Here's v4, based on linux-next/master. Mostly minor changes this time,
primarily due to Petr's v3 comments.
v4:
- add warnings for "impossible" scenarios in __save_stack_trace_reliable()
- sort _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK flags
- move klp_transition_work to transition.c. This resulted in the following
related changes:
- klp_mutex is now visible to transition.c
- klp_start_transition() now calls klp_try_complete_transition()
- klp_try_complete_transition() now sets up the work
- rearrange code in transition.c accordingly
- klp_reverse_transition(): clear TIF flags and call synchronize_rcu()
- klp_try_complete_transition(): do synchronize_rcu() only when unpatching
- klp_start_transition(): only set TIF flags when necessary
- klp_complete_transition(): add synchronize_rcu() when patching
- klp_ftrace_handler(): put WARN_ON_ONCE back in and add comment
- use for_each_possible_cpu() to patch offline idle tasks
- add warnings to sample module when setting patch.immediate
- don't use pr_debug() with the task rq lock
- add documentation about porting consistency model to other arches
- move klp_patch_pending() to patch 13
- improve several comments and commit messages
v3:
- rebase on new x86 unwinder
- force !HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE arches to use patch->immediate for
now, because we don't have a way to transition kthreads otherwise
- rebase s390 TIF_PATCH_PENDING patch onto latest entry code
- update barrier comments and move barrier from the end of
klp_init_transition() to its callers
- "klp_work" -> "klp_transition_work"
- "klp_patch_task()" -> "klp_update_patch_state()"
- explicit _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK
- change klp_reverse_transition() to not try to complete transition.
instead modify the work queue delay to zero.
- get rid of klp_schedule_work() in favor of calling
schedule_delayed_work() directly with a KLP_TRANSITION_DELAY
- initialize klp_target_state to KLP_UNDEFINED
- move klp_target_state assignment to before patch->immediate check in
klp_init_transition()
- rcu_read_lock() in klp_update_patch_state(), test the thread flag in
patch task, synchronize_rcu() in klp_complete_transition()
- use kstrtobool() in enabled_store()
- change task_rq_lock() argument type to struct rq_flags
- add several WARN_ON_ONCE assertions for klp_target_state and
task->patch_state
v2:
- "universe" -> "patch state"
- rename klp_update_task_universe() -> klp_patch_task()
- add preempt IRQ tracking (TF_PREEMPT_IRQ)
- fix print_context_stack_reliable() bug
- improve print_context_stack_reliable() comments
- klp_ftrace_handler comment fixes
- add "patch_state" proc file to tid_base_stuff
- schedule work even for !RELIABLE_STACKTRACE
- forked child inherits patch state from parent
- add detailed comment to livepatch.h klp_func definition about the
klp_func patched/transition state transitions
- update exit_to_usermode_loop() comment
- clear all TIF_KLP_NEED_UPDATE flags in klp_complete_transition()
- remove unnecessary function externs
- add livepatch documentation, sysfs documentation, /proc documentation
- /proc/pid/patch_state: -1 means no patch is currently being applied/reverted
- "TIF_KLP_NEED_UPDATE" -> "TIF_PATCH_PENDING"
- support for s390 and powerpc-le
- don't assume stacks with dynamic ftrace trampolines are reliable
- add _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK info to commit log
v1.9:
- revive from the dead and rebased
- reliable stacks!
- add support for immediate consistency model
- add a ton of comments
- fix up memory barriers
- remove "allow patch modules to be removed" patch for now, it still
needs more discussion and thought - it can be done with something
- "proc/pid/universe" -> "proc/pid/patch_status"
- remove WARN_ON_ONCE from !func condition in ftrace handler -- can
happen because of RCU
- keep klp_mutex private by putting the work_fn in core.c
- convert states from int to boolean
- remove obsolete '@state' comments
- several header file and include improvements suggested by Jiri S
- change kallsyms_lookup_size_offset() errors from EINVAL -> ENOENT
- change proc file permissions S_IRUGO -> USR
- use klp_for_each_object/func helpers
Jiri Slaby (1):
livepatch/s390: reorganize TIF thread flag bits
Josh Poimboeuf (12):
stacktrace/x86: add function for detecting reliable stack traces
x86/entry: define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK flags explicitly
livepatch: create temporary klp_update_patch_state() stub
livepatch/x86: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch/powerpc: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch: separate enabled and patched states
livepatch: remove unnecessary object loaded check
livepatch: move patching functions into patch.c
livepatch: use kstrtobool() in enabled_store()
livepatch: store function sizes
livepatch: change to a per-task consistency model
livepatch: add /proc/<pid>/patch_state
Miroslav Benes (2):
livepatch/s390: add TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag
livepatch: allow removal of a disabled patch
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-livepatch | 8 +
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 18 +
Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt | 186 ++++++--
arch/Kconfig | 6 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +-
arch/powerpc/kernel/signal.c | 4 +
arch/s390/include/asm/thread_info.h | 24 +-
arch/s390/kernel/entry.S | 31 +-
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/common.c | 9 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 13 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h | 6 +
arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c | 85 +++-
arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c | 2 +
fs/proc/base.c | 15 +
include/linux/init_task.h | 9 +
include/linux/livepatch.h | 68 ++-
include/linux/sched.h | 3 +
include/linux/stacktrace.h | 8 +-
kernel/fork.c | 3 +
kernel/livepatch/Makefile | 2 +-
kernel/livepatch/core.c | 431 +++++++-----------
kernel/livepatch/patch.c | 266 +++++++++++
kernel/livepatch/patch.h | 33 ++
kernel/livepatch/transition.c | 533 +++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/livepatch/transition.h | 13 +
kernel/sched/idle.c | 4 +
kernel/stacktrace.c | 12 +-
samples/livepatch/livepatch-sample.c | 18 +-
29 files changed, 1465 insertions(+), 350 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 kernel/livepatch/patch.c
create mode 100644 kernel/livepatch/patch.h
create mode 100644 kernel/livepatch/transition.c
create mode 100644 kernel/livepatch/transition.h
--
2.7.4
For live patching and possibly other use cases, a stack trace is only
useful if it can be assured that it's completely reliable. Add a new
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() function to achieve that.
Note that if the target task isn't the current task, and the target task
is allowed to run, then it could be writing the stack while the unwinder
is reading it, resulting in possible corruption. So the caller of
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() must ensure that the task is either
'current' or inactive.
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() relies on the x86 unwinder's detection
of pt_regs on the stack. If the pt_regs are not user-mode registers
from a syscall, then they indicate an in-kernel interrupt or exception
(e.g. preemption or a page fault), in which case the stack is considered
unreliable due to the nature of frame pointers.
It also relies on the x86 unwinder's detection of other issues, such as:
- corrupted stack data
- stack grows the wrong way
- stack walk doesn't reach the bottom
- user didn't provide a large enough entries array
Such issues are reported by checking unwind_error() and !unwind_done().
Also add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE so arch-independent code can
determine at build time whether the function is implemented.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
---
arch/Kconfig | 6 +++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h | 6 +++
arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c | 2 +
include/linux/stacktrace.h | 8 ++--
kernel/stacktrace.c | 12 +++++-
7 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
The _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK macro automatically includes the least-significant
16 bits of the thread_info flags, which is less than obvious and tends
to create confusion and surprises when reading or modifying the code.
Define the flags explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Kamalesh Babulal <redacted>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
@@ -133,8 +130,10 @@ struct thread_info {/* work to do on any return to user space */#define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK \-((0x0000FFFF&~_TIF_SECCOMP)|_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT|\-_TIF_NOHZ)+(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME|_TIF_SIGPENDING|\+_TIF_NEED_RESCHED|_TIF_SINGLESTEP|_TIF_SYSCALL_EMU|\+_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY|_TIF_UPROBE|\+_TIF_NOHZ|_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)/* flags to check in __switch_to() */#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW \
Create temporary stubs for klp_update_patch_state() so we can add
TIF_PATCH_PENDING to different architectures in separate patches without
breaking build bisectability.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
---
include/linux/livepatch.h | 5 ++++-
kernel/livepatch/core.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Add the TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag to enable the new livepatch
per-task consistency model for powerpc. The bit getting set indicates
the thread has a pending patch which needs to be applied when the thread
exits the kernel.
The bit is included in the _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK macro so that
do_notify_resume() and klp_update_patch_state() get called when the bit
is set.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Kamalesh Babulal <redacted>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +++-
arch/powerpc/kernel/signal.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
klp_patch_object()'s callers already ensure that the object is loaded,
so its call to klp_is_object_loaded() is unnecessary.
This will also make it possible to move the patching code into a
separate file.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kamalesh Babulal <redacted>
---
kernel/livepatch/core.c | 3 ---
1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
Once we have a consistency model, patches and their objects will be
enabled and disabled at different times. For example, when a patch is
disabled, its loaded objects' funcs can remain registered with ftrace
indefinitely until the unpatching operation is complete and they're no
longer in use.
It's less confusing if we give them different names: patches can be
enabled or disabled; objects (and their funcs) can be patched or
unpatched:
- Enabled means that a patch is logically enabled (but not necessarily
fully applied).
- Patched means that an object's funcs are registered with ftrace and
added to the klp_ops func stack.
Also, since these states are binary, represent them with booleans
instead of ints.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kamalesh Babulal <redacted>
---
include/linux/livepatch.h | 17 ++++-------
kernel/livepatch/core.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
@@ -348,11 +348,11 @@ static unsigned long klp_get_ftrace_location(unsigned long faddr)}#endif-staticvoidklp_disable_func(structklp_func*func)+staticvoidklp_unpatch_func(structklp_func*func){structklp_ops*ops;-if(WARN_ON(func->state!=KLP_ENABLED))+if(WARN_ON(!func->patched))return;if(WARN_ON(!func->old_addr))return;
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ static int klp_enable_func(struct klp_func *func)if(WARN_ON(!func->old_addr))return-EINVAL;-if(WARN_ON(func->state!=KLP_DISABLED))+if(WARN_ON(func->patched))return-EINVAL;ops=klp_find_ops(func->old_addr);
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static int klp_enable_func(struct klp_func *func)list_add_rcu(&func->stack_node,&ops->func_stack);}-func->state=KLP_ENABLED;+func->patched=true;return0;
@@ -448,36 +448,36 @@ static int klp_enable_func(struct klp_func *func)returnret;}-staticvoidklp_disable_object(structklp_object*obj)+staticvoidklp_unpatch_object(structklp_object*obj){structklp_func*func;klp_for_each_func(obj,func)-if(func->state==KLP_ENABLED)-klp_disable_func(func);+if(func->patched)+klp_unpatch_func(func);-obj->state=KLP_DISABLED;+obj->patched=false;}-staticintklp_enable_object(structklp_object*obj)+staticintklp_patch_object(structklp_object*obj){structklp_func*func;intret;-if(WARN_ON(obj->state!=KLP_DISABLED))+if(WARN_ON(obj->patched))return-EINVAL;if(WARN_ON(!klp_is_object_loaded(obj)))return-EINVAL;klp_for_each_func(obj,func){-ret=klp_enable_func(func);+ret=klp_patch_func(func);if(ret){-klp_disable_object(obj);+klp_unpatch_object(obj);returnret;}}-obj->state=KLP_ENABLED;+obj->patched=true;return0;}
@@ -488,17 +488,17 @@ static int __klp_disable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch)/* enforce stacking: only the last enabled patch can be disabled */if(!list_is_last(&patch->list,&klp_patches)&&-list_next_entry(patch,list)->state==KLP_ENABLED)+list_next_entry(patch,list)->enabled)return-EBUSY;pr_notice("disabling patch '%s'\n",patch->mod->name);klp_for_each_object(patch,obj){-if(obj->state==KLP_ENABLED)-klp_disable_object(obj);+if(obj->patched)+klp_unpatch_object(obj);}-patch->state=KLP_DISABLED;+patch->enabled=false;return0;}
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ int klp_disable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch)gotoerr;}-if(patch->state==KLP_DISABLED){+if(!patch->enabled){ret=-EINVAL;gotoerr;}
@@ -540,12 +540,12 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch)structklp_object*obj;intret;-if(WARN_ON(patch->state!=KLP_DISABLED))+if(WARN_ON(patch->enabled))return-EINVAL;/* enforce stacking: only the first disabled patch can be enabled */if(patch->list.prev!=&klp_patches&&-list_prev_entry(patch,list)->state==KLP_DISABLED)+!list_prev_entry(patch,list)->enabled)return-EBUSY;pr_notice("enabling patch '%s'\n",patch->mod->name);
@@ -554,12 +554,12 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch)if(!klp_is_object_loaded(obj))continue;-ret=klp_enable_object(obj);+ret=klp_patch_object(obj);if(ret)gotounregister;}-patch->state=KLP_ENABLED;+patch->enabled=true;return0;
@@ -617,20 +617,20 @@ static ssize_t enabled_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,if(ret)return-EINVAL;-if(val!=KLP_DISABLED&&val!=KLP_ENABLED)+if(val>1)return-EINVAL;patch=container_of(kobj,structklp_patch,kobj);mutex_lock(&klp_mutex);-if(val==patch->state){+if(patch->enabled==val){/* already in requested state */ret=-EINVAL;gotoerr;}-if(val==KLP_ENABLED){+if(val){ret=__klp_enable_patch(patch);if(ret)gotoerr;
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ static int klp_init_func(struct klp_object *obj, struct klp_func *func)return-EINVAL;INIT_LIST_HEAD(&func->stack_node);-func->state=KLP_DISABLED;+func->patched=false;/* The format for the sysfs directory is <function,sympos> where sympos*isthenthoccurrenceofthissymbolinkallsymsforthepatched
The sysfs enabled value is a boolean, so kstrtobool() is a better fit
for parsing the input string since it does the range checking for us.
