[PATCH] vhost: make sure log_num < in_num
From: > <hidden>
Date: 2019-09-11 09:45:15
Also in:
kvm, lkml
Subsystem:
the rest, virtio host (vhost) · Maintainers:
Linus Torvalds, "Michael S. Tsirkin", Jason Wang
From: yongduan <redacted>
The code assumes log_num < in_num everywhere, and that is true as long as
in_num is incremented by descriptor iov count, and log_num by 1. However
this breaks if there's a zero sized descriptor.
As a result, if a malicious guest creates a vring desc with desc.len = 0,
it may cause the host kernel to crash by overflowing the log array. This
bug can be triggered during the VM migration.
There's no need to log when desc.len = 0, so just don't increment log_num
in this case.
Fixes: 3a4d5c94e959 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server")
Reviewed-by: Lidong Chen <redacted>
Signed-off-by: ruippan <redacted>
Signed-off-by: yongduan <redacted>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <redacted>
---
drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
index 5dc174a..36ca2cf 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c@@ -2178,7 +2178,7 @@ static int get_indirect(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, /* If this is an input descriptor, increment that count. */ if (access == VHOST_ACCESS_WO) { *in_num += ret; - if (unlikely(log)) { + if (unlikely(log && ret)) { log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr); log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len); ++*log_num;
@@ -2319,7 +2319,7 @@ int vhost_get_vq_desc(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, /* If this is an input descriptor, * increment that count. */ *in_num += ret; - if (unlikely(log)) { + if (unlikely(log && ret)) { log[*log_num].addr = vhost64_to_cpu(vq, desc.addr); log[*log_num].len = vhost32_to_cpu(vq, desc.len); ++*log_num;
--
1.8.3.1