Re: [RFC v4 00/18] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing
From: Alexei Starovoitov <hidden>
Date: 2016-11-13 17:38:37
Also in:
cgroups, linux-api, lkml
On Sun, Nov 13, 2016 at 6:23 AM, Mickaël Salaün [off-list ref] wrote:
Hi, After the BoF at LPC last week, we came to a multi-step roadmap to upstream Landlock. A first patch series containing the basic properties needed for a "minimum viable product", which means being able to test it, without full features. The idea is to set in place the main components which include the LSM part (some hooks with the manager logic) and the new eBPF type. To have a minimum amount of code, the first userland entry point will be the seccomp syscall. This doesn't imply non-upstream patches and should be more simple. For the sake of simplicity and to ease the review, this first series will only be dedicated to privileged processes (i.e. with CAP_SYS_ADMIN). We may want to only allow one level of rules at first, instead of dealing with more complex rule inheritance (like seccomp-bpf can do). The second series will focus on the cgroup manager. It will follow the same rules of inheritance as the Daniel Mack's patches does. The third series will try to bring a BPF map of handles for Landlock and the dedicated BPF helpers. Finally, the fourth series will bring back the unprivileged mode (with no_new_privs), at least for process hierarchies (via seccomp). This also imply to handle multi-level of rules. Right now, an important point of attention is the userland ABI. We don't want LSM hooks to be exposed "as is" to userland. This may have some future implications if their semantic and/or enforcement point(s) change. In the next series, I will propose a new abstraction over the currently used LSM hooks. I'll also propose a new way to deal with resource accountability. Finally, I plan to create a minimal (kernel) developer documentation and a test suite.
Thanks for the summary. That's exactly what we discussed and agreed upon.