Suggested-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
---
kernel/livepatch/core.c | 13 +++++--------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
From: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Update a task's patch state when returning from a system call or user
space interrupt, or after handling a signal.
This greatly increases the chances of a patch operation succeeding. If
a task is I/O bound, it can be patched when returning from a system
call. If a task is CPU bound, it can be patched when returning from an
interrupt. If a task is sleeping on a to-be-patched function, the user
can send SIGSTOP and SIGCONT to force it to switch.
Since there are two ways the syscall can be restarted on return from a
signal handling process, it is important to clear the flag before
do_signal() is called. Otherwise we could miss the migration if we used
SIGSTOP/SIGCONT procedure or fake signal to migrate patching blocking
tasks. If we place our hook to sysc_work label in entry before
TIF_SIGPENDING is evaluated we kill two birds with one stone. The task
is correctly migrated in all return paths from a syscall.
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/thread_info.h | 2 ++
arch/s390/kernel/entry.S | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
@@ -352,6 +352,11 @@ ENTRY(system_call)#endifTSTMSK__PT_FLAGS(%r11),_PIF_PER_TRAPjo.Lsysc_singlestep+#ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH+TSTMSK__TI_flags(%r12),_TIF_PATCH_PENDING+jo.Lsysc_patch_pending# handle live patching just before+# signals and possible syscall restart+#endifTSTMSK__TI_flags(%r12),_TIF_SIGPENDINGjo.Lsysc_sigpendingTSTMSK__TI_flags(%r12),_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
@@ -426,6 +431,16 @@ ENTRY(system_call)#endif#+# _TIF_PATCH_PENDING is set, call klp_update_patch_state+#+#ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH+.Lsysc_patch_pending:+lg%r2,__LC_CURRENT# pass pointer to task struct+larl%r14,.Lsysc_return+jgklp_update_patch_state+#endif++## _PIF_PER_TRAP is set, call do_per_trap#.Lsysc_singlestep:
Expose the per-task patch state value so users can determine which tasks
are holding up completion of a patching operation.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
---
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
fs/proc/base.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ Table of Contents 3.8 /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd> - Information about opened file 3.9 /proc/<pid>/map_files - Information about memory mapped files 3.10 /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns - Task timerslack value+ 3.11 /proc/<pid>/patch_state - Livepatch patch operation state 4 Configuring procfs 4.1 Mount options
@@ -1886,6 +1887,23 @@ Valid values are from 0 - ULLONG_MAX An application setting the value must have PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS level permissions on the task specified to change its timerslack_ns value.+3.11 /proc/<pid>/patch_state - Livepatch patch operation state+-----------------------------------------------------------------+When CONFIG_LIVEPATCH is enabled, this file displays the value of the+patch state for the task.++A value of '-1' indicates that no patch is in transition.++A value of '0' indicates that a patch is in transition and the task is+unpatched. If the patch is being enabled, then the task hasn't been+patched yet. If the patch is being disabled, then the task has already+been unpatched.++A value of '1' indicates that a patch is in transition and the task is+patched. If the patch is being enabled, then the task has already been+patched. If the patch is being disabled, then the task hasn't been+unpatched yet.+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Configuring procfs
From: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Currently we do not allow patch module to unload since there is no
method to determine if a task is still running in the patched code.
The consistency model gives us the way because when the unpatching
finishes we know that all tasks were marked as safe to call an original
function. Thus every new call to the function calls the original code
and at the same time no task can be somewhere in the patched code,
because it had to leave that code to be marked as safe.
We can safely let the patch module go after that.
Completion is used for synchronization between module removal and sysfs
infrastructure in a similar way to commit 942e443127e9 ("module: Fix
mod->mkobj.kobj potentially freed too early").
Note that we still do not allow the removal for immediate model, that is
no consistency model. The module refcount may increase in this case if
somebody disables and enables the patch several times. This should not
cause any harm.
With this change a call to try_module_get() is moved to
__klp_enable_patch from klp_register_patch to make module reference
counting symmetric (module_put() is in a patch disable path) and to
allow to take a new reference to a disabled module when being enabled.
Finally, we need to be very careful about possible races between
klp_unregister_patch(), kobject_put() functions and operations
on the related sysfs files.
kobject_put(&patch->kobj) must be called without klp_mutex. Otherwise,
it might be blocked by enabled_store() that needs the mutex as well.
In addition, enabled_store() must check if the patch was not
unregisted in the meantime.
There is no need to do the same for other kobject_put() callsites
at the moment. Their sysfs operations neiter take the lock nor
they access any data that might be freed in the meantime.
There was an attempt to use kobjects the right way and prevent these
races by design. But it made the patch definition more complicated
and opened another can of worms. See
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464018848-4303-1-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.com
[Thanks to Petr Mladek for improving the commit message.]
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
---
Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt | 28 ++++--------
include/linux/livepatch.h | 3 ++
kernel/livepatch/core.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
kernel/livepatch/transition.c | 12 +++++-
samples/livepatch/livepatch-sample.c | 1 -
5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
@@ -296,8 +296,15 @@ section "Livepatch life-cycle" below for more details about these two operations. Module removal is only safe when there are no users of the underlying-functions. The immediate consistency model is not able to detect this;-therefore livepatch modules cannot be removed. See "Limitations" below.+functions. The immediate consistency model is not able to detect this. The+code just redirects the functions at the very beginning and it does not+check if the functions are in use. In other words, it knows when the+functions get called but it does not know when the functions return.+Therefore it cannot be decided when the livepatch module can be safely+removed. This is solved by a hybrid consistency model. When the system is+transitioned to a new patch state (patched/unpatched) it is guaranteed that+no task sleeps or runs in the old code.+ 5. Livepatch life-cycle =======================
@@ -449,23 +456,6 @@ The current Livepatch implementation has several limitations: by "notrace".- + Livepatch modules can not be removed.-- The current implementation just redirects the functions at the very- beginning. It does not check if the functions are in use. In other- words, it knows when the functions get called but it does not- know when the functions return. Therefore it can not decide when- the livepatch module can be safely removed.-- This will get most likely solved once a more complex consistency model- is supported. The idea is that a safe state for patching should also- mean a safe state for removing the patch.-- Note that the patch itself might get disabled by writing zero- to /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/enabled. It causes that the new- code will not longer get called. But it does not guarantee- that anyone is not sleeping anywhere in the new code.- + Livepatch works reliably only when the dynamic ftrace is located at the very beginning of the function.
Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the
foundation which will eventually enable us to patch those ~10% of
security patches which change function or data semantics. This is the
biggest remaining piece needed to make livepatch more generally useful.
This code stems from the design proposal made by Vojtech [1] in November
2014. It's a hybrid of kGraft and kpatch: it uses kGraft's per-task
consistency and syscall barrier switching combined with kpatch's stack
trace switching. There are also a number of fallback options which make
it quite flexible.
Patches are applied on a per-task basis, when the task is deemed safe to
switch over. When a patch is enabled, livepatch enters into a
transition state where tasks are converging to the patched state.
Usually this transition state can complete in a few seconds. The same
sequence occurs when a patch is disabled, except the tasks converge from
the patched state to the unpatched state.
An interrupt handler inherits the patched state of the task it
interrupts. The same is true for forked tasks: the child inherits the
patched state of the parent.
Livepatch uses several complementary approaches to determine when it's
safe to patch tasks:
1. The first and most effective approach is stack checking of sleeping
tasks. If no affected functions are on the stack of a given task,
the task is patched. In most cases this will patch most or all of
the tasks on the first try. Otherwise it'll keep trying
periodically. This option is only available if the architecture has
reliable stacks (HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE).
2. The second approach, if needed, is kernel exit switching. A
task is switched when it returns to user space from a system call, a
user space IRQ, or a signal. It's useful in the following cases:
a) Patching I/O-bound user tasks which are sleeping on an affected
function. In this case you have to send SIGSTOP and SIGCONT to
force it to exit the kernel and be patched.
b) Patching CPU-bound user tasks. If the task is highly CPU-bound
then it will get patched the next time it gets interrupted by an
IRQ.
c) In the future it could be useful for applying patches for
architectures which don't yet have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. In
this case you would have to signal most of the tasks on the
system. However this isn't supported yet because there's
currently no way to patch kthreads without
HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE.
3. For idle "swapper" tasks, since they don't ever exit the kernel, they
instead have a klp_update_patch_state() call in the idle loop which
allows them to be patched before the CPU enters the idle state.
(Note there's not yet such an approach for kthreads.)
All the above approaches may be skipped by setting the 'immediate' flag
in the 'klp_patch' struct, which will disable per-task consistency and
patch all tasks immediately. This can be useful if the patch doesn't
change any function or data semantics. Note that, even with this flag
set, it's possible that some tasks may still be running with an old
version of the function, until that function returns.
There's also an 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_func' struct which allows
you to specify that certain functions in the patch can be applied
without per-task consistency. This might be useful if you want to patch
a common function like schedule(), and the function change doesn't need
consistency but the rest of the patch does.
For architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, the user
must set patch->immediate which causes all tasks to be patched
immediately. This option should be used with care, only when the patch
doesn't change any function or data semantics.
In the future, architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE
may be allowed to use per-task consistency if we can come up with
another way to patch kthreads.
The /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/transition file shows whether a patch
is in transition. Only a single patch (the topmost patch on the stack)
can be in transition at a given time. A patch can remain in transition
indefinitely, if any of the tasks are stuck in the initial patch state.
