[PATCH] irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths

Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes.  Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <redacted>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
---
 net/irda/iriap.c |    6 ++++++
 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/irda/iriap.c b/net/irda/iriap.c
index 5b743bd..3647753 100644
--- a/net/irda/iriap.c
+++ b/net/irda/iriap.c

@@ -656,10 +656,16 @@ static void iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication(struct iriap_cb *self,
 	n = 1;
 
 	name_len = fp[n++];
+
+	IRDA_ASSERT(name_len < IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME + 1, return;);
+
 	memcpy(name, fp+n, name_len); n+=name_len;
 	name[name_len] = '\0';
 
 	attr_len = fp[n++];
+
+	IRDA_ASSERT(attr_len < IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME + 1, return;);
+
 	memcpy(attr, fp+n, attr_len); n+=attr_len;
 	attr[attr_len] = '\0';
 

On Sun, 2011-03-20 at 21:32 -0400, Dan Rosenberg wrote:

Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes.  Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.

While this is the most serious bug I see, this function also seems to
lack any validation against skb->len.  If someone wants to take care of
this, by all means...if not, I'll post a follow-up patch in the next day
or so.

-Dan

From: Dan Rosenberg <redacted>
Date: Sun, 20 Mar 2011 21:32:06 -0400

Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes.  Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <redacted>
Cc: stable@kernel.org

Applied.