From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit c48fc11b69e95007109206311b0187a3090591f3 ]
When sendmsg() finds a call to continue on with, if the call is in an
inappropriate state, it doesn't release the ref it just got on that call
before returning an error.
This causes the following symptom to show up with kasan:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rxrpc_send_keepalive+0x8a2/0x940
net/rxrpc/output.c:635
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888064219698 by task kworker/0:3/11077
where line 635 is:
whdr.epoch = htonl(peer->local->rxnet->epoch);
The local endpoint (which cannot be pinned by the call) has been released,
but not the peer (which is pinned by the call).
Fix this by releasing the call in the error path.
Fixes: 37411cad633f ("rxrpc: Fix potential NULL-pointer exception")
Reported-by: syzbot+d850c266e3df14da1d31@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 55f6c98e3674ce16038a1949c3f9ca5a9a99f289 ]
rxrpc_put_peer() calls trace_rxrpc_peer() after it has done the decrement
of the refcount - which looks at the debug_id in the peer record. But
unless the refcount was reduced to zero, we no longer have the right to
look in the record and, indeed, it may be deleted by some other thread.
Fix this by getting the debug_id out before decrementing the refcount and
then passing that into the tracepoint.
This can cause the following symptoms:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __rxrpc_put_peer net/rxrpc/peer_object.c:411
[inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rxrpc_put_peer+0x685/0x6a0
net/rxrpc/peer_object.c:435
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888097ec0058 by task syz-executor823/24216
Fixes: 1159d4b496f5 ("rxrpc: Add a tracepoint to track rxrpc_peer refcounting")
Reported-by: syzbot+b9be979c55f2bea8ed30@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 6 +++---
net/rxrpc/peer_object.c | 11 +++++++----
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
@@ -197,29 +197,22 @@ static int llc_sap_next_state(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb)*Afterexecutingactionsoftheevent,upperlayerwillbeindicated*ifneeded(onreceivinganUIframe).skcanbenullforthe*datalink_protocase.+*+*Thisfunctionalwaysconsumesareferencetotheskb.*/staticvoidllc_sap_state_process(structllc_sap*sap,structsk_buff*skb){structllc_sap_state_ev*ev=llc_sap_ev(skb);-/*-*Wehavetoholdtheskb,becausellc_sap_next_state-*willkfreeitinthesendingpathandweneedto-*lookattheskb->cb,whereweencodellc_sap_state_ev.-*/-skb_get(skb);ev->ind_cfm_flag=0;llc_sap_next_state(sap,skb);-if(ev->ind_cfm_flag==LLC_IND){-if(skb->sk->sk_state==TCP_LISTEN)-kfree_skb(skb);-else{-llc_save_primitive(skb->sk,skb,ev->prim);-/* queue skb to the user. */-if(sock_queue_rcv_skb(skb->sk,skb))-kfree_skb(skb);-}+if(ev->ind_cfm_flag==LLC_IND&&skb->sk->sk_state!=TCP_LISTEN){+llc_save_primitive(skb->sk,skb,ev->prim);++/* queue skb to the user. */+if(sock_queue_rcv_skb(skb->sk,skb)==0)+return;}kfree_skb(skb);}
@@ -193,11 +193,11 @@ int llc_conn_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)returnrc;}-intllc_conn_send_pdu(structsock*sk,structsk_buff*skb)+voidllc_conn_send_pdu(structsock*sk,structsk_buff*skb){/* queue PDU to send to MAC layer */skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue,skb);-returnllc_conn_send_pdus(sk,skb);+llc_conn_send_pdus(sk);}/**
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ void llc_conn_resend_i_pdu_as_cmd(struct sock *sk, u8 nr, u8 first_p_bit)if(howmany_resend>0)llc->vS=(llc->vS+1)%LLC_2_SEQ_NBR_MODULO;/* any PDUs to re-send are queued up; start sending to MAC */-llc_conn_send_pdus(sk,NULL);+llc_conn_send_pdus(sk);out:;}
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ void llc_conn_resend_i_pdu_as_rsp(struct sock *sk, u8 nr, u8 first_f_bit)if(howmany_resend>0)llc->vS=(llc->vS+1)%LLC_2_SEQ_NBR_MODULO;/* any PDUs to re-send are queued up; start sending to MAC */-llc_conn_send_pdus(sk,NULL);+llc_conn_send_pdus(sk);out:;}
From: Dag Moxnes <redacted>
[ Upstream commit bf1867db9b850fff2dd54a1a117a684a10b8cd90 ]
Add the RDMA cookie and RX timestamp to the usercopy whitelist.
