[PATCH bpf-next v3 0/7] bpf: fix typos and repeated words in comments

@@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ static inline void emit_ldsx_r(const s8 dst[], const s8 src,
 	arm_bpf_put_reg64(dst, rd, ctx);
 }
 
-/* Arithmatic Operation */
+/* Arithmetic Operation */
 static inline void emit_ar_r(const u8 rd, const u8 rt, const u8 rm,
 			     const u8 rn, struct jit_ctx *ctx, u8 op,
 			     bool is_jmp64) {

@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ struct ctl_table_header;
 #define BPF_ALU32_IMM(OP, DST, IMM)				\
 	BPF_ALU32_IMM_OFF(OP, DST, IMM, 0)
 
-/* Endianess conversion, cpu_to_{l,b}e(), {l,b}e_to_cpu() */
+/* Endianness conversion, cpu_to_{l,b}e(), {l,b}e_to_cpu() */
 
 #define BPF_ENDIAN(TYPE, DST, LEN)				\
 	((struct bpf_insn) {					\

@@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@ static inline u8 *bpf_skb_cb(const struct sk_buff *skb)
 	 *
 	 * In some socket filter cases, the cb unfortunately needs to be
 	 * saved/restored so that protocol specific skb->cb[] data won't
-	 * be lost. In any case, due to unpriviledged eBPF programs
+	 * be lost. In any case, due to unprivileged eBPF programs
 	 * attached to sockets, we need to clear the bpf_skb_cb() area
 	 * to not leak previous contents to user space.
 	 */

@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ reuseport_array_update_check(const struct reuseport_array *array,
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
 
 	/*
-	 * sk must be hashed (i.e. listening in the TCP case or binded
+	 * sk must be hashed (i.e. listening in the TCP case or bound
 	 * in the UDP case) and
 	 * it must also be a SO_REUSEPORT sk (i.e. reuse cannot be NULL).
 	 *

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  *
  *		[	prev sp		] <-------------
  *		[   nv gpr save area	] 16 * 4	|
- * fp (r31) -->	[   ebpf stack space	] upto 512	|
+ * fp (r31) -->	[   ebpf stack space	] up to 512	|
  *		[     frame header	] 16		|
  * sp (r1) --->	[    stack pointer	] --------------
  */

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  * Stack layout with frame:
  * Layout when setting up our own stack frame.
  * Note: r1 at bottom, component offsets positive wrt r1.
- * Ensure the top half (upto local_tmp_var) stays consistent
+ * Ensure the top half (up to local_tmp_var) stays consistent
  * with our redzone usage.
  *
  * tail_call_info - stores tailcall count value in main program's

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  *		[   nv gpr save area	] (6 * 8)	|
  *		[ addl. nv gpr save area] (12 * 8)	| <--- exception boundary/callback program
  *		[    local_tmp_var	] 24		|
- * fp (r31) -->	[   ebpf stack space	] upto 512	|
+ * fp (r31) -->	[   ebpf stack space	] up to 512	|
  *		[     frame header	] 32/112	|
  * sp (r1) --->	[    stack pointer	] --------------
  *

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  * IPv6 header with a Segment Routing Header, with segments :
  *	fd00::1 -> fd00::2 -> fd00::3 -> fd00::4
  *
- * 3 fd00::/16 IPv6 addresses are binded to seg6local End.BPF actions :
+ * 3 fd00::/16 IPv6 addresses are bound to seg6local End.BPF actions :
  * - fd00::1 : add a TLV, change the flags and apply a End.X action to fc42::1
  * - fd00::2 : remove the TLV, change the flags, add a tag
  * - fd00::3 : apply an End.T action to fd00::4, through routing table 117

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static tld_key_t __tld_create_key(const char *name, size_t size, bool dyn_data)
 		}
 
