info *np = netdev_priv(dev);
 	struct netfront_stats *tx_stats = this_cpu_ptr(np->tx_stats);
+	struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq info = {
+		.queue = queue,
+		.skb = NULL,
+		.page = virt_to_page(xdpf->data),
+	};
 	int notify;
 
-	xennet_make_first_txreq(queue, NULL,
-				virt_to_page(xdpf->data),
+	xennet_make_first_txreq(&info,
 				offset_in_page(xdpf->data),
 				xdpf->len);
 
@@ -647,6 +641,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev
 	unsigned int len;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct netfront_queue *queue = NULL;
+	struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq info = { };
 	unsigned int num_queues = dev->real_num_tx_queues;
 	u16 queue_index;
 	struct sk_buff *nskb;
@@ -704,14 +699,16 @@ static netdev_tx_t xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev
 	}
 
 	/* First request for the linear area. */
-	first_tx = tx = xennet_make_first_txreq(queue, skb,
-						page, offset, len);
+	info.queue = queue;
+	info.skb = skb;
+	info.page = page;
+	first_tx = tx = xennet_make_first_txreq(&info, offset, len);
 	offset += tx->size;
 	if (offset == PAGE_SIZE) {
 		page++;
 		offset = 0;
 	}
-	len -= tx->size;
+	len -= info.tx_local.size;
 
 	if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
 		/* local packet? */
@@ -741,12 +738,12 @@ static netdev_tx_t xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev
 	}
 
 	/* Requests for the rest of the linear area. */
-	tx = xennet_make_txreqs(queue, tx, skb, page, offset, len);
+	xennet_make_txreqs(&info, page, offset, len);
 
 	/* Requests for all the frags. */
 	for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
 		skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
-		tx = xennet_make_txreqs(queue, tx, skb, skb_frag_page(frag),
+		xennet_make_txreqs(&info, skb_frag_page(frag),
 					skb_frag_off(frag),
 					skb_frag_size(frag));
 	}
-- 
2.26.2

[PATCH 7/8] xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Date: 2021-05-13 10:05:58

Today netfront will trust the backend to send only sane response data.
In order to avoid privilege escalations or crashes in case of malicious
backends verify the data to be within expected limits. Especially make
sure that the response always references an outstanding request.

Note that only the tx queue needs special id handling, as for the rx
queue the id is equal to the index in the ring page.

Introduce a new indicator for the device whether it is broken and let
the device stop working when it is set. Set this indicator in case the
backend sets any weird data.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
index 261c35be0147..ccd6d1389b0a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ struct netfront_queue {
 
 	struct page_pool *page_pool;
 	struct xdp_rxq_info xdp_rxq;
+
+	bool tx_pending[NET_TX_RING_SIZE];
 };
 
 struct netfront_info {
@@ -173,6 +175,9 @@ struct netfront_info {
 	bool netback_has_xdp_headroom;
 	bool netfront_xdp_enabled;
 
+	/* Is device behaving sane? */
+	bool broken;
+
 	atomic_t rx_gso_checksum_fixup;
 };
 
@@ -363,7 +368,7 @@ static int xennet_open(struct net_device *dev)
 	unsigned int i = 0;
 	struct netfront_queue *queue = NULL;
 
-	if (!np->queues)
+	if (!np->queues || np->broken)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < num_queues; ++i) {
@@ -391,11 +396,17 @@ static void xennet_tx_buf_gc(struct netfront_queue *queue)
 	unsigned short id;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	bool more_to_do;
+	const struct device *dev = &queue->info->netdev->dev;
 
 	BUG_ON(!netif_carrier_ok(queue->info->netdev));
 
 	do {
 		prod = queue->tx.sring->rsp_prod;
+		if (RING_RESPONSE_PROD_OVERFLOW(&queue->tx, prod)) {
+			dev_alert(dev, "Illegal number of responses %u\n",
+				  prod - queue->tx.rsp_cons);
+			goto err;
+		}
 		rmb(); /* Ensure we see responses up to 'rp'. */
 
 		for (cons = queue->tx.rsp_cons; cons != prod; cons++) {
@@ -406,12 +417,25 @@ static void xennet_tx_buf_gc(struct netfront_queue *queue)
 				continue;
 