After the introduction of hardened usercopy whitelisting
(https://lwn.net/Articles/727322/), a warning is displayed when the
RDMA cookie or RX timestamp is copied to userspace:
kernel: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 5750 at
mm/usercopy.c:81 usercopy_warn+0x8e/0xa6
[...]
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: __check_heap_object+0xb8/0x11b
kernel: __check_object_size+0xe3/0x1bc
kernel: put_cmsg+0x95/0x115
kernel: rds_recvmsg+0x43d/0x620 [rds]
kernel: sock_recvmsg+0x43/0x4a
kernel: ___sys_recvmsg+0xda/0x1e6
kernel: ? __handle_mm_fault+0xcae/0xf79
kernel: __sys_recvmsg+0x51/0x8a
kernel: SyS_recvmsg+0x12/0x1c
kernel: do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1ae
When the whitelisting feature was introduced, the memory for the RDMA
cookie and RX timestamp in RDS was not added to the whitelist, causing
the warning above.
Signed-off-by: Dag Moxnes <redacted>
Tested-by: Jenny <redacted>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <redacted>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/rds/ib_recv.c | 11 ++++++++---
net/rds/rds.h | 9 +++++++--
net/rds/recv.c | 22 ++++++++++++----------
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
@@ -271,6 +271,12 @@ struct rds_ext_header_rdma_dest {#define RDS_MSG_RX_END 2#define RDS_MSG_RX_CMSG 3+/* The following values are whitelisted for usercopy */+structrds_inc_usercopy{+rds_rdma_cookie_trdma_cookie;+ktime_trx_tstamp;+};+structrds_incoming{refcount_ti_refcount;structlist_headi_item;
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static void rds_recv_incoming_exthdrs(struct rds_incoming *inc, struct rds_sockcaseRDS_EXTHDR_RDMA_DEST:/* We ignore the size for now. We could stash it*somewhereanduseitforerrorchecking.*/-inc->i_rdma_cookie=rds_rdma_make_cookie(+inc->i_usercopy.rdma_cookie=rds_rdma_make_cookie(be32_to_cpu(buffer.rdma_dest.h_rdma_rkey),be32_to_cpu(buffer.rdma_dest.h_rdma_offset));
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 819be8108fded0b9e710bbbf81193e52f7bab2f7 ]
This patch is to fix a NULL-ptr deref in selinux_socket_connect_helper:
[...] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
[...] RIP: 0010:selinux_socket_connect_helper+0x94/0x460
[...] Call Trace:
[...] selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x16a/0x1d0
[...] security_sctp_bind_connect+0x58/0x90
[...] sctp_process_asconf+0xa52/0xfd0 [sctp]
[...] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x785/0x980 [sctp]
[...] sctp_do_sm+0x175/0x5a0 [sctp]
[...] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x285/0x5b0 [sctp]
[...] sctp_backlog_rcv+0x482/0x910 [sctp]
[...] __release_sock+0x11e/0x310
[...] release_sock+0x4f/0x180
[...] sctp_accept+0x3f9/0x5a0 [sctp]
[...] inet_accept+0xe7/0x720
It was caused by that the 'newsk' sk_socket was not set before going to
security sctp hook when processing asconf chunk with SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP
or SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
inet_accept()->
sctp_accept():
lock_sock():
lock listening 'sk'
do_softirq():
sctp_rcv(): <-- [1]
asconf chunk arrives and
enqueued in 'sk' backlog
sctp_sock_migrate():
set asoc's sk to 'newsk'
release_sock():
sctp_backlog_rcv():
lock 'newsk'
sctp_process_asconf() <-- [2]
unlock 'newsk'
sock_graft():
set sk_socket <-- [3]
As it shows, at [1] the asconf chunk would be put into the listening 'sk'
backlog, as accept() was holding its sock lock. Then at [2] asconf would
get processed with 'newsk' as asoc's sk had been set to 'newsk'. However,
'newsk' sk_socket is not set until [3], while selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
would deref it, then kernel crashed.
Here to fix it by adding the chunk to sk_backlog until newsk sk_socket is
set when .accept() is done.