 		/*
-		 * TLD_DEFINE_KEY() is given memory upto a page while at most
+		 * TLD_DEFINE_KEY() is given memory up to a page while at most
 		 * TLD_DYN_DATA_SIZE is allocated for tld_create_key()
 		 */
 		if (dyn_data) {

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 SEC("freplace/btf_unreliable_kprobe")
 /* context type is what BPF verifier expects for kprobe context, but target
- * program has `stuct whatever *ctx` argument, so freplace operation will be
+ * program has `struct whatever *ctx` argument, so freplace operation will be
  * rejected with the following message:
  *
  * arg0 replace_btf_unreliable_kprobe(struct pt_regs *) doesn't match btf_unreliable_kprobe(struct whatever *)

@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ __naked void stack_write_priv_vs_unpriv(void)
 }
 
 /* Similar to the previous test, but this time also perform a read from the
- * address written to with a variable offet. The read is allowed, showing that,
+ * address written to with a variable offset. The read is allowed, showing that,
  * after a variable-offset write, a privileged program can read the slots that
  * were in the range of that write (even if the verifier doesn't actually know if
  * the slot being read was really written to or not.

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ bpf_error:
 	/* Make the JIT program return zero.  The JIT epilogue
 	 * stores away the original %o7 into r_saved_O7.  The
 	 * normal leaf function return is to use "retl" which
-	 * would evalute to "jmpl %o7 + 8, %g0" but we want to
+	 * would evaluate to "jmpl %o7 + 8, %g0" but we want to
 	 * use the saved value thus the sequence you see here.
 	 */
 	jmpl	r_saved_O7 + 8, %g0

@@ -3847,7 +3847,7 @@ static int btf_dedup_remap_types(struct btf_dedup *d);
  * types, in general, can form graphs containing cycles, not just DAGs.
  *
  * While algorithm does deduplication, it also merges and resolves type
- * information (unless disabled throught `struct btf_opts`), whenever possible.
+ * information (unless disabled through `struct btf_opts`), whenever possible.
  * E.g., in the example above with two compilation units having partial type
  * information for structs `A` and `B`, the output of algorithm will emit
  * a single copy of each BTF type that describes structs `A`, `B`, and `S`

@@ -5648,7 +5648,7 @@ static int btf_dedup_resolve_fwds(struct btf_dedup *d)
  *
  * After we established for each type its corresponding canonical representative
  * type, we now can eliminate types that are not canonical and leave only
- * canonical ones layed out sequentially in memory by copying them over
+ * canonical ones laid out sequentially in memory by copying them over
  * duplicates. During compaction btf_dedup->hypot_map array is reused to store
  * a map from original type ID to a new compacted type ID, which will be used
  * during next phase to "fix up" type IDs, referenced from struct/union and

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
  * about. This state has to be maintained per-BPF object and coordinate
  * between different USDT attachments within the same BPF object.
  *
- * Spec ID is the key in spec BPF map, value is the actual USDT spec layed out
+ * Spec ID is the key in spec BPF map, value is the actual USDT spec laid out
  * as struct usdt_spec. Each invocation of BPF program at runtime needs to
  * know its associated spec ID. It gets it either through BPF cookie, which
  * libbpf sets to spec ID during attach time, or, if kernel is too old to

@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static __always_inline bool check_asan_args(s8 __arena *addr, size_t size,
 		goto confirmed_valid;
 
 	/*
-	 * Wraparound is possible for values close to the the edge of the
+	 * Wraparound is possible for values close to the edge of the
 	 * 4GiB boundary of the arena (last valid address is 1UL << 32 - 1).
 	 *
 	 *

@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ __naked int checkpoint_states_deletion(void)
 	 * would get equal to one of the explored states and thus loop
 	 * exploration would be finished (at-least for a specific path).
 	 * Verifier evicts explored states with high miss to hit ratio
-	 * to to avoid comparing current state with too many explored
+	 * to avoid comparing current state with too many explored
 	 * states per instruction.
 	 * This test is designed to "stress test" eviction policy defined using formula:
 	 *