A transition can be reversed and effectively canceled by writing the
opposite value to the /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/enabled file while
the transition is in progress. Then all the tasks will attempt to
converge back to the original patch state.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141107140458.GA21774@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-livepatch | 8 +
Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt | 158 ++++++-
include/linux/init_task.h | 9 +
include/linux/livepatch.h | 42 +-
include/linux/sched.h | 3 +
kernel/fork.c | 3 +
kernel/livepatch/Makefile | 2 +-
kernel/livepatch/core.c | 98 ++++-
kernel/livepatch/patch.c | 53 +++
kernel/livepatch/patch.h | 1 +
kernel/livepatch/transition.c | 525 +++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/livepatch/transition.h | 13 +
kernel/sched/idle.c | 4 +
samples/livepatch/livepatch-sample.c | 17 +
14 files changed, 892 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 kernel/livepatch/transition.c
create mode 100644 kernel/livepatch/transition.h
@@ -25,6 +25,14 @@ Description: code is currently applied. Writing 0 will disable the patch while writing 1 will re-enable the patch.+What: /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/transition+Date: May 2016+KernelVersion: 4.11.0+Contact: live-patching@vger.kernel.org+Description:+ An attribute which indicates whether the patch is currently in+ transition.+ What: /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/<object> Date: Nov 2014 KernelVersion: 3.19.0
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ example, they add a NULL pointer or a boundary check, fix a race by adding a missing memory barrier, or add some locking around a critical section. Most of these changes are self contained and the function presents itself the same way to the rest of the system. In this case, the functions might-be updated independently one by one.+be updated independently one by one. (This can be done by setting the+'immediate' flag in the klp_patch struct.) But there are more complex fixes. For example, a patch might change ordering of locking in multiple functions at the same time. Or a patch
@@ -86,20 +87,127 @@ or no data are stored in the modified structures at the moment. The theory about how to apply functions a safe way is rather complex. The aim is to define a so-called consistency model. It attempts to define conditions when the new implementation could be used so that the system-stays consistent. The theory is not yet finished. See the discussion at-https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141107140458.GA21774@suse.cz--The current consistency model is very simple. It guarantees that either-the old or the new function is called. But various functions get redirected-one by one without any synchronization.--In other words, the current implementation _never_ modifies the behavior-in the middle of the call. It is because it does _not_ rewrite the entire-function in the memory. Instead, the function gets redirected at the-very beginning. But this redirection is used immediately even when-some other functions from the same patch have not been redirected yet.--See also the section "Limitations" below.+stays consistent.++Livepatch has a consistency model which is a hybrid of kGraft and+kpatch: it uses kGraft's per-task consistency and syscall barrier+switching combined with kpatch's stack trace switching. There are also+a number of fallback options which make it quite flexible.++Patches are applied on a per-task basis, when the task is deemed safe to+switch over. When a patch is enabled, livepatch enters into a+transition state where tasks are converging to the patched state.+Usually this transition state can complete in a few seconds. The same+sequence occurs when a patch is disabled, except the tasks converge from+the patched state to the unpatched state.++An interrupt handler inherits the patched state of the task it+interrupts. The same is true for forked tasks: the child inherits the+patched state of the parent.++Livepatch uses several complementary approaches to determine when it's+safe to patch tasks:++1. The first and most effective approach is stack checking of sleeping+ tasks. If no affected functions are on the stack of a given task,+ the task is patched. In most cases this will patch most or all of+ the tasks on the first try. Otherwise it'll keep trying+ periodically. This option is only available if the architecture has+ reliable stacks (HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE).++2. The second approach, if needed, is kernel exit switching. A+ task is switched when it returns to user space from a system call, a+ user space IRQ, or a signal. It's useful in the following cases:++ a) Patching I/O-bound user tasks which are sleeping on an affected+ function. In this case you have to send SIGSTOP and SIGCONT to+ force it to exit the kernel and be patched.+ b) Patching CPU-bound user tasks. If the task is highly CPU-bound+ then it will get patched the next time it gets interrupted by an+ IRQ.+ c) In the future it could be useful for applying patches for+ architectures which don't yet have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. In+ this case you would have to signal most of the tasks on the+ system. However this isn't supported yet because there's+ currently no way to patch kthreads without+ HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE.++3. For idle "swapper" tasks, since they don't ever exit the kernel, they+ instead have a klp_update_patch_state() call in the idle loop which+ allows them to be patched before the CPU enters the idle state.++ (Note there's not yet such an approach for kthreads.)++All the above approaches may be skipped by setting the 'immediate' flag+in the 'klp_patch' struct, which will disable per-task consistency and+patch all tasks immediately. This can be useful if the patch doesn't+change any function or data semantics. Note that, even with this flag+set, it's possible that some tasks may still be running with an old+version of the function, until that function returns.++There's also an 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_func' struct which allows+you to specify that certain functions in the patch can be applied+without per-task consistency. This might be useful if you want to patch+a common function like schedule(), and the function change doesn't need+consistency but the rest of the patch does.++For architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, the user+must set patch->immediate which causes all tasks to be patched+immediately. This option should be used with care, only when the patch+doesn't change any function or data semantics.++In the future, architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE+may be allowed to use per-task consistency if we can come up with+another way to patch kthreads.++The /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/transition file shows whether a patch+is in transition. Only a single patch (the topmost patch on the stack)+can be in transition at a given time. A patch can remain in transition+indefinitely, if any of the tasks are stuck in the initial patch state.++A transition can be reversed and effectively canceled by writing the+opposite value to the /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/enabled file while+the transition is in progress. Then all the tasks will attempt to+converge back to the original patch state.++There's also a /proc/<pid>/patch_state file which can be used to+determine which tasks are blocking completion of a patching operation.+If a patch is in transition, this file shows 0 to indicate the task is+unpatched and 1 to indicate it's patched. Otherwise, if no patch is in+transition, it shows -1. Any tasks which are blocking the transition+can be signaled with SIGSTOP and SIGCONT to force them to change their+patched state.+++3.1 Adding consistency model support to new architectures+---------------------------------------------------------++For adding consistency model support to new architectures, there are a+few options:++1) Add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. This means porting objtool, and+ for non-DWARF unwinders, also making sure there's a way for the stack+ tracing code to detect interrupts on the stack.++2) Alternatively, figure out a way to patch kthreads without stack+ checking. If all kthreads sleep in the same place, then we can+ designate that place as a patching point. I think Petr M has been+ working on that? In that case, arches without+ HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE would still be able to use the+ non-stack-checking parts of the consistency model:++ a) patching user tasks when they cross the kernel/user space+ boundary; and++ b) patching kthreads and idle tasks at their designated patch points.++ This option isn't as good as option 1 because it requires signaling+ most of the tasks to patch them. But it could still be a good backup+ option for those architectures which don't have reliable stack traces+ yet.++In the meantime, patches for such architectures can bypass the+consistency model by setting klp_patch.immediate to true. 4. Livepatch module
@@ -134,7 +242,7 @@ Documentation/livepatch/module-elf-format.txt for more details. 4.2. Metadata-------------+------------- The patch is described by several structures that split the information into three levels:
@@ -239,9 +347,15 @@ Registered patches might be enabled either by calling klp_enable_patch() or by writing '1' to /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/enabled. The system will start using the new implementation of the patched functions at this stage.-In particular, if an original function is patched for the first time, a-function specific struct klp_ops is created and an universal ftrace handler-is registered.+When a patch is enabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where+tasks are converging to the patched state. This is indicated by a value+of '1' in /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/transition. Once all tasks have+been patched, the 'transition' value changes to '0'. For more+information about this process, see the "Consistency model" section.++If an original function is patched for the first time, a function+specific struct klp_ops is created and an universal ftrace handler is+registered. Functions might be patched multiple times. The ftrace handler is registered only once for the given function. Further patches just add an entry to the
@@ -261,6 +375,12 @@ by writing '0' to /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/enabled. At this stage either the code from the previously enabled patch or even the original code gets used.+When a patch is disabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where+tasks are converging to the unpatched state. This is indicated by a+value of '1' in /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/transition. Once all tasks+have been unpatched, the 'transition' value changes to '0'. For more+information about this process, see the "Consistency model" section.+ Here all the functions (struct klp_func) associated with the to-be-disabled patch are removed from the corresponding struct klp_ops. The ftrace handler is unregistered and the struct klp_ops is freed when the func_stack list
@@ -1973,6 +1973,9 @@ struct task_struct {/* A live task holds one reference. */atomic_tstack_refcount;#endif+#ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH+intpatch_state;+#endif/* CPU-specific state of this task */structthread_structthread;/*
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ static void klp_find_object_module(struct klp_object *obj)mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);}-/* klp_mutex must be held by caller */staticboolklp_is_patch_registered(structklp_patch*patch){structklp_patch*mypatch;
@@ -281,20 +280,25 @@ static int klp_write_object_relocations(struct module *pmod,staticint__klp_disable_patch(structklp_patch*patch){-structklp_object*obj;+if(klp_transition_patch)+return-EBUSY;/* enforce stacking: only the last enabled patch can be disabled */if(!list_is_last(&patch->list,&klp_patches)&&list_next_entry(patch,list)->enabled)return-EBUSY;-pr_notice("disabling patch '%s'\n",patch->mod->name);+klp_init_transition(patch,KLP_UNPATCHED);-klp_for_each_object(patch,obj){-if(obj->patched)-klp_unpatch_object(obj);-}+/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheklp_target_statewritein+*klp_init_transition()andtheTIF_PATCH_PENDINGwritesin+*klp_start_transition()toensurethatklp_update_patch_state()+*doesn'tsetatask->patch_statetoKLP_UNDEFINED.+*/+smp_wmb();+klp_start_transition();patch->enabled=false;return0;
@@ -337,6 +341,9 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch)structklp_object*obj;intret;+if(klp_transition_patch)+return-EBUSY;+if(WARN_ON(patch->enabled))return-EINVAL;