Note that sk->sk_socket can be NULL when the sock is closed, so SOCK_DEAD
flag is also needed to check in sctp_newsk_ready().
Thanks to Ondrej for reviewing the code.
Fixes: d452930fd3b9 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Reported-by: Ying Xu <redacted>
Suggested-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
include/net/sctp/sctp.h | 5 +++++
net/sctp/input.c | 12 +++++++++---
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
From: Vlad Buslov <redacted>
[ Upstream commit c2999f7fb05b87da4060e38150c70fa46794d82b ]
Recent changes that removed rtnl dependency from rules update path of tc
also made tcf_block_put() function sleeping. This function is called from
ops->destroy() of several Qdisc implementations, which in turn is called by
qdisc_put(). Some Qdiscs call qdisc_put() while holding sch tree spinlock,
which results sleeping-while-atomic BUG.
Steps to reproduce for multiq:
tc qdisc add dev ens1f0 root handle 1: multiq
tc qdisc add dev ens1f0 parent 1:10 handle 50: sfq perturb 10
ethtool -L ens1f0 combined 2
tc qdisc change dev ens1f0 root handle 1: multiq
Resulting dmesg:
[ 5539.419344] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:909
[ 5539.420945] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 27658, name: tc
[ 5539.422435] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 5539.423904] CPU: 21 PID: 27658 Comm: tc Tainted: G W 5.3.0-rc8+ #721
[ 5539.425400] Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-2028TP-DECR/X10DRT-P, BIOS 2.0b 03/30/2017
[ 5539.426911] Call Trace:
[ 5539.428380] dump_stack+0x85/0xc0
[ 5539.429823] ___might_sleep.cold+0xac/0xbc
[ 5539.431262] __mutex_lock+0x5b/0x960
[ 5539.432682] ? tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del.isra.0+0x1b/0xf0
[ 5539.434103] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x51/0x840
[ 5539.435493] ? tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del.isra.0+0x1b/0xf0
[ 5539.436903] tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del.isra.0+0x1b/0xf0
[ 5539.438327] tcf_block_put_ext.part.0+0x21/0x50
[ 5539.439752] tcf_block_put+0x50/0x70
[ 5539.441165] sfq_destroy+0x15/0x50 [sch_sfq]
[ 5539.442570] qdisc_destroy+0x5f/0x160
[ 5539.444000] multiq_tune+0x14a/0x420 [sch_multiq]
[ 5539.445421] tc_modify_qdisc+0x324/0x840
[ 5539.446841] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x170/0x4b0
[ 5539.448269] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x95/0x400
[ 5539.449691] ? rtnl_dellink+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 5539.451116] netlink_rcv_skb+0x49/0x110
[ 5539.452522] netlink_unicast+0x171/0x200
[ 5539.453914] netlink_sendmsg+0x224/0x3f0
[ 5539.455304] sock_sendmsg+0x5e/0x60
[ 5539.456686] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2ae/0x330
[ 5539.458071] ? ___sys_recvmsg+0x159/0x1f0
[ 5539.459461] ? do_wp_page+0x9c/0x790
[ 5539.460846] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xcd3/0x19e0
[ 5539.462263] __sys_sendmsg+0x59/0xa0
[ 5539.463661] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xb0
[ 5539.465044] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 5539.466454] RIP: 0033:0x7f1fe08177b8
[ 5539.467863] Code: 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 65 8f 0c 00 8b 00 85 c0 75 17 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 58 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 28 89 5
4
[ 5539.470906] RSP: 002b:00007ffe812de5d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[ 5539.472483] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000005d8135e3 RCX: 00007f1fe08177b8
[ 5539.474069] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe812de640 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 5539.475655] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000182e9b0
[ 5539.477203] R10: 0000000000404eda R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 5539.478699] R13: 000000000047f640 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Rearrange locking in multiq_tune() in following ways:
- In loop that removes Qdiscs from disabled queues, call
qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog() on Qdisc that
is being destroyed. Save the Qdisc in temporary allocated array and call
qdisc_put() on each element of the array after sch tree lock is released.
This is safe to do because Qdiscs have already been reset by
qdisc_purge_queue() inside sch tree lock critical section.
