# Re: \[RFC PATCH ghak32 V2 01/13\] audit: add container id

- From: Casey Schaufler \<casey@schaufler-ca.com\>
- Date: 2018-04-19 00:41:40 
- List: netdev
- Page: https://ratatoskr.run/netdev/2018/04/134428
- Thread: https://ratatoskr.run/cgroups/2018/03/132928/t.md

```text
On 4/18/2018 4:47 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:00 AM, Richard Guy Briggs [ref] wrote:
>> Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container ID of a process,
>> emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER record to document the event.
>> ...
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
>> index d258826..1b82191 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
>> @@ -796,6 +796,7 @@ struct task_struct {
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
>>         kuid_t                          loginuid;
>>         unsigned int                    sessionid;
>> +       u64                             containerid;
> This one line addition to the task_struct scares me the most of
> anything in this patchset.  Why?  It's a field named "containerid" in
> a perhaps one of the most widely used core kernel structures; the
> possibilities for abuse are endless, and it's foolish to think we
> would ever be able to adequately police this.

If we can get the LSM infrastructure managed task blobs from 
module stacking in ahead of this we could create a trivial security
module to manage this. It's not as if there aren't all sorts of
interactions between security modules and the audit system already.
```