@@ -347,22 +354,37 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch)pr_notice("enabling patch '%s'\n",patch->mod->name);+klp_init_transition(patch,KLP_PATCHED);++/*+*Enforcetheorderofthefunc->transitionwritesin+*klp_init_transition()andtheops->func_stackwritesin+*klp_patch_object(),sothatklp_ftrace_handler()willseethe+*func->transitionupdatesbeforethehandlerisregisteredandthe+*newfuncsbecomevisibletothehandler.+*/+smp_wmb();+klp_for_each_object(patch,obj){if(!klp_is_object_loaded(obj))continue;ret=klp_patch_object(obj);-if(ret)-gotounregister;+if(ret){+pr_warn("failed to enable patch '%s'\n",+patch->mod->name);++klp_unpatch_objects(patch);+klp_complete_transition();++returnret;+}}+klp_start_transition();patch->enabled=true;return0;--unregister:-WARN_ON(__klp_disable_patch(patch));-returnret;}/**
@@ -544,6 +581,7 @@ static int klp_init_func(struct klp_object *obj, struct klp_func *func)INIT_LIST_HEAD(&func->stack_node);func->patched=false;+func->transition=false;/* The format for the sysfs directory is <function,sympos> where sympos*isthenthoccurrenceofthissymbolinkallsymsforthepatched
@@ -740,6 +778,16 @@ int klp_register_patch(struct klp_patch *patch)return-ENODEV;/*+*Architectureswithoutreliablestacktraceshavetoset+*patch->immediatebecausethere'scurrentlynowaytopatchkthreads+*withtheconsistencymodel.+*/+if(!klp_have_reliable_stack()&&!patch->immediate){+pr_err("This architecture doesn't have support for the livepatch consistency model.\n");+return-ENOSYS;+}++/**Areferenceistakenonthepatchmoduletopreventitfrombeing*unloaded.Rightnow,wedon'tallowpatchmodulestounloadsince*thereiscurrentlynomethodtodetermineifathreadisstill
@@ -788,7 +836,11 @@ int klp_module_coming(struct module *mod)gotoerr;}-if(!patch->enabled)+/*+*Onlypatchthemoduleifthepatchisenabledoris+*intransition.+*/+if(!patch->enabled&&patch!=klp_transition_patch)break;pr_notice("applying patch '%s' to loading module '%s'\n",
@@ -0,0 +1,525 @@+/*+*transition.c-KernelLivePatchingtransitionfunctions+*+*Copyright(C)2015-2016JoshPoimboeuf<jpoimboe@redhat.com>+*+*Thisprogramisfreesoftware;youcanredistributeitand/or+*modifyitunderthetermsoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*aspublishedbytheFreeSoftwareFoundation;eitherversion2+*oftheLicense,or(atyouroption)anylaterversion.+*+*Thisprogramisdistributedinthehopethatitwillbeuseful,+*butWITHOUTANYWARRANTY;withouteventheimpliedwarrantyof+*MERCHANTABILITYorFITNESSFORAPARTICULARPURPOSE.Seethe+*GNUGeneralPublicLicenseformoredetails.+*+*YoushouldhavereceivedacopyoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*alongwiththisprogram;ifnot,see<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.+*/++#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt++#include<linux/cpu.h>+#include<linux/stacktrace.h>+#include"patch.h"+#include"transition.h"+#include"../sched/sched.h"++#define MAX_STACK_ENTRIES 100+#define STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE 128++externstructmutexklp_mutex;++structklp_patch*klp_transition_patch;++staticintklp_target_state=KLP_UNDEFINED;++/*+*Thisworkcanbeperformedperiodicallytofinishpatchingorunpatchingany+*"straggler"taskswhichfailedtotransitioninthefirstattempt.+*/+staticvoidklp_try_complete_transition(void);+staticvoidklp_transition_work_fn(structwork_struct*work)+{+mutex_lock(&klp_mutex);++if(klp_transition_patch)+klp_try_complete_transition();++mutex_unlock(&klp_mutex);+}+staticDECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(klp_transition_work,klp_transition_work_fn);++/*+*Thetransitiontothetargetpatchstateiscomplete.Cleanupthedata+*structures.+*/+voidklp_complete_transition(void)+{+structklp_object*obj;+structklp_func*func;+structtask_struct*g,*task;+unsignedintcpu;++if(klp_transition_patch->immediate)+gotodone;++klp_for_each_object(klp_transition_patch,obj)+klp_for_each_func(obj,func)+func->transition=false;++/* Prevent klp_ftrace_handler() from seeing KLP_UNDEFINED state */+if(klp_target_state==KLP_PATCHED)+synchronize_rcu();++read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+for_each_process_thread(g,task){+WARN_ON_ONCE(test_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING));+task->patch_state=KLP_UNDEFINED;+}+read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++for_each_possible_cpu(cpu){+task=idle_task(cpu);+WARN_ON_ONCE(test_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING));+task->patch_state=KLP_UNDEFINED;+}++done:+klp_target_state=KLP_UNDEFINED;+klp_transition_patch=NULL;+}++/*+*Switchthepatchedstateofthetasktothesetoffunctionsinthetarget+*patchstate.+*+*NOTE:Iftaskisnot'current',thecallermustensurethetaskisinactive.+*Otherwiseklp_ftrace_handler()mightreadthewrong'patch_state'value.+*/+voidklp_update_patch_state(structtask_struct*task)+{+rcu_read_lock();++/*+*Thistest_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag()callalsoservesasaread+*barriertoenforcetheorderoftheTIF_PATCH_PENDINGand+*klp_target_statereads.Thecorrespondingwritebarrierisin+*__klp_disable_patch().+*/+if(test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING))+task->patch_state=READ_ONCE(klp_target_state);++rcu_read_unlock();+}++/*+*Determinewhetherthegivenstacktraceincludesanyreferencestoa+*to-be-patchedorto-be-unpatchedfunction.+*/+staticintklp_check_stack_func(structklp_func*func,+structstack_trace*trace)+{+unsignedlongfunc_addr,func_size,address;+structklp_ops*ops;+inti;++if(func->immediate)+return0;++for(i=0;i<trace->nr_entries;i++){+address=trace->entries[i];++if(klp_target_state==KLP_UNPATCHED){+/*+*Checkfortheto-be-unpatchedfunction+*(thefuncitself).+*/+func_addr=(unsignedlong)func->new_func;+func_size=func->new_size;+}else{+/*+*Checkfortheto-be-patchedfunction+*(thepreviousfunc).+*/+ops=klp_find_ops(func->old_addr);++if(list_is_singular(&ops->func_stack)){+/* original function */+func_addr=func->old_addr;+func_size=func->old_size;+}else{+/* previously patched function */+structklp_func*prev;++prev=list_next_entry(func,stack_node);+func_addr=(unsignedlong)prev->new_func;+func_size=prev->new_size;+}+}++if(address>=func_addr&&address<func_addr+func_size)+return-EAGAIN;+}++return0;+}++/*+*Determinewhetherit'ssafetotransitionthetasktothetargetpatchstate+*bylookingforanyto-be-patchedorto-be-unpatchedfunctionsonitsstack.+*/+staticintklp_check_stack(structtask_struct*task,char*err_buf)+{+staticunsignedlongentries[MAX_STACK_ENTRIES];+structstack_tracetrace;+structklp_object*obj;+structklp_func*func;+intret;++trace.skip=0;+trace.nr_entries=0;+trace.max_entries=MAX_STACK_ENTRIES;+trace.entries=entries;+ret=save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable(task,&trace);+WARN_ON_ONCE(ret==-ENOSYS);+if(ret){+snprintf(err_buf,STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+"%s: %s:%d has an unreliable stack\n",+__func__,task->comm,task->pid);+returnret;+}++klp_for_each_object(klp_transition_patch,obj){+if(!obj->patched)+continue;+klp_for_each_func(obj,func){+ret=klp_check_stack_func(func,&trace);+if(ret){+snprintf(err_buf,STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+"%s: %s:%d is sleeping on function %s\n",+__func__,task->comm,task->pid,+func->old_name);+returnret;+}+}+}++return0;+}++/*+*Trytosafelyswitchatasktothetargetpatchstate.Ifit'scurrently+*running,orit'ssleepingonato-be-patchedorto-be-unpatchedfunction,or+*ifthestackisunreliable,returnfalse.+*/+staticboolklp_try_switch_task(structtask_struct*task)+{+structrq*rq;+structrq_flagsflags;+intret;+boolsuccess=false;+charerr_buf[STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE];++err_buf[0]='\0';++/* check if this task has already switched over */+if(task->patch_state==klp_target_state)+returntrue;++/*+*Forarcheswhichdon'thavereliablestacktraces,wehavetorely+*onothermethods(e.g.,switchingtasksatkernelexit).+*/+if(!klp_have_reliable_stack())+returnfalse;++/*+*Nowtrytocheckthestackforanyto-be-patchedorto-be-unpatched+*functions.Ifallgoeswell,switchthetasktothetargetpatch+*state.+*/+rq=task_rq_lock(task,&flags);++if(task_running(rq,task)&&task!=current){+snprintf(err_buf,STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+"%s: %s:%d is running\n",__func__,task->comm,+task->pid);+gotodone;+}++ret=klp_check_stack(task,err_buf);+if(ret)+gotodone;++success=true;++clear_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+task->patch_state=klp_target_state;++done:+task_rq_unlock(rq,task,&flags);++/*+*Duetoconsoledeadlockissues,pr_debug()can'tbeusedwhile+*holdingthetaskrqlock.Insteadwehavetouseatemporarybuffer+*andprintthedebugmessageafterreleasingthelock.+*/+if(err_buf[0]!='\0')+pr_debug("%s",err_buf);++returnsuccess;++}++/*+*Trytoswitchallremainingtaskstothetargetpatchstatebywalkingthe+*stacksofsleepingtasksandlookingforanyto-be-patchedor+*to-be-unpatchedfunctions.Ifsuchfunctionsarefound,thetaskcan'tbe+*switchedyet.+*+*Ifanytasksarestillstuckintheinitialpatchstate,schedulearetry.+*/+staticvoidklp_try_complete_transition(void)+{+unsignedintcpu;+structtask_struct*g,*task;+boolcomplete=true;++WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state==KLP_UNDEFINED);++/*+*Ifthepatchcanbeappliedorrevertedimmediately,skipthe+*per-tasktransitions.+*/+if(klp_transition_patch->immediate)+gotosuccess;++/*+*Trytoswitchthetaskstothetargetpatchstatebywalkingtheir+*stacksandlookingforanyto-be-patchedorto-be-unpatched+*functions.Ifsuchfunctionsarefoundonastack,orifthestack+*isdeemedunreliable,thetaskcan'tbeswitchedyet.+*+*Usuallythiswilltransitionmost(orall)ofthetasksonasystem+*unlessthepatchincludeschangestoaverycommonfunction.+*/+read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+for_each_process_thread(g,task)+if(!klp_try_switch_task(task))+complete=false;+read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++/*+*Dittofortheidle"swapper"tasks.+*/+get_online_cpus();+for_each_possible_cpu(cpu){+task=idle_task(cpu);+if(cpu_online(cpu)){+if(!klp_try_switch_task(task))+complete=false;+}elseif(task->patch_state!=klp_target_state){+/* offline idle tasks can be switched immediately */+clear_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+task->patch_state=klp_target_state;+}+}+put_online_cpus();++/*+*Sometasksweren'tabletobeswitchedover.Tryagainlaterand/or+*waitforothermethodslikekernelexitswitching.+*/+if(!complete){+schedule_delayed_work(&klp_transition_work,+round_jiffies_relative(HZ));+return;+}++success:++if(klp_target_state==KLP_UNPATCHED){+/*+*AlltaskshavetransitionedtoKLP_UNPATCHEDsowecannow+*removethenewfunctionsfromthefunc_stack.+*/+klp_unpatch_objects(klp_transition_patch);++/*+*Makesureklp_ftrace_handler()seesthatthefunctionshave+*beenremovedfromops->func_stackbeforeweclear+*func->transition.Otherwiseitmaypickthewrong+*transition.+*/+synchronize_rcu();+}++pr_notice("'%s': %s complete\n",klp_transition_patch->mod->name,+klp_target_state==KLP_PATCHED?"patching":"unpatching");++/* we're done, now cleanup the data structures */+klp_complete_transition();+}++/*+*Startthetransitiontothespecifiedtargetpatchstatesotaskscanbegin+*switchingtoit.+*/+voidklp_start_transition(void)+{+structtask_struct*g,*task;+unsignedintcpu;++WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state==KLP_UNDEFINED);++pr_notice("'%s': %s...\n",klp_transition_patch->mod->name,+klp_target_state==KLP_PATCHED?"patching":"unpatching");++/*+*Ifthepatchcanbeappliedorrevertedimmediately,skipthe+*per-tasktransitions.+*/+if(klp_transition_patch->immediate)+return;++/*+*Markallnormaltasksasneedingapatchstateupdate.They'll+*switcheitherinklp_try_complete_transition()orastheyexitthe+*kernel.+*/+read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+for_each_process_thread(g,task)+if(task->patch_state!=klp_target_state)+set_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++/*+*Markallidletasksasneedingapatchstateupdate.They'llswitch+*eitherinklp_try_complete_transition()orattheidleloopswitch+*point.+*/+for_each_possible_cpu(cpu){+task=idle_task(cpu);+if(task->patch_state!=klp_target_state)+set_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+}++klp_try_complete_transition();+}++/*+*Initializetheglobaltargetpatchstateandalltaskstotheinitialpatch+*state,andinitializeallfunctiontransitionstatestotrueinpreparation+*forpatchingorunpatching.+*/+voidklp_init_transition(structklp_patch*patch,intstate)+{+structtask_struct*g,*task;+unsignedintcpu;+structklp_object*obj;+structklp_func*func;+intinitial_state=!state;++WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state!=KLP_UNDEFINED);++klp_transition_patch=patch;++/*+*Settheglobaltargetpatchstatewhichtaskswillswitchto.This+*hasnoeffectuntiltheTIF_PATCH_PENDINGflagsgetsetlater.+*/+klp_target_state=state;++/*+*Ifthepatchcanbeappliedorrevertedimmediately,skipthe+*per-tasktransitions.+*/+if(patch->immediate)+return;++/*+*Initializealltaskstotheinitialpatchstatetopreparethemfor+*switchingtothetargetstate.+*/+read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+for_each_process_thread(g,task){+WARN_ON_ONCE(task->patch_state!=KLP_UNDEFINED);+task->patch_state=initial_state;+}+read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++/*+*Dittofortheidle"swapper"tasks.+*/+for_each_possible_cpu(cpu){+task=idle_task(cpu);+WARN_ON_ONCE(task->patch_state!=KLP_UNDEFINED);+task->patch_state=initial_state;+}++/*+*Enforcetheorderofthetask->patch_stateinitializationsandthe+*func->transitionupdatestoensurethat,intheenablepath,+*klp_ftrace_handler()doesn'tseeafuncintransitionwitha+*task->patch_stateofKLP_UNDEFINED.+*/+smp_wmb();++/*+*Setthefunctransitionstatessoklp_ftrace_handler()willknowto+*switchtothetransitionlogic.+*+*Whenpatching,thefuncsaren'tyetinthefunc_stackandwillbe+*madevisibletotheftracehandlershortlybythecallsto+*klp_patch_object().+*+*Whenunpatching,thefuncsarealreadyinthefunc_stackandsoare+*alreadyvisibletotheftracehandler.+*/+klp_for_each_object(patch,obj)+klp_for_each_func(obj,func)+func->transition=true;+}++/*+*Thisfunctioncanbecalledinthemiddleofanexistingtransitionto+*reversethedirectionofthetargetpatchstate.Thiscanbedoneto+*effectivelycancelanexistingenableordisableoperationifthereareany+*taskswhicharestuckintheinitialpatchstate.+*/+voidklp_reverse_transition(void)+{+unsignedintcpu;+structtask_struct*g,*task;++klp_transition_patch->enabled=!klp_transition_patch->enabled;++klp_target_state=!klp_target_state;++/*+*ClearallTIF_PATCH_PENDINGflagstopreventracescausedby+*klp_update_patch_state()runninginparallelwith+*klp_start_transition().+*/+read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+for_each_process_thread(g,task)+clear_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)+clear_tsk_thread_flag(idle_task(cpu),TIF_PATCH_PENDING);++/* Let any remaining calls to klp_update_patch_state() complete */+synchronize_rcu();++klp_start_transition();+}++/* Called from copy_process() during fork */+voidklp_copy_process(structtask_struct*child)+{+child->patch_state=current->patch_state;++/* TIF_PATCH_PENDING gets copied in setup_thread_stack() */+}