- Do the same change for second loop that initializes Qdiscs for newly
enabled queues in multiq_tune() function. Since sch tree lock is obtained
and released on each iteration of this loop, just call qdisc_put()
directly outside of critical section. Don't verify that old Qdisc is not
noop_qdisc before releasing reference to it because such check is already
performed by qdisc_put*() functions.
Fixes: c266f64dbfa2 ("net: sched: protect block state with mutex")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <redacted>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/sched/sch_multiq.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
From: David Ahern <redacted>
[ Upstream commit a3ce2a21bb8969ae27917281244fa91bf5f286d7 ]
Rajendra reported a kernel panic when a link was taken down:
[ 6870.263084] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a8
[ 6870.271856] IP: [<ffffffff8efc5764>] __ipv6_ifa_notify+0x154/0x290
<snip>
[ 6870.570501] Call Trace:
[ 6870.573238] [<ffffffff8efc58c6>] ? ipv6_ifa_notify+0x26/0x40
[ 6870.579665] [<ffffffff8efc98ec>] ? addrconf_dad_completed+0x4c/0x2c0
[ 6870.586869] [<ffffffff8efe70c6>] ? ipv6_dev_mc_inc+0x196/0x260
[ 6870.593491] [<ffffffff8efc9c6a>] ? addrconf_dad_work+0x10a/0x430
[ 6870.600305] [<ffffffff8f01ade4>] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[ 6870.606732] [<ffffffff8ea93a7a>] ? process_one_work+0x18a/0x430
[ 6870.613449] [<ffffffff8ea93d6d>] ? worker_thread+0x4d/0x490
[ 6870.619778] [<ffffffff8ea93d20>] ? process_one_work+0x430/0x430
[ 6870.626495] [<ffffffff8ea99dd9>] ? kthread+0xd9/0xf0
[ 6870.632145] [<ffffffff8f01ade4>] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[ 6870.638573] [<ffffffff8ea99d00>] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60
[ 6870.644707] [<ffffffff8f01ae77>] ? ret_from_fork+0x57/0x70
[ 6870.650936] Code: 31 c0 31 d2 41 b9 20 00 08 02 b9 09 00 00 0
addrconf_dad_work is kicked to be scheduled when a device is brought
up. There is a race between addrcond_dad_work getting scheduled and
taking the rtnl lock and a process taking the link down (under rtnl).
The latter removes the host route from the inet6_addr as part of
addrconf_ifdown which is run for NETDEV_DOWN. The former attempts
to use the host route in ipv6_ifa_notify. If the down event removes
the host route due to the race to the rtnl, then the BUG listed above
occurs.
This scenario does not occur when the ipv6 address is not kept
(net.ipv6.conf.all.keep_addr_on_down = 0) as addrconf_ifdown sets the
state of the ifp to DEAD. Handle when the addresses are kept by checking
IF_READY which is reset by addrconf_ifdown.
The 'dead' flag for an inet6_addr is set only under rtnl, in
addrconf_ifdown and it means the device is getting removed (or IPv6 is
disabled). The interesting cases for changing the idev flag are
addrconf_notify (NETDEV_UP and NETDEV_CHANGE) and addrconf_ifdown
(reset the flag). The former does not have the idev lock - only rtnl;
the latter has both. Based on that the existing dead + IF_READY check
can be moved to right after the rtnl_lock in addrconf_dad_work.
Fixes: f1705ec197e7 ("net: ipv6: Make address flushing on ifdown optional")
Reported-by: Rajendra Dendukuri <redacted>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
@@ -4032,6 +4032,12 @@ static void addrconf_dad_work(struct work_struct *w)rtnl_lock();+/* check if device was taken down before this delayed work+*functioncouldbecanceled+*/+if(idev->dead||!(idev->if_flags&IF_READY))+gotoout;+spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);if(ifp->state==INET6_IFADDR_STATE_PREDAD){action=DAD_BEGIN;
@@ -1401,7 +1402,7 @@ static int htb_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32 classid,if(parent&&!parent->level){/* turn parent into inner node */qdisc_purge_queue(parent->leaf.q);-qdisc_put(parent->leaf.q);+parent_qdisc=parent->leaf.q;if(parent->prio_activity)htb_deactivate(q,parent);
@@ -1480,6 +1481,7 @@ static int htb_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32 classid,cl->cbuffer=PSCHED_TICKS2NS(hopt->cbuffer);sch_tree_unlock(sch);+qdisc_put(parent_qdisc);if(warn)pr_warn("HTB: quantum of class %X is %s. Consider r2q change.\n",
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
[ Upstream commit 105333435b4f3b21ffc325f32fae17719310db64 ]
seen during boot:
BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#2, swapper/0/1
lock: nf_connlabels_lock+0x0/0x60, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
Call Trace:
do_raw_spin_lock+0x14e/0x1b0
nf_connlabels_get+0x15/0x40
ct_init_net+0xc4/0x270
ops_init+0x56/0x1c0
register_pernet_operations+0x1c8/0x350
register_pernet_subsys+0x1f/0x40
tcf_register_action+0x7c/0x1a0
do_one_initcall+0x13d/0x2d9
Problem is that ct action init function can run before
connlabels_init(). Lock has not been initialised yet.
