Xen frontends shouldn't BUG() in case of illegal data received from
their backends. So replace the BUG_ON()s when reading illegal data from
the ring page with negative return values.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
V2:
- drop BUG_ON() (Christophe Leroy, Greg Kroah-Hartmann)
- replace WARN_ONCE() by pr_err_once() (Greg Kroah-Hartmann)
- break out from original series
---
drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
@@ -86,7 +86,11 @@ static int __write_console(struct xencons_info *xencons,cons=intf->out_cons;prod=intf->out_prod;mb();/* update queue values before going on */-BUG_ON((prod-cons)>sizeof(intf->out));++if((prod-cons)>sizeof(intf->out)){+pr_err_once("xencons: Illegal ring page indices");+return-EINVAL;+}while((sent<len)&&((prod-cons)<sizeof(intf->out)))intf->out[MASK_XENCONS_IDX(prod++,intf->out)]=data[sent++];
@@ -114,7 +118,10 @@ static int domU_write_console(uint32_t vtermno, const char *data, int len)*/while(len){intsent=__write_console(cons,data,len);-++if(sent<0)+returnsent;+data+=sent;len-=sent;
@@ -138,7 +145,11 @@ static int domU_read_console(uint32_t vtermno, char *buf, int len)cons=intf->in_cons;prod=intf->in_prod;mb();/* get pointers before reading ring */-BUG_ON((prod-cons)>sizeof(intf->in));++if((prod-cons)>sizeof(intf->in)){+pr_err_once("xencons: Illegal ring page indices");+return-EINVAL;+}while(cons!=prod&&recv<len)buf[recv++]=intf->in[MASK_XENCONS_IDX(cons++,intf->in)];
From: Jan Beulich <hidden> Date: 2021-07-07 09:57:46
On 07.07.2021 11:10, Juergen Gross wrote:
Xen frontends shouldn't BUG() in case of illegal data received from
their backends. So replace the BUG_ON()s when reading illegal data from
the ring page with negative return values.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
@@ -86,7 +86,11 @@ static int __write_console(struct xencons_info *xencons,cons=intf->out_cons;prod=intf->out_prod;mb();/* update queue values before going on */
Largely unrelated note: While in general the barriers here may want
switching to virt_*mb(), this particular one looks to be too heavy
anyway: a read barrier is all that's needed here afaict, just like
there's only a write barrier between ring contents and producer
writing in __write_console().
And btw, since I've got puzzled by the linuxppc-dev@ in the recipients
list, I did look up relevant entries in ./MAINTAINERS. Shouldn't the
file be part of "XEN HYPERVISOR INTERFACE"?
Jan
Xen frontends shouldn't BUG() in case of illegal data received from
their backends. So replace the BUG_ON()s when reading illegal data from
the ring page with negative return values.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
@@ -86,7 +86,11 @@ static int __write_console(struct xencons_info *xencons,cons=intf->out_cons;prod=intf->out_prod;mb();/* update queue values before going on */
Largely unrelated note: While in general the barriers here may want
switching to virt_*mb(), this particular one looks to be too heavy
anyway: a read barrier is all that's needed here afaict, just like
there's only a write barrier between ring contents and producer
writing in __write_console().
I agree.
And btw, since I've got puzzled by the linuxppc-dev@ in the recipients
list, I did look up relevant entries in ./MAINTAINERS. Shouldn't the
file be part of "XEN HYPERVISOR INTERFACE"?
I wouldn't mind. Greg, Jiri, what do you think?
Juergen
And btw, since I've got puzzled by the linuxppc-dev@ in the recipients
list, I did look up relevant entries in ./MAINTAINERS. Shouldn't the
file be part of "XEN HYPERVISOR INTERFACE"?