@@ -69,6 +71,21 @@ static int livepatch_init(void){intret;+if(!klp_have_reliable_stack()&&!patch.immediate){+/*+*WARNING:Beverycarefulwhenusing'patch.immediate'in+*yourpatches.It'soktouseitforsimplepatcheslike+*this,butformorecomplexpatcheswhichchangefunction+*semantics,lockingsemantics,ordatastructures,itmaynot+*besafe.Useofthisoptionwillalsopreventremovalof+*thepatch.+*+*SeeDocumentation/livepatch/livepatch.txtformoredetails.+*/+patch.immediate=true;+pr_notice("The consistency model isn't supported for your architecture. Bypassing safety mechanisms and applying the patch immediately.\n");+}+ret=klp_register_patch(&patch);if(ret)returnret;
For the consistency model we'll need to know the sizes of the old and
new functions to determine if they're on the stacks of any tasks.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kamalesh Babulal <redacted>
---
include/linux/livepatch.h | 3 +++
kernel/livepatch/core.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
@@ -314,171 +279,6 @@ static int klp_write_object_relocations(struct module *pmod,returnret;}-staticvoidnotraceklp_ftrace_handler(unsignedlongip,-unsignedlongparent_ip,-structftrace_ops*fops,-structpt_regs*regs)-{-structklp_ops*ops;-structklp_func*func;--ops=container_of(fops,structklp_ops,fops);--rcu_read_lock();-func=list_first_or_null_rcu(&ops->func_stack,structklp_func,-stack_node);-if(WARN_ON_ONCE(!func))-gotounlock;--klp_arch_set_pc(regs,(unsignedlong)func->new_func);-unlock:-rcu_read_unlock();-}--/*-*Convertafunctionaddressintotheappropriateftracelocation.-*-*Usuallythisisjusttheaddressofthefunction,butonsomearchitectures-*it'smorecomplicatedsoallowthemtoprovideacustombehaviour.-*/-#ifndef klp_get_ftrace_location-staticunsignedlongklp_get_ftrace_location(unsignedlongfaddr)-{-returnfaddr;-}-#endif--staticvoidklp_unpatch_func(structklp_func*func)-{-structklp_ops*ops;--if(WARN_ON(!func->patched))-return;-if(WARN_ON(!func->old_addr))-return;--ops=klp_find_ops(func->old_addr);-if(WARN_ON(!ops))-return;--if(list_is_singular(&ops->func_stack)){-unsignedlongftrace_loc;--ftrace_loc=klp_get_ftrace_location(func->old_addr);-if(WARN_ON(!ftrace_loc))-return;--WARN_ON(unregister_ftrace_function(&ops->fops));-WARN_ON(ftrace_set_filter_ip(&ops->fops,ftrace_loc,1,0));--list_del_rcu(&func->stack_node);-list_del(&ops->node);-kfree(ops);-}else{-list_del_rcu(&func->stack_node);-}--func->patched=false;-}--staticintklp_patch_func(structklp_func*func)-{-structklp_ops*ops;-intret;--if(WARN_ON(!func->old_addr))-return-EINVAL;--if(WARN_ON(func->patched))-return-EINVAL;--ops=klp_find_ops(func->old_addr);-if(!ops){-unsignedlongftrace_loc;--ftrace_loc=klp_get_ftrace_location(func->old_addr);-if(!ftrace_loc){-pr_err("failed to find location for function '%s'\n",-func->old_name);-return-EINVAL;-}--ops=kzalloc(sizeof(*ops),GFP_KERNEL);-if(!ops)-return-ENOMEM;--ops->fops.func=klp_ftrace_handler;-ops->fops.flags=FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS|-FTRACE_OPS_FL_DYNAMIC|-FTRACE_OPS_FL_IPMODIFY;--list_add(&ops->node,&klp_ops);--INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ops->func_stack);-list_add_rcu(&func->stack_node,&ops->func_stack);--ret=ftrace_set_filter_ip(&ops->fops,ftrace_loc,0,0);-if(ret){-pr_err("failed to set ftrace filter for function '%s' (%d)\n",-func->old_name,ret);-gotoerr;-}--ret=register_ftrace_function(&ops->fops);-if(ret){-pr_err("failed to register ftrace handler for function '%s' (%d)\n",-func->old_name,ret);-ftrace_set_filter_ip(&ops->fops,ftrace_loc,1,0);-gotoerr;-}---}else{-list_add_rcu(&func->stack_node,&ops->func_stack);-}--func->patched=true;--return0;--err:-list_del_rcu(&func->stack_node);-list_del(&ops->node);-kfree(ops);-returnret;-}--staticvoidklp_unpatch_object(structklp_object*obj)-{-structklp_func*func;--klp_for_each_func(obj,func)-if(func->patched)-klp_unpatch_func(func);--obj->patched=false;-}--staticintklp_patch_object(structklp_object*obj)-{-structklp_func*func;-intret;--if(WARN_ON(obj->patched))-return-EINVAL;--klp_for_each_func(obj,func){-ret=klp_patch_func(func);-if(ret){-klp_unpatch_object(obj);-returnret;-}-}-obj->patched=true;--return0;-}-staticint__klp_disable_patch(structklp_patch*patch){structklp_object*obj;
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@+/*+*patch.c-livepatchpatchingfunctions+*+*Copyright(C)2014SethJennings<sjenning@redhat.com>+*Copyright(C)2014SUSE+*Copyright(C)2015JoshPoimboeuf<jpoimboe@redhat.com>+*+*Thisprogramisfreesoftware;youcanredistributeitand/or+*modifyitunderthetermsoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*aspublishedbytheFreeSoftwareFoundation;eitherversion2+*oftheLicense,or(atyouroption)anylaterversion.+*+*Thisprogramisdistributedinthehopethatitwillbeuseful,+*butWITHOUTANYWARRANTY;withouteventheimpliedwarrantyof+*MERCHANTABILITYorFITNESSFORAPARTICULARPURPOSE.Seethe+*GNUGeneralPublicLicenseformoredetails.+*+*YoushouldhavereceivedacopyoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*alongwiththisprogram;ifnot,see<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.+*/++#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt++#include<linux/livepatch.h>+#include<linux/list.h>+#include<linux/ftrace.h>+#include<linux/rculist.h>+#include<linux/slab.h>+#include<linux/bug.h>+#include<linux/printk.h>+#include"patch.h"++staticLIST_HEAD(klp_ops);++structklp_ops*klp_find_ops(unsignedlongold_addr)+{+structklp_ops*ops;+structklp_func*func;++list_for_each_entry(ops,&klp_ops,node){+func=list_first_entry(&ops->func_stack,structklp_func,+stack_node);+if(func->old_addr==old_addr)+returnops;+}++returnNULL;+}++staticvoidnotraceklp_ftrace_handler(unsignedlongip,+unsignedlongparent_ip,+structftrace_ops*fops,+structpt_regs*regs)+{+structklp_ops*ops;+structklp_func*func;++ops=container_of(fops,structklp_ops,fops);++rcu_read_lock();+func=list_first_or_null_rcu(&ops->func_stack,structklp_func,+stack_node);+if(WARN_ON_ONCE(!func))+gotounlock;++klp_arch_set_pc(regs,(unsignedlong)func->new_func);+unlock:+rcu_read_unlock();+}++/*+*Convertafunctionaddressintotheappropriateftracelocation.+*+*Usuallythisisjusttheaddressofthefunction,butonsomearchitectures+*it'smorecomplicatedsoallowthemtoprovideacustombehaviour.+*/+#ifndef klp_get_ftrace_location+staticunsignedlongklp_get_ftrace_location(unsignedlongfaddr)+{+returnfaddr;+}+#endif++staticvoidklp_unpatch_func(structklp_func*func)+{+structklp_ops*ops;++if(WARN_ON(!func->patched))+return;+if(WARN_ON(!func->old_addr))+return;++ops=klp_find_ops(func->old_addr);+if(WARN_ON(!ops))+return;++if(list_is_singular(&ops->func_stack)){+unsignedlongftrace_loc;++ftrace_loc=klp_get_ftrace_location(func->old_addr);+if(WARN_ON(!ftrace_loc))+return;++WARN_ON(unregister_ftrace_function(&ops->fops));+WARN_ON(ftrace_set_filter_ip(&ops->fops,ftrace_loc,1,0));++list_del_rcu(&func->stack_node);+list_del(&ops->node);+kfree(ops);+}else{+list_del_rcu(&func->stack_node);+}++func->patched=false;+}++staticintklp_patch_func(structklp_func*func)+{+structklp_ops*ops;+intret;++if(WARN_ON(!func->old_addr))+return-EINVAL;++if(WARN_ON(func->patched))+return-EINVAL;++ops=klp_find_ops(func->old_addr);+if(!ops){+unsignedlongftrace_loc;++ftrace_loc=klp_get_ftrace_location(func->old_addr);+if(!ftrace_loc){+pr_err("failed to find location for function '%s'\n",+func->old_name);+return-EINVAL;+}++ops=kzalloc(sizeof(*ops),GFP_KERNEL);+if(!ops)+return-ENOMEM;++ops->fops.func=klp_ftrace_handler;+ops->fops.flags=FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS|+FTRACE_OPS_FL_DYNAMIC|+FTRACE_OPS_FL_IPMODIFY;++list_add(&ops->node,&klp_ops);++INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ops->func_stack);+list_add_rcu(&func->stack_node,&ops->func_stack);++ret=ftrace_set_filter_ip(&ops->fops,ftrace_loc,0,0);+if(ret){+pr_err("failed to set ftrace filter for function '%s' (%d)\n",+func->old_name,ret);+gotoerr;+}++ret=register_ftrace_function(&ops->fops);+if(ret){+pr_err("failed to register ftrace handler for function '%s' (%d)\n",+func->old_name,ret);+ftrace_set_filter_ip(&ops->fops,ftrace_loc,1,0);+gotoerr;+}+++}else{+list_add_rcu(&func->stack_node,&ops->func_stack);+}++func->patched=true;++return0;++err:+list_del_rcu(&func->stack_node);+list_del(&ops->node);+kfree(ops);+returnret;+}++voidklp_unpatch_object(structklp_object*obj)+{+structklp_func*func;++klp_for_each_func(obj,func)+if(func->patched)+klp_unpatch_func(func);++obj->patched=false;+}++intklp_patch_object(structklp_object*obj)+{+structklp_func*func;+intret;++if(WARN_ON(obj->patched))+return-EINVAL;++klp_for_each_func(obj,func){+ret=klp_patch_func(func);+if(ret){+klp_unpatch_object(obj);+returnret;+}+}+obj->patched=true;++return0;+}
Add the TIF_PATCH_PENDING thread flag to enable the new livepatch
per-task consistency model for x86_64. The bit getting set indicates
the thread has a pending patch which needs to be applied when the thread
exits the kernel.
The bit is placed in the _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK macro, which results in
exit_to_usermode_loop() calling klp_update_patch_state() when it's set.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Kamalesh Babulal <redacted>
---
arch/x86/entry/common.c | 9 ++++++---
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
From: Jiri Slaby <redacted>
Group the TIF thread flag bits by their inclusion in the _TIF_WORK and
_TIF_TRACE macros.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/thread_info.h | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
From: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Date: 2017-01-26 13:56:12
On Thu 2017-01-19 09:46:09, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
For live patching and possibly other use cases, a stack trace is only
useful if it can be assured that it's completely reliable. Add a new
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() function to achieve that.
We should make sure that show_stack() is called only once as well.
Otherwise, it would fill logbuffer with random stacktraces without
any context. It might easily cause flood of messages and the first
useful one might get lost in the ring buffer.
quoted hunk
+ return -1;+ }+ break;+ }++ addr = unwind_get_return_address(&state);++ /*+ * A NULL or invalid return address probably means there's some+ * generated code which __kernel_text_address() doesn't know+ * about.+ */+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!addr)) {+ show_stack(task, NULL);
Same here.
quoted hunk
+ return -1;+ }++ if (save_stack_address(trace, addr, false))+ return -1;+ }++ /* Check for stack corruption */+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(unwind_error(&state))) {+ show_stack(task, NULL);
And here.
quoted hunk
+ return -1;+ }++ if (trace->nr_entries < trace->max_entries)+ trace->entries[trace->nr_entries++] = ULONG_MAX;++ return 0;+}++/*+ * This function returns an error if it detects any unreliable features of the+ * stack. Otherwise it guarantees that the stack trace is reliable.+ *+ * If the task is not 'current', the caller *must* ensure the task is inactive.+ */+int save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable(struct task_struct *tsk,+ struct stack_trace *trace)+{+ int ret;++ if (!try_get_task_stack(tsk))+ return -EINVAL;++ ret = __save_stack_trace_reliable(trace, tsk);
__save_stack_trace_reliable() returns -1 in case of problems.
But this function returns a meaningful error codes, line -EINVAL,
-ENOSYS, otherwise.