Fix it by using a static initialiser.
Fixes: b57dc7c13ea9 ("net/sched: Introduce action ct")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_labels.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
From: Valentin Vidic <redacted>
[ Upstream commit 77b6d09f4ae66d42cd63b121af67780ae3d1a5e9 ]
Make sure res does not contain random value if the call to
sr_read_cmd fails for some reason.
Reported-by: syzbot+f1842130bbcfb335bac1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Valentin Vidic <redacted>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/usb/sr9800.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6af3aa57a0984e061f61308fe181a9a12359fecc ]
The driver would fail to deregister and its class device and free
related resources on late probe errors.
Reported-by: syzbot+cb035c75c03dbe34b796@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 32ecc75ded72 ("NFC: pn533: change order operations in dev registation")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
From: Mahesh Bandewar <redacted>
[ Upstream commit b0818f80c8c1bc215bba276bd61c216014fab23b ]
While invalidating the dst, we assign backhole_netdev instead of
loopback device. However, this device does not have idev pointer
and hence no ip6_ptr even if IPv6 is enabled. Possibly this has
triggered the syzbot reported crash.
The syzbot report does not have reproducer, however, this is the
only device that doesn't have matching idev created.
Crash instruction is :
static inline bool ip6_ignore_linkdown(const struct net_device *dev)
{
const struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
return !!idev->cnf.ignore_routes_with_linkdown; <= crash
}
Also ipv6 always assumes presence of idev and never checks for it
being NULL (as does the above referenced code). So adding a idev
for the blackhole_netdev to avoid this class of crashes in the future.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 7 ++++++-
net/ipv6/route.c | 15 ++++++---------
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
On Fri, Oct 25, 2019 at 09:54:44AM -0400, Sasha Levin wrote:
From: Mahesh Bandewar <redacted>
[ Upstream commit b0818f80c8c1bc215bba276bd61c216014fab23b ]
While invalidating the dst, we assign backhole_netdev instead of
loopback device. However, this device does not have idev pointer
and hence no ip6_ptr even if IPv6 is enabled. Possibly this has
triggered the syzbot reported crash.
The syzbot report does not have reproducer, however, this is the
only device that doesn't have matching idev created.
Crash instruction is :
static inline bool ip6_ignore_linkdown(const struct net_device *dev)
{
const struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
return !!idev->cnf.ignore_routes_with_linkdown; <= crash
}
Also ipv6 always assumes presence of idev and never checks for it
being NULL (as does the above referenced code). So adding a idev
for the blackhole_netdev to avoid this class of crashes in the future.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 9ebeddef58c41bd700419cdcece24cf64ce32276 ]
The rxrpc_peer record needs to hold a reference on the rxrpc_local record
it points as the peer is used as a base to access information in the
rxrpc_local record.
This can cause problems in __rxrpc_put_peer(), where we need the network
namespace pointer, and in rxrpc_send_keepalive(), where we need to access
the UDP socket, leading to symptoms like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __rxrpc_put_peer net/rxrpc/peer_object.c:411
[inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rxrpc_put_peer+0x685/0x6a0
net/rxrpc/peer_object.c:435
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888097ec0058 by task syz-executor823/24216
Fix this by taking a ref on the local record for the peer record.
Fixes: ace45bec6d77 ("rxrpc: Fix firewall route keepalive")
Fixes: 2baec2c3f854 ("rxrpc: Support network namespacing")
Reported-by: syzbot+b9be979c55f2bea8ed30@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/rxrpc/peer_object.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)