 			id  = txrsp.id;
+			if (id >= RING_SIZE(&queue->tx)) {
+				dev_alert(dev,
+					  "Response has incorrect id (%u)\n",
+					  id);
+				goto err;
+			}
+			if (!queue->tx_pending[id]) {
+				dev_alert(dev,
+					  "Response for inactive request\n");
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+			queue->tx_pending[id] = false;
 			skb = queue->tx_skbs[id].skb;
 			if (unlikely(gnttab_query_foreign_access(
 				queue->grant_tx_ref[id]) != 0)) {
-				pr_alert("%s: warning -- grant still in use by backend domain\n",
-					 __func__);
-				BUG();
+				dev_alert(dev,
+					  "Grant still in use by backend domain\n");
+				goto err;
 			}
 			gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(
 				queue->grant_tx_ref[id], GNTMAP_readonly);
@@ -429,6 +453,12 @@ static void xennet_tx_buf_gc(struct netfront_queue *queue)
 	} while (more_to_do);
 
 	xennet_maybe_wake_tx(queue);
+
+	return;
+
+ err:
+	queue->info->broken = true;
+	dev_alert(dev, "Disabled for further use\n");
 }
 
 struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq {
@@ -472,6 +502,13 @@ static void xennet_tx_setup_grant(unsigned long gfn, unsigned int offset,
 
 	*tx = info->tx_local;
 
+	/*
+	 * The request is not in its final form, as size and flags might be
+	 * modified later, but even if a malicious backend will send a response
+	 * now, nothing bad regarding security could happen.
+	 */
+	queue->tx_pending[id] = true;
+
 	info->tx = tx;
 	info->size += info->tx_local.size;
 }
@@ -605,6 +642,8 @@ static int xennet_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int n,
 	int nxmit = 0;
 	int i;
 
+	if (unlikely(np->broken))
+		return -ENODEV;
 	if (unlikely(flags & ~XDP_XMIT_FLAGS_MASK))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -649,6 +688,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev
 	/* Drop the packet if no queues are set up */
 	if (num_queues < 1)
 		goto drop;
+	if (unlikely(np->broken))
+		goto drop;
 	/* Determine which queue to transmit this SKB on */
 	queue_index = skb_get_queue_mapping(skb);
 	queue = &np->queues[queue_index];
@@ -1153,6 +1194,13 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
 	skb_queue_head_init(&tmpq);
 
 	rp = queue->rx.sring->rsp_prod;
+	if (RING_RESPONSE_PROD_OVERFLOW(&queue->rx, rp)) {
+		dev_alert(&dev->dev, "Illegal number of responses %u\n",
+			  rp - queue->rx.rsp_cons);
+		queue->info->broken = true;
+		spin_unlock(&queue->rx_lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
 	rmb(); /* Ensure we see queued responses up to 'rp'. */
 
 	i = queue->rx.rsp_cons;
@@ -1373,6 +1421,9 @@ static irqreturn_t xennet_tx_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
 	struct netfront_queue *queue = dev_id;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	if (queue->info->broken)
+		return IRQ_HANDLED;
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->tx_lock, flags);
 	xennet_tx_buf_gc(queue);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->tx_lock, flags);
@@ -1385,6 +1436,9 @@ static irqreturn_t xennet_rx_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
 	struct netfront_queue *queue = dev_id;
 	struct net_device *dev = queue->info->netdev;
 
+	if (queue->info->broken)
+		return IRQ_HANDLED;
+
 	if (likely(netif_carrier_ok(dev) &&
 		   RING_HAS_UNCONSUMED_RESPONSES(&queue->rx)))
 		napi_schedule(&queue->napi);
@@ -1406,6 +1460,10 @@ static void xennet_poll_controller(struct net_device *dev)
 	struct netfront_info *info = netdev_priv(dev);
 	unsigned int num_queues = dev->real_num_tx_queues;
 	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (info->broken)
+		return;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < num_queues; ++i)
 		xennet_interrupt(0, &info->queues[i]);
 }
@@ -1477,6 +1535,11 @@ static int xennet_xdp_set(struct net_device *dev, struct bpf_prog *prog,
 
 static int xennet_xdp(struct net_device *dev, struct netdev_bpf *xdp)
 {
+	struct netfront_info *np = netdev_priv(dev);
+
+	if (np->broken)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
 	switch (xdp->command) {
 	case XDP_SETUP_PROG:
 		return xennet_xdp_set(dev, xdp->prog, xdp->extack);
-- 
2.26.2