We should either transform the error code here to something
"meaningful", probably -EINVAL. Or we should update
__save_stack_trace_reliable() to return meaningful error codes.
quoted hunk
+ put_task_stack(tsk);++ return ret;+}+#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE */+ /* Userspace stacktrace - based on kernel/trace/trace_sysprof.c */ struct stack_frame_user {
Otherwise, all the logic looks fine to me. Great work!
Best Regards,
Petr
On Thu, Jan 26, 2017 at 02:56:03PM +0100, Petr Mladek wrote:
On Thu 2017-01-19 09:46:09, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
quoted
For live patching and possibly other use cases, a stack trace is only
useful if it can be assured that it's completely reliable. Add a new
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() function to achieve that.
We should make sure that show_stack() is called only once as well.
Otherwise, it would fill logbuffer with random stacktraces without
any context. It might easily cause flood of messages and the first
useful one might get lost in the ring buffer.
Agreed.
quoted
+ return -1;+ }+ break;+ }++ addr = unwind_get_return_address(&state);++ /*+ * A NULL or invalid return address probably means there's some+ * generated code which __kernel_text_address() doesn't know+ * about.+ */+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!addr)) {+ show_stack(task, NULL);
Same here.
quoted
+ return -1;+ }++ if (save_stack_address(trace, addr, false))+ return -1;+ }++ /* Check for stack corruption */+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(unwind_error(&state))) {+ show_stack(task, NULL);
And here.
quoted
+ return -1;+ }++ if (trace->nr_entries < trace->max_entries)+ trace->entries[trace->nr_entries++] = ULONG_MAX;++ return 0;+}++/*+ * This function returns an error if it detects any unreliable features of the+ * stack. Otherwise it guarantees that the stack trace is reliable.+ *+ * If the task is not 'current', the caller *must* ensure the task is inactive.+ */+int save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable(struct task_struct *tsk,+ struct stack_trace *trace)+{+ int ret;++ if (!try_get_task_stack(tsk))+ return -EINVAL;++ ret = __save_stack_trace_reliable(trace, tsk);
__save_stack_trace_reliable() returns -1 in case of problems.
But this function returns a meaningful error codes, line -EINVAL,
-ENOSYS, otherwise.
We should either transform the error code here to something
"meaningful", probably -EINVAL. Or we should update
__save_stack_trace_reliable() to return meaningful error codes.
Agreed.
quoted
+ put_task_stack(tsk);++ return ret;+}+#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE */+ /* Userspace stacktrace - based on kernel/trace/trace_sysprof.c */ struct stack_frame_user {
Otherwise, all the logic looks fine to me. Great work!
@@ -29,12 +31,12 @@ extern void save_stack_trace_user(struct stack_trace *trace);# define save_stack_trace_user(trace) do { } while (0)#endif-#else+#else /* !CONFIG_STACKTRACE */# define save_stack_trace(trace) do { } while (0)# define save_stack_trace_tsk(tsk, trace) do { } while (0)# define save_stack_trace_user(trace) do { } while (0)# define print_stack_trace(trace, spaces) do { } while (0)# define snprint_stack_trace(buf, size, trace, spaces) do { } while (0)
Is there a reason you did not define empty save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable()
here? Right, it should not be needed now as livepatching is the only user,
but still.
Miroslav
From: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Date: 2017-01-27 08:54:08
On Thu, 19 Jan 2017, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
Create temporary stubs for klp_update_patch_state() so we can add
TIF_PATCH_PENDING to different architectures in separate patches without
breaking build bisectability.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Miroslav
@@ -29,12 +31,12 @@ extern void save_stack_trace_user(struct stack_trace *trace);# define save_stack_trace_user(trace) do { } while (0)#endif-#else+#else /* !CONFIG_STACKTRACE */# define save_stack_trace(trace) do { } while (0)# define save_stack_trace_tsk(tsk, trace) do { } while (0)# define save_stack_trace_user(trace) do { } while (0)# define print_stack_trace(trace, spaces) do { } while (0)# define snprint_stack_trace(buf, size, trace, spaces) do { } while (0)
Is there a reason you did not define empty save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable()
here? Right, it should not be needed now as livepatching is the only user,
but still.
Agreed, thanks. I'll make the stub return an error, since an empty
stack trace isn't very reliable.
--
Josh
From: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Date: 2017-01-31 14:31:56
On Thu, 19 Jan 2017, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
quoted hunk
Expose the per-task patch state value so users can determine which tasks
are holding up completion of a patching operation.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
---
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
fs/proc/base.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ Table of Contents 3.8 /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd> - Information about opened file 3.9 /proc/<pid>/map_files - Information about memory mapped files 3.10 /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns - Task timerslack value+ 3.11 /proc/<pid>/patch_state - Livepatch patch operation state 4 Configuring procfs 4.1 Mount options
@@ -1886,6 +1887,23 @@ Valid values are from 0 - ULLONG_MAX An application setting the value must have PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS level permissions on the task specified to change its timerslack_ns value.+3.11 /proc/<pid>/patch_state - Livepatch patch operation state+-----------------------------------------------------------------+When CONFIG_LIVEPATCH is enabled, this file displays the value of the+patch state for the task.++A value of '-1' indicates that no patch is in transition.++A value of '0' indicates that a patch is in transition and the task is+unpatched. If the patch is being enabled, then the task hasn't been+patched yet. If the patch is being disabled, then the task has already+been unpatched.++A value of '1' indicates that a patch is in transition and the task is+patched. If the patch is being enabled, then the task has already been+patched. If the patch is being disabled, then the task hasn't been+unpatched yet.+
Despite my review I thought about this some more. I think the logic make
sense internally but when exposed it can be confusing. We do not export
klp_target_state value, so users have to know if a patch is being enabled
or disabled. Of course, they should know that, but I guess they'd like to
use an userspace tool for this. Such tool needs to look at
/proc/<pid>/patch_state to find out which tasks are blocking the
completion and that is it. No more information anywhere.
We can either export klp_target_state, or change /proc/<pid>/patch_state
to show only two states - task is in transition (1), task is patched (0).
What do you think?
Miroslav
On Tue, Jan 31, 2017 at 03:31:39PM +0100, Miroslav Benes wrote:
On Thu, 19 Jan 2017, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
quoted
Expose the per-task patch state value so users can determine which tasks
are holding up completion of a patching operation.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
---
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
fs/proc/base.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ Table of Contents 3.8 /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd> - Information about opened file 3.9 /proc/<pid>/map_files - Information about memory mapped files 3.10 /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns - Task timerslack value+ 3.11 /proc/<pid>/patch_state - Livepatch patch operation state 4 Configuring procfs 4.1 Mount options
@@ -1886,6 +1887,23 @@ Valid values are from 0 - ULLONG_MAX An application setting the value must have PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS level permissions on the task specified to change its timerslack_ns value.+3.11 /proc/<pid>/patch_state - Livepatch patch operation state+-----------------------------------------------------------------+When CONFIG_LIVEPATCH is enabled, this file displays the value of the+patch state for the task.++A value of '-1' indicates that no patch is in transition.++A value of '0' indicates that a patch is in transition and the task is+unpatched. If the patch is being enabled, then the task hasn't been+patched yet. If the patch is being disabled, then the task has already+been unpatched.++A value of '1' indicates that a patch is in transition and the task is+patched. If the patch is being enabled, then the task has already been+patched. If the patch is being disabled, then the task hasn't been+unpatched yet.+
Despite my review I thought about this some more. I think the logic make
sense internally but when exposed it can be confusing. We do not export
klp_target_state value, so users have to know if a patch is being enabled
or disabled. Of course, they should know that, but I guess they'd like to
use an userspace tool for this. Such tool needs to look at
/proc/<pid>/patch_state to find out which tasks are blocking the
completion and that is it. No more information anywhere.
We can either export klp_target_state, or change /proc/<pid>/patch_state
to show only two states - task is in transition (1), task is patched (0).
What do you think?
Isn't this information already available in
/sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/{enabled,transition}?
--
Josh
From: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Date: 2017-02-01 08:55:06
On Tue, 31 Jan 2017, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
On Tue, Jan 31, 2017 at 03:31:39PM +0100, Miroslav Benes wrote:
quoted
On Thu, 19 Jan 2017, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
quoted
Expose the per-task patch state value so users can determine which tasks
are holding up completion of a patching operation.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
---
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
fs/proc/base.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ Table of Contents 3.8 /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd> - Information about opened file 3.9 /proc/<pid>/map_files - Information about memory mapped files 3.10 /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns - Task timerslack value+ 3.11 /proc/<pid>/patch_state - Livepatch patch operation state 4 Configuring procfs 4.1 Mount options
@@ -1886,6 +1887,23 @@ Valid values are from 0 - ULLONG_MAX An application setting the value must have PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS level permissions on the task specified to change its timerslack_ns value.+3.11 /proc/<pid>/patch_state - Livepatch patch operation state+-----------------------------------------------------------------+When CONFIG_LIVEPATCH is enabled, this file displays the value of the+patch state for the task.++A value of '-1' indicates that no patch is in transition.++A value of '0' indicates that a patch is in transition and the task is+unpatched. If the patch is being enabled, then the task hasn't been+patched yet. If the patch is being disabled, then the task has already+been unpatched.++A value of '1' indicates that a patch is in transition and the task is+patched. If the patch is being enabled, then the task has already been+patched. If the patch is being disabled, then the task hasn't been+unpatched yet.+
Despite my review I thought about this some more. I think the logic make
sense internally but when exposed it can be confusing. We do not export
klp_target_state value, so users have to know if a patch is being enabled
or disabled. Of course, they should know that, but I guess they'd like to
use an userspace tool for this. Such tool needs to look at
/proc/<pid>/patch_state to find out which tasks are blocking the
completion and that is it. No more information anywhere.
We can either export klp_target_state, or change /proc/<pid>/patch_state
to show only two states - task is in transition (1), task is patched (0).
What do you think?
Isn't this information already available in
/sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/{enabled,transition}?
transition no. That only gives the hint that something is happening with
the patch. But yes, enabled is the one I wanted. I don't know how I missed
that. Combined with /proc/<pid>/task it is exactly what a tool needs.
Miroslav
For live patching and possibly other use cases, a stack trace is only
useful if it can be assured that it's completely reliable. Add a new
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() function to achieve that.
Note that if the target task isn't the current task, and the target task
is allowed to run, then it could be writing the stack while the unwinder
is reading it, resulting in possible corruption. So the caller of
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() must ensure that the task is either
'current' or inactive.
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() relies on the x86 unwinder's detection
of pt_regs on the stack. If the pt_regs are not user-mode registers
from a syscall, then they indicate an in-kernel interrupt or exception
(e.g. preemption or a page fault), in which case the stack is considered
unreliable due to the nature of frame pointers.
It also relies on the x86 unwinder's detection of other issues, such as:
- corrupted stack data
- stack grows the wrong way
- stack walk doesn't reach the bottom
- user didn't provide a large enough entries array
Such issues are reported by checking unwind_error() and !unwind_done().
Also add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE so arch-independent code can
determine at build time whether the function is implemented.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
---
v4.1 changes:
- return -EINVAL in __save_stack_trace_reliable()
- only call show_stack() once
- add save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() define for !CONFIG_STACKTRACE
arch/Kconfig | 6 +++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h | 6 +++
arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c | 2 +
include/linux/stacktrace.h | 9 ++--
kernel/stacktrace.c | 12 +++++-
7 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
On Thu, Jan 19, 2017 at 09:46:08AM -0600, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
Here's v4, based on linux-next/master. Mostly minor changes this time,
primarily due to Petr's v3 comments.
So far, the only review comments have been related to the first patch,
of which I just posted an updated version.
If there are no more comments, it would be great to get these patches in
for the 4.11 merge window. Any objections to that?
--
Josh
From: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Date: 2017-02-01 20:52:50
On Wed, 1 Feb 2017, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
On Thu, Jan 19, 2017 at 09:46:08AM -0600, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
quoted
Here's v4, based on linux-next/master. Mostly minor changes this time,
primarily due to Petr's v3 comments.
So far, the only review comments have been related to the first patch,
of which I just posted an updated version.
