Re: [PATCH net-next 09/17] net: Allow userns root control of the core of the network stack.

2 messages, 2 authors, 2012-11-16 · open the first message on its own page

Re: [PATCH net-next 09/17] net: Allow userns root control of the core of the network stack.

From: Glauber Costa <hidden>
Date: 2012-11-16 13:55:14

On 11/16/2012 05:03 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return netdev_store(dev, attr, buf, len, change_tx_queue_len);
You mean ns_capable here?

Re: [PATCH net-next 09/17] net: Allow userns root control of the core of the network stack.

From: Eric W. Biederman <hidden>
Date: 2012-11-16 14:32:35

Glauber Costa [off-list ref] writes:
On 11/16/2012 05:03 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
quoted
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return netdev_store(dev, attr, buf, len, change_tx_queue_len);
You mean ns_capable here?
No.  There I meant capable.

I deliberately call capable here because I don't understand what
the tx_queue_len well enough to be certain it is safe to relax
that check to be just ns_capable.

My get feel is that allowing an unprivileged user to be able to
arbitrarily change the tx_queue_len on a networking device would be a
nice way to allow queuing as many network packets as you would like with
kernel memory and DOSing the machine.

So since with a quick read of the code I could not convince myself it
was safe to allow unprivilged users to change tx_queue_len I left it
protected by capable.  While at the same time I relaxed the check in
netdev_store to be ns_capable.

Eric
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