Re: [PATCH 5/8] xen/netfront: read response from backend only once

From: Jan Beulich <hidden>
Date: 2021-05-17 14:24:05

On 13.05.2021 12:02, Juergen Gross wrote:
In order to avoid problems in case the backend is modifying a response
on the ring page while the frontend has already seen it, just read the
response into a local buffer in one go and then operate on that buffer
only.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <redacted>
with one remark:
quoted hunk
@@ -830,24 +830,22 @@ static int xennet_get_extras(struct netfront_queue *queue,
 			break;
 		}
 
-		extra = (struct xen_netif_extra_info *)
-			RING_GET_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, ++cons);
+		RING_COPY_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, ++cons, &extra);
 
-		if (unlikely(!extra->type ||
-			     extra->type >= XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX)) {
+		if (unlikely(!extra.type ||
+			     extra.type >= XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX)) {
 			if (net_ratelimit())
 				dev_warn(dev, "Invalid extra type: %d\n",
-					extra->type);
+					extra.type);
 			err = -EINVAL;
 		} else {
-			memcpy(&extras[extra->type - 1], extra,
-			       sizeof(*extra));
+			memcpy(&extras[extra.type - 1], &extra, sizeof(extra));
Maybe take the opportunity and switch to (type safe) structure
assignment?

Jan

Re: [PATCH 5/8] xen/netfront: read response from backend only once

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Date: 2021-05-17 14:28:58

On 17.05.21 16:20, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 13.05.2021 12:02, Juergen Gross wrote:
quoted
In order to avoid problems in case the backend is modifying a response
on the ring page while the frontend has already seen it, just read the
response into a local buffer in one go and then operate on that buffer
only.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <redacted>
with one remark:
quoted
@@ -830,24 +830,22 @@ static int xennet_get_extras(struct netfront_queue *queue,
  			break;
  		}
  
-		extra = (struct xen_netif_extra_info *)
-			RING_GET_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, ++cons);
+		RING_COPY_RESPONSE(&queue->rx, ++cons, &extra);
  
-		if (unlikely(!extra->type ||
-			     extra->type >= XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX)) {
+		if (unlikely(!extra.type ||
+			     extra.type >= XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX)) {
  			if (net_ratelimit())
  				dev_warn(dev, "Invalid extra type: %d\n",
-					extra->type);
+					extra.type);
  			err = -EINVAL;
  		} else {
-			memcpy(&extras[extra->type - 1], extra,
-			       sizeof(*extra));
+			memcpy(&extras[extra.type - 1], &extra, sizeof(extra));
Maybe take the opportunity and switch to (type safe) structure
assignment?
Yes, good idea.


Juergen

Re: [PATCH 6/8] xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page

From: Jan Beulich <hidden>
Date: 2021-05-17 15:21:50

On 13.05.2021 12:03, Juergen Gross wrote:
In order to avoid a malicious backend being able to influence the local
processing of a request build the request locally first and then copy
it to the ring page. Any reading from the request needs to be done on
the local instance.
"Any reading" isn't really true - you don't change xennet_make_one_txreq(),
yet that has a read-modify-write operation. Without that I would have
been inclined to ask whether ...
quoted hunk
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -435,7 +435,8 @@ struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq {
 	struct netfront_queue *queue;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	struct page *page;
-	struct xen_netif_tx_request *tx; /* Last request */
+	struct xen_netif_tx_request *tx;      /* Last request on ring page */
+	struct xen_netif_tx_request tx_local; /* Last request local copy*/
... retaining the tx field here is a good idea.
quoted hunk
@@ -463,30 +464,27 @@ static void xennet_tx_setup_grant(unsigned long gfn, unsigned int offset,
 	queue->grant_tx_page[id] = page;
 	queue->grant_tx_ref[id] = ref;
 