Yes, I'm really sorry about that. I'm going through the main patch of the
series (13/15) and it's slow to explore all details. I know Petr is in the
process too (and I think he has found some issues. He'll speak up.).
If there are no more comments, it would be great to get these patches in
for the 4.11 merge window. Any objections to that?
That would be nice but I don't think it's realistic. The merge window is
quite close and we still need to finish the review and get some Acks -
at least arch maintainers and PeterZ and/or Ingo for rq lock.
It would be great to keep in next- for a while (one cycle) too.
Miroslav
If there are no more comments, it would be great to get these patches in
for the 4.11 merge window. Any objections to that?
That'd mean that the exposure in -next would be really short, which I'd
like to avoid. I'd love to tentatively target 4.12 though (I personally am
still far from being done with reviewing the patchset myself, thanks a lot
to Peter and Miroslav for doing all the heavy lifting on this front so
far).
More importantly though, we're still missing quite some Acks from
subsystem/arch maintainers. Namely, I'd really appreciate Acks for patches
touching sched/idle.c and s390/x86/ppc arch specific bits from the
respective maintainers.
Peter, Ingo, Heiko, Michael, please?
Thanks,
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
From: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Date: 2017-02-02 11:45:38
On Thu 2017-01-19 09:46:21, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
quoted hunk
Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the
foundation which will eventually enable us to patch those ~10% of
security patches which change function or data semantics. This is the
biggest remaining piece needed to make livepatch more generally useful.
diff --git a/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt b/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txtindex 7f04e13..fb00d66 100644--- a/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt+++ b/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt
+3.1 Adding consistency model support to new architectures
+---------------------------------------------------------
+
+For adding consistency model support to new architectures, there are a
+few options:
+
+1) Add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. This means porting objtool, and
+ for non-DWARF unwinders, also making sure there's a way for the stack
+ tracing code to detect interrupts on the stack.
+
+2) Alternatively, figure out a way to patch kthreads without stack
+ checking. If all kthreads sleep in the same place, then we can
+ designate that place as a patching point. I think Petr M has been
+ working on that?
Alternatively, every kthread has to explicitely switch
current->patch_state on a safe place. Kthreads are typically
"infinite" loops that do some action repeatedly. The safe
location is between the loops when there are no locks
taken and all data structures are in a well defined state.
The location is well defined when using the workqueues or
kthread worker API. These kthreads process "independent"
works in a generic loop.
It is much more complicated with kthreads using a custom
loop. There the safe place must be carefully localized case
by case.
quoted hunk
+ In that case, arches without+ HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE would still be able to use the+ non-stack-checking parts of the consistency model:++ a) patching user tasks when they cross the kernel/user space+ boundary; and++ b) patching kthreads and idle tasks at their designated patch points.++ This option isn't as good as option 1 because it requires signaling+ most of the tasks to patch them.
Kthreads need to be waken because most of them ignore signals.
And idle tasks might need to be explicitely scheduled if there
is too big load. Mirek knows more about this.
Well, I am not sure if you want to get into such details.
quoted hunk
+ But it could still be a good backup+ option for those architectures which don't have reliable stack traces+ yet.++In the meantime, patches for such architectures can bypass the+consistency model by setting klp_patch.immediate to true.
I would add that this is perfectly fine for patches that do not
change semantic of the patched functions. In practice, this is
usable in about 90% of security and critical fixes.
quoted hunk
4. Livepatch module
@@ -134,7 +242,7 @@ Documentation/livepatch/module-elf-format.txt for more details. 4.2. Metadata-------------+------------- The patch is described by several structures that split the information into three levels:
@@ -239,9 +347,15 @@ Registered patches might be enabled either by calling klp_enable_patch() or by writing '1' to /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/enabled. The system will start using the new implementation of the patched functions at this stage.-In particular, if an original function is patched for the first time, a-function specific struct klp_ops is created and an universal ftrace handler-is registered.+When a patch is enabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where+tasks are converging to the patched state. This is indicated by a value+of '1' in /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/transition. Once all tasks have+been patched, the 'transition' value changes to '0'. For more+information about this process, see the "Consistency model" section.++If an original function is patched for the first time, a function+specific struct klp_ops is created and an universal ftrace handler is+registered. Functions might be patched multiple times. The ftrace handler is registered only once for the given function. Further patches just add an entry to the
@@ -261,6 +375,12 @@ by writing '0' to /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/enabled. At this stage either the code from the previously enabled patch or even the original code gets used.+When a patch is disabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where+tasks are converging to the unpatched state. This is indicated by a+value of '1' in /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/transition. Once all tasks+have been unpatched, the 'transition' value changes to '0'. For more+information about this process, see the "Consistency model" section.+ Here all the functions (struct klp_func) associated with the to-be-disabled patch are removed from the corresponding struct klp_ops. The ftrace handler is unregistered and the struct klp_ops is freed when the func_stack list
@@ -1973,6 +1973,9 @@ struct task_struct {/* A live task holds one reference. */atomic_tstack_refcount;#endif+#ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH+intpatch_state;+#endif/* CPU-specific state of this task */structthread_structthread;/*
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ static void klp_find_object_module(struct klp_object *obj)mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);}-/* klp_mutex must be held by caller */staticboolklp_is_patch_registered(structklp_patch*patch){structklp_patch*mypatch;
@@ -281,20 +280,25 @@ static int klp_write_object_relocations(struct module *pmod,staticint__klp_disable_patch(structklp_patch*patch){-structklp_object*obj;+if(klp_transition_patch)+return-EBUSY;/* enforce stacking: only the last enabled patch can be disabled */if(!list_is_last(&patch->list,&klp_patches)&&list_next_entry(patch,list)->enabled)return-EBUSY;-pr_notice("disabling patch '%s'\n",patch->mod->name);+klp_init_transition(patch,KLP_UNPATCHED);-klp_for_each_object(patch,obj){-if(obj->patched)-klp_unpatch_object(obj);-}+/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheklp_target_statewritein+*klp_init_transition()andtheTIF_PATCH_PENDINGwritesin+*klp_start_transition()toensurethatklp_update_patch_state()+*doesn'tsetatask->patch_statetoKLP_UNDEFINED.+*/+smp_wmb();
The description is not clear. The klp_target_state manipulation
is synchronized by another barrier inside klp_init_transition().
Do we need this barrier at all?
It is not needed when the patch is immediate. klp_target_state
and task->patch_state are synchronized againts func->transition
by the other barrier in klp_init_transition(). The only thing left
is synchronizing func->transition against TIF_PATCH_PENDING.
But the compiler barrier should be enough here. The task must
not be migrated when it is inside klp_ftrace_handler().
At least I am not able to find the place for the corresponding
read barrier.
Note that we need the write barrier in __klp_enable_patch()
because ops->func_stack writes in klp_patch_object(). It is
correctly described there.
So, I would the write barrier here with something like:
/*
* Enforce the order of func->transtion write in
* klp_init_transition() against TIF_PATCH_PENDING writes
* in klp_start_transition(). The compiler barrier is
* enough because TIF_PATCH_PENDING flag has no effect
* when a task is inside klp_ftrace_handler(). It is
* the place where func->transition is read without lock.
* It is not a safe state to migrate a task, definitely.
*/
barrier();
@@ -337,6 +341,9 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) struct klp_object *obj; int ret;+ if (klp_transition_patch)+ return -EBUSY;+ if (WARN_ON(patch->enabled)) return -EINVAL;
@@ -347,22 +354,37 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) pr_notice("enabling patch '%s'\n", patch->mod->name);+ klp_init_transition(patch, KLP_PATCHED);++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the func->transition writes in+ * klp_init_transition() and the ops->func_stack writes in+ * klp_patch_object(), so that klp_ftrace_handler() will see the+ * func->transition updates before the handler is registered and the+ * new funcs become visible to the handler.+ */+ smp_wmb();+ klp_for_each_object(patch, obj) { if (!klp_is_object_loaded(obj)) continue; ret = klp_patch_object(obj);- if (ret)- goto unregister;+ if (ret) {+ pr_warn("failed to enable patch '%s'\n",+ patch->mod->name);++ klp_unpatch_objects(patch);
We should call here synchronize_rcu() here as we do
in klp_try_complete_transition. Some of the affected
functions might have more patches on the stack and we
need to make sure that klp_ftrace_handler() will
see the removed patch on the stack.
In fact, I would put/move the synchronize_rcu() into
klp_unpatch_objects().
@@ -544,6 +581,7 @@ static int klp_init_func(struct klp_object *obj, struct klp_func *func) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&func->stack_node); func->patched = false;+ func->transition = false; /* The format for the sysfs directory is <function,sympos> where sympos * is the nth occurrence of this symbol in kallsyms for the patched
@@ -740,6 +778,16 @@ int klp_register_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) return -ENODEV; /*+ * Architectures without reliable stack traces have to set+ * patch->immediate because there's currently no way to patch kthreads+ * with the consistency model.+ */+ if (!klp_have_reliable_stack() && !patch->immediate) {+ pr_err("This architecture doesn't have support for the livepatch consistency model.\n");+ return -ENOSYS;+ }++ /* * A reference is taken on the patch module to prevent it from being * unloaded. Right now, we don't allow patch modules to unload since * there is currently no method to determine if a thread is still
@@ -788,7 +836,11 @@ int klp_module_coming(struct module *mod) goto err; }- if (!patch->enabled)+ /*+ * Only patch the module if the patch is enabled or is+ * in transition.+ */+ if (!patch->enabled && patch != klp_transition_patch) break; pr_notice("applying patch '%s' to loading module '%s'\n",
@@ -54,15 +55,58 @@ static void notrace klp_ftrace_handler(unsigned long ip,{structklp_ops*ops;structklp_func*func;+intpatch_state;ops=container_of(fops,structklp_ops,fops);rcu_read_lock();+func=list_first_or_null_rcu(&ops->func_stack,structklp_func,stack_node);++/*+*funcshouldneverbeNULLbecausepreemptionshouldbedisabledhere+*andunregister_ftrace_function()doestheequivalentofa+*synchronize_sched()beforethefunc_stackremoval.+*/+if(WARN_ON_ONCE(!func))+gotounlock;++/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheops->func_stackandfunc->transitionreads.+*Thecorrespondingwritebarrierisin__klp_enable_patch().+*/+smp_rmb();
I was curious why the comment did not mention __klp_disable_patch().
It helped me to find that we did not need the write barrier there.
The counter piece in the disable path would be in klp_try_complete_transition()
and klp_unpatch_objects(). But there we need rcu_sychronize as a
bigger hammer.
quoted hunk
+ if (unlikely(func->transition)) {++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the func->transition and+ * current->patch_state reads. Otherwise we could read an+ * out-of-date task state and pick the wrong function. The+ * corresponding write barriers are in klp_init_transition()+ * and __klp_disable_patch().+ */+ smp_rmb();
We actually do not need the barrier in __klp_disable_patch().
The func->transition and task->patch_state manipulation are
synchronized by the barrier in klp_init_transition().
The manipulation related to TIF_PATCH_PENDING is
secure. klp_update_patch() must not be called when the task
is inside this ftrace handler.
