These patches prevent an infinite loop for gso packets with a protocol
from virtio net hdr that doesn't match the protocol in the packet.
Note that packets coming from a device without
header_ops->parse_protocol being implemented will not be caught by
the check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb, but the infinite loop will still
be prevented by the check in the gso layer.
Changes from v2 to v3:
- Remove unused *eth.
- Use MPLS_HLEN to also check if the MPLS header length is a multiple
of four.
Balazs Nemeth (2):
net: check if protocol extracted by virtio_net_hdr_set_proto is
correct
net: avoid infinite loop in mpls_gso_segment when mpls_hlen == 0
include/linux/virtio_net.h | 7 ++++++-
net/mpls/mpls_gso.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.29.2
A packet with skb_inner_network_header(skb) == skb_network_header(skb)
and ETH_P_MPLS_UC will prevent mpls_gso_segment from pulling any headers
from the packet. Subsequently, the call to skb_mac_gso_segment will
again call mpls_gso_segment with the same packet leading to an infinite
loop. In addition, ensure that the header length is a multiple of four,
which should hold irrespective of the number of stacked labels.
Signed-off-by: Balazs Nemeth <redacted>
---
net/mpls/mpls_gso.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
For gso packets, virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets the protocol (if it isn't
set) based on the type in the virtio net hdr, but the skb could contain
anything since it could come from packet_snd through a raw socket. If
there is a mismatch between what virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets and
the actual protocol, then the skb could be handled incorrectly later
on.
An example where this poses an issue is with the subsequent call to
skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic which relies on skb->protocol being set
correctly. A specially crafted packet could fool
skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic preventing EINVAL to be returned.
Avoid blindly trusting the information provided by the virtio net header
by checking that the protocol in the packet actually matches the
protocol set by virtio_net_hdr_set_proto. Note that since the protocol
is only checked if skb->dev implements header_ops->parse_protocol,
packets from devices without the implementation are not checked at this
stage.
Fixes: 9274124f023b ("net: stricter validation of untrusted gso packets")
Signed-off-by: Balazs Nemeth <redacted>
---
include/linux/virtio_net.h | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com> Date: 2021-03-09 14:31:15
On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 6:32 AM Balazs Nemeth [off-list ref] wrote:
A packet with skb_inner_network_header(skb) == skb_network_header(skb)
and ETH_P_MPLS_UC will prevent mpls_gso_segment from pulling any headers
from the packet. Subsequently, the call to skb_mac_gso_segment will
again call mpls_gso_segment with the same packet leading to an infinite
loop. In addition, ensure that the header length is a multiple of four,
which should hold irrespective of the number of stacked labels.
Signed-off-by: Balazs Nemeth <redacted>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
The compiler will convert that modulo into a cheap & (ETH_HLEN - 1)
test for this constant.
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com> Date: 2021-03-09 14:37:26
On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 6:32 AM Balazs Nemeth [off-list ref] wrote:
For gso packets, virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets the protocol (if it isn't
set) based on the type in the virtio net hdr, but the skb could contain
anything since it could come from packet_snd through a raw socket. If
there is a mismatch between what virtio_net_hdr_set_proto sets and
the actual protocol, then the skb could be handled incorrectly later
on.
An example where this poses an issue is with the subsequent call to
skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic which relies on skb->protocol being set
correctly. A specially crafted packet could fool
skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic preventing EINVAL to be returned.
Avoid blindly trusting the information provided by the virtio net header
by checking that the protocol in the packet actually matches the
protocol set by virtio_net_hdr_set_proto. Note that since the protocol
is only checked if skb->dev implements header_ops->parse_protocol,
packets from devices without the implementation are not checked at this
stage.
Fixes: 9274124f023b ("net: stricter validation of untrusted gso packets")
Signed-off-by: Balazs Nemeth <redacted>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
This still relies entirely on data from the untrusted process. But it
adds the constraint that the otherwise untrusted data at least has to
be consistent, closing one loophole.
As responded in v2, we may want to look at the (few) callers and make
sure that they initialize skb->protocol before the call to
virtio_net_hdr_to_skb where possible. That will avoid this entire
branch.
From: David Ahern <hidden> Date: 2021-03-09 15:56:53
On 3/9/21 4:31 AM, Balazs Nemeth wrote:
A packet with skb_inner_network_header(skb) == skb_network_header(skb)
and ETH_P_MPLS_UC will prevent mpls_gso_segment from pulling any headers
from the packet. Subsequently, the call to skb_mac_gso_segment will
again call mpls_gso_segment with the same packet leading to an infinite
loop. In addition, ensure that the header length is a multiple of four,
which should hold irrespective of the number of stacked labels.
Signed-off-by: Balazs Nemeth <redacted>
---
net/mpls/mpls_gso.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
Hello:
This series was applied to netdev/net.git (refs/heads/master):
On Tue, 9 Mar 2021 12:30:59 +0100 you wrote:
These patches prevent an infinite loop for gso packets with a protocol
from virtio net hdr that doesn't match the protocol in the packet.
Note that packets coming from a device without
header_ops->parse_protocol being implemented will not be caught by
the check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb, but the infinite loop will still
be prevented by the check in the gso layer.
[...]