-	tx->id = id;
-	tx->gref = ref;
-	tx->offset = offset;
-	tx->size = len;
-	tx->flags = 0;
+	info->tx_local.id = id;
+	info->tx_local.gref = ref;
+	info->tx_local.offset = offset;
+	info->tx_local.size = len;
+	info->tx_local.flags = 0;
+
+	*tx = info->tx_local;
 
 	info->tx = tx;
-	info->size += tx->size;
+	info->size += info->tx_local.size;
 }
 
 static struct xen_netif_tx_request *xennet_make_first_txreq(
-	struct netfront_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb,
-	struct page *page, unsigned int offset, unsigned int len)
+	struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq *info,
+	unsigned int offset, unsigned int len)
 {
-	struct xennet_gnttab_make_txreq info = {
-		.queue = queue,
-		.skb = skb,
-		.page = page,
-		.size = 0,
-	};
+	info->size = 0;
 
-	gnttab_for_one_grant(page, offset, len, xennet_tx_setup_grant, &info);
+	gnttab_for_one_grant(info->page, offset, len, xennet_tx_setup_grant, info);
 
-	return info.tx;
+	return info->tx;
 }
Similarly this returning of a pointer into the ring looks at least
risky to me. At the very least it looks as if ...
quoted hunk
@@ -704,14 +699,16 @@ static netdev_tx_t xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev
 	}
 
 	/* First request for the linear area. */
-	first_tx = tx = xennet_make_first_txreq(queue, skb,
-						page, offset, len);
+	info.queue = queue;
+	info.skb = skb;
+	info.page = page;
+	first_tx = tx = xennet_make_first_txreq(&info, offset, len);
... you could avoid setting tx here; perhaps the local variable
could go away altogether, showing it's really just first_rx that
is still needed. It's odd that ...
 	offset += tx->size;
... you don't change this one, when ...
 	if (offset == PAGE_SIZE) {
 		page++;
 		offset = 0;
 	}
-	len -= tx->size;
+	len -= info.tx_local.size;
... you do so here. Likely just an oversight.

Jan

Re: [PATCH 7/8] xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly

From: Jan Beulich <hidden>
Date: 2021-05-17 15:49:20

On 13.05.2021 12:03, Juergen Gross wrote:
quoted hunk
@@ -429,6 +453,12 @@ static void xennet_tx_buf_gc(struct netfront_queue *queue)
 	} while (more_to_do);
 
 	xennet_maybe_wake_tx(queue);
+
+	return;
+
+ err:
+	queue->info->broken = true;
+	dev_alert(dev, "Disabled for further use\n");
 }
If in blkfront the ability to revive a device via a suspend/resume cycle
is "a nice side effect", wouldn't it be nice for all frontends to behave
similarly in this regard? I.e. wouldn't you want to also clear this flag
somewhere? And shouldn't additionally / more generally a disconnect /
connect cycle allow proper operation again?
quoted hunk
@@ -472,6 +502,13 @@ static void xennet_tx_setup_grant(unsigned long gfn, unsigned int offset,
 
 	*tx = info->tx_local;
 
+	/*
+	 * The request is not in its final form, as size and flags might be
+	 * modified later, but even if a malicious backend will send a response
+	 * now, nothing bad regarding security could happen.
+	 */
+	queue->tx_pending[id] = true;
I'm not sure I can agree with what the comment says. If the backend
sent a response prematurely, wouldn't the underlying slot(s) become
available for re-use, and hence potentially get filled / updated by
two parties?

Jan

Re: [PATCH 0/8] xen: harden frontends against malicious backends

From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <hidden>
Date: 2021-05-21 10:43:15

On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 12:02:54PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0
user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might
reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so
a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still
mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by
other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest).

Unfortunately many frontends in the Linux kernel are fully trusting
their respective backends. This series is starting to fix the most
important frontends: console, disk and network.

It was discussed to handle this as a security problem, but the topic
was discussed in public before, so it isn't a real secret.
Is it based on patches we ship in Qubes[1] and also I've sent here some
years ago[2]? I see a lot of similarities. If not, you may want to
compare them.

[1] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-kernel/
[2] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-04/msg02336.html

Juergen Gross (8):
  xen: sync include/xen/interface/io/ring.h with Xen's newest version
  xen/blkfront: read response from backend only once
  xen/blkfront: don't take local copy of a request from the ring page
  xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
  xen/netfront: read response from backend only once
  xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page
  xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
  xen/hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value

 drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c    | 118 +++++++++-----
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c      | 184 ++++++++++++++-------
 drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c       |  15 +-
 include/xen/interface/io/ring.h | 278 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
 4 files changed, 369 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-)

-- 
2.26.2
-- 
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
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