I am sorry if I repeate myself. I try to check comments about
memory barriers. The things are complicated. Every location
helps to me to see it from a different point and use
a bit different wording.
quoted hunk
+ patch_state = current->patch_state;++ WARN_ON_ONCE(patch_state == KLP_UNDEFINED);++ if (patch_state == KLP_UNPATCHED) {+ /*+ * Use the previously patched version of the function.+ * If no previous patches exist, continue with the+ * original function.+ */+ func = list_entry_rcu(func->stack_node.next,+ struct klp_func, stack_node);++ if (&func->stack_node == &ops->func_stack)+ goto unlock;+ }+ }+ klp_arch_set_pc(regs, (unsigned long)func->new_func); unlock: rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -0,0 +1,525 @@+/*+*transition.c-KernelLivePatchingtransitionfunctions+*+*Copyright(C)2015-2016JoshPoimboeuf<jpoimboe@redhat.com>+*+*Thisprogramisfreesoftware;youcanredistributeitand/or+*modifyitunderthetermsoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*aspublishedbytheFreeSoftwareFoundation;eitherversion2+*oftheLicense,or(atyouroption)anylaterversion.+*+*Thisprogramisdistributedinthehopethatitwillbeuseful,+*butWITHOUTANYWARRANTY;withouteventheimpliedwarrantyof+*MERCHANTABILITYorFITNESSFORAPARTICULARPURPOSE.Seethe+*GNUGeneralPublicLicenseformoredetails.+*+*YoushouldhavereceivedacopyoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*alongwiththisprogram;ifnot,see<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.+*/++#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt++#include<linux/cpu.h>+#include<linux/stacktrace.h>+#include"patch.h"+#include"transition.h"+#include"../sched/sched.h"++#define MAX_STACK_ENTRIES 100+#define STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE 128++externstructmutexklp_mutex;++structklp_patch*klp_transition_patch;++staticintklp_target_state=KLP_UNDEFINED;++/*+*Thisworkcanbeperformedperiodicallytofinishpatchingorunpatchingany+*"straggler"taskswhichfailedtotransitioninthefirstattempt.+*/+staticvoidklp_try_complete_transition(void);+staticvoidklp_transition_work_fn(structwork_struct*work)+{+mutex_lock(&klp_mutex);++if(klp_transition_patch)+klp_try_complete_transition();++mutex_unlock(&klp_mutex);+}+staticDECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(klp_transition_work,klp_transition_work_fn);++/*+*Thetransitiontothetargetpatchstateiscomplete.Cleanupthedata+*structures.+*/+voidklp_complete_transition(void)+{+structklp_object*obj;+structklp_func*func;+structtask_struct*g,*task;+unsignedintcpu;++if(klp_transition_patch->immediate)+gotodone;++klp_for_each_object(klp_transition_patch,obj)+klp_for_each_func(obj,func)+func->transition=false;++/* Prevent klp_ftrace_handler() from seeing KLP_UNDEFINED state */+if(klp_target_state==KLP_PATCHED)+synchronize_rcu();++read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+for_each_process_thread(g,task){+WARN_ON_ONCE(test_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING));+task->patch_state=KLP_UNDEFINED;+}+read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++for_each_possible_cpu(cpu){+task=idle_task(cpu);+WARN_ON_ONCE(test_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING));+task->patch_state=KLP_UNDEFINED;+}++done:+klp_target_state=KLP_UNDEFINED;+klp_transition_patch=NULL;+}++/*+*Switchthepatchedstateofthetasktothesetoffunctionsinthetarget+*patchstate.+*+*NOTE:Iftaskisnot'current',thecallermustensurethetaskisinactive.+*Otherwiseklp_ftrace_handler()mightreadthewrong'patch_state'value.+*/+voidklp_update_patch_state(structtask_struct*task)+{+rcu_read_lock();++/*+*Thistest_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag()callalsoservesasaread+*barriertoenforcetheorderoftheTIF_PATCH_PENDINGand+*klp_target_statereads.Thecorrespondingwritebarrierisin+*__klp_disable_patch().+*/+if(test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING))+task->patch_state=READ_ONCE(klp_target_state);++rcu_read_unlock();+}++/*+*Determinewhetherthegivenstacktraceincludesanyreferencestoa+*to-be-patchedorto-be-unpatchedfunction.+*/+staticintklp_check_stack_func(structklp_func*func,+structstack_trace*trace)+{+unsignedlongfunc_addr,func_size,address;+structklp_ops*ops;+inti;++if(func->immediate)+return0;++for(i=0;i<trace->nr_entries;i++){+address=trace->entries[i];++if(klp_target_state==KLP_UNPATCHED){+/*+*Checkfortheto-be-unpatchedfunction+*(thefuncitself).+*/+func_addr=(unsignedlong)func->new_func;+func_size=func->new_size;+}else{+/*+*Checkfortheto-be-patchedfunction+*(thepreviousfunc).+*/+ops=klp_find_ops(func->old_addr);++if(list_is_singular(&ops->func_stack)){+/* original function */+func_addr=func->old_addr;+func_size=func->old_size;+}else{+/* previously patched function */+structklp_func*prev;++prev=list_next_entry(func,stack_node);+func_addr=(unsignedlong)prev->new_func;+func_size=prev->new_size;+}+}++if(address>=func_addr&&address<func_addr+func_size)+return-EAGAIN;+}++return0;+}++/*+*Determinewhetherit'ssafetotransitionthetasktothetargetpatchstate+*bylookingforanyto-be-patchedorto-be-unpatchedfunctionsonitsstack.+*/+staticintklp_check_stack(structtask_struct*task,char*err_buf)+{+staticunsignedlongentries[MAX_STACK_ENTRIES];+structstack_tracetrace;+structklp_object*obj;+structklp_func*func;+intret;++trace.skip=0;+trace.nr_entries=0;+trace.max_entries=MAX_STACK_ENTRIES;+trace.entries=entries;+ret=save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable(task,&trace);+WARN_ON_ONCE(ret==-ENOSYS);+if(ret){+snprintf(err_buf,STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+"%s: %s:%d has an unreliable stack\n",+__func__,task->comm,task->pid);+returnret;+}++klp_for_each_object(klp_transition_patch,obj){+if(!obj->patched)+continue;+klp_for_each_func(obj,func){+ret=klp_check_stack_func(func,&trace);+if(ret){+snprintf(err_buf,STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+"%s: %s:%d is sleeping on function %s\n",+__func__,task->comm,task->pid,+func->old_name);+returnret;+}+}+}++return0;+}++/*+*Trytosafelyswitchatasktothetargetpatchstate.Ifit'scurrently+*running,orit'ssleepingonato-be-patchedorto-be-unpatchedfunction,or+*ifthestackisunreliable,returnfalse.+*/+staticboolklp_try_switch_task(structtask_struct*task)+{+structrq*rq;+structrq_flagsflags;+intret;+boolsuccess=false;+charerr_buf[STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE];++err_buf[0]='\0';++/* check if this task has already switched over */+if(task->patch_state==klp_target_state)+returntrue;++/*+*Forarcheswhichdon'thavereliablestacktraces,wehavetorely+*onothermethods(e.g.,switchingtasksatkernelexit).+*/+if(!klp_have_reliable_stack())+returnfalse;++/*+*Nowtrytocheckthestackforanyto-be-patchedorto-be-unpatched+*functions.Ifallgoeswell,switchthetasktothetargetpatch+*state.+*/+rq=task_rq_lock(task,&flags);++if(task_running(rq,task)&&task!=current){+snprintf(err_buf,STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+"%s: %s:%d is running\n",__func__,task->comm,+task->pid);+gotodone;+}++ret=klp_check_stack(task,err_buf);+if(ret)+gotodone;++success=true;++clear_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+task->patch_state=klp_target_state;++done:+task_rq_unlock(rq,task,&flags);++/*+*Duetoconsoledeadlockissues,pr_debug()can'tbeusedwhile+*holdingthetaskrqlock.Insteadwehavetouseatemporarybuffer+*andprintthedebugmessageafterreleasingthelock.+*/+if(err_buf[0]!='\0')+pr_debug("%s",err_buf);++returnsuccess;++}++/*+*Trytoswitchallremainingtaskstothetargetpatchstatebywalkingthe+*stacksofsleepingtasksandlookingforanyto-be-patchedor+*to-be-unpatchedfunctions.Ifsuchfunctionsarefound,thetaskcan'tbe+*switchedyet.+*+*Ifanytasksarestillstuckintheinitialpatchstate,schedulearetry.+*/+staticvoidklp_try_complete_transition(void)+{+unsignedintcpu;+structtask_struct*g,*task;+boolcomplete=true;++WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state==KLP_UNDEFINED);++/*+*Ifthepatchcanbeappliedorrevertedimmediately,skipthe+*per-tasktransitions.+*/+if(klp_transition_patch->immediate)+gotosuccess;++/*+*Trytoswitchthetaskstothetargetpatchstatebywalkingtheir+*stacksandlookingforanyto-be-patchedorto-be-unpatched+*functions.Ifsuchfunctionsarefoundonastack,orifthestack+*isdeemedunreliable,thetaskcan'tbeswitchedyet.+*+*Usuallythiswilltransitionmost(orall)ofthetasksonasystem+*unlessthepatchincludeschangestoaverycommonfunction.+*/+read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+for_each_process_thread(g,task)+if(!klp_try_switch_task(task))+complete=false;+read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++/*+*Dittofortheidle"swapper"tasks.+*/+get_online_cpus();+for_each_possible_cpu(cpu){+task=idle_task(cpu);+if(cpu_online(cpu)){+if(!klp_try_switch_task(task))+complete=false;+}elseif(task->patch_state!=klp_target_state){+/* offline idle tasks can be switched immediately */+clear_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+task->patch_state=klp_target_state;+}+}+put_online_cpus();++/*+*Sometasksweren'tabletobeswitchedover.Tryagainlaterand/or+*waitforothermethodslikekernelexitswitching.+*/+if(!complete){+schedule_delayed_work(&klp_transition_work,+round_jiffies_relative(HZ));+return;+}++success:++if(klp_target_state==KLP_UNPATCHED){+/*+*AlltaskshavetransitionedtoKLP_UNPATCHEDsowecannow+*removethenewfunctionsfromthefunc_stack.+*/+klp_unpatch_objects(klp_transition_patch);++/*+*Makesureklp_ftrace_handler()seesthatthefunctionshave+*beenremovedfromops->func_stackbeforeweclear+*func->transition.Otherwiseitmaypickthewrong+*transition.+*/+synchronize_rcu();+}++pr_notice("'%s': %s complete\n",klp_transition_patch->mod->name,+klp_target_state==KLP_PATCHED?"patching":"unpatching");++/* we're done, now cleanup the data structures */+klp_complete_transition();+}++/*+*Startthetransitiontothespecifiedtargetpatchstatesotaskscanbegin+*switchingtoit.+*/+voidklp_start_transition(void)+{+structtask_struct*g,*task;+unsignedintcpu;++WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state==KLP_UNDEFINED);++pr_notice("'%s': %s...\n",klp_transition_patch->mod->name,+klp_target_state==KLP_PATCHED?"patching":"unpatching");++/*+*Ifthepatchcanbeappliedorrevertedimmediately,skipthe+*per-tasktransitions.+*/+if(klp_transition_patch->immediate)+return;++/*+*Markallnormaltasksasneedingapatchstateupdate.They'll+*switcheitherinklp_try_complete_transition()orastheyexitthe+*kernel.+*/+read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+for_each_process_thread(g,task)+if(task->patch_state!=klp_target_state)+set_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++/*+*Markallidletasksasneedingapatchstateupdate.They'llswitch+*eitherinklp_try_complete_transition()orattheidleloopswitch+*point.+*/+for_each_possible_cpu(cpu){+task=idle_task(cpu);+if(task->patch_state!=klp_target_state)+set_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+}++klp_try_complete_transition();+}++/*+*Initializetheglobaltargetpatchstateandalltaskstotheinitialpatch+*state,andinitializeallfunctiontransitionstatestotrueinpreparation+*forpatchingorunpatching.+*/+voidklp_init_transition(structklp_patch*patch,intstate)+{+structtask_struct*g,*task;+unsignedintcpu;+structklp_object*obj;+structklp_func*func;+intinitial_state=!state;++WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state!=KLP_UNDEFINED);++klp_transition_patch=patch;++/*+*Settheglobaltargetpatchstatewhichtaskswillswitchto.This+*hasnoeffectuntiltheTIF_PATCH_PENDINGflagsgetsetlater.+*/+klp_target_state=state;++/*+*Ifthepatchcanbeappliedorrevertedimmediately,skipthe+*per-tasktransitions.+*/+if(patch->immediate)+return;++/*+*Initializealltaskstotheinitialpatchstatetopreparethemfor+*switchingtothetargetstate.+*/+read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+for_each_process_thread(g,task){+WARN_ON_ONCE(task->patch_state!=KLP_UNDEFINED);+task->patch_state=initial_state;+}+read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++/*+*Dittofortheidle"swapper"tasks.+*/+for_each_possible_cpu(cpu){+task=idle_task(cpu);+WARN_ON_ONCE(task->patch_state!=KLP_UNDEFINED);+task->patch_state=initial_state;+}++/*+*Enforcetheorderofthetask->patch_stateinitializationsandthe+*func->transitionupdatestoensurethat,intheenablepath,+*klp_ftrace_handler()doesn'tseeafuncintransitionwitha+*task->patch_stateofKLP_UNDEFINED.+*/+smp_wmb();++/*+*Setthefunctransitionstatessoklp_ftrace_handler()willknowto+*switchtothetransitionlogic.+*+*Whenpatching,thefuncsaren'tyetinthefunc_stackandwillbe+*madevisibletotheftracehandlershortlybythecallsto+*klp_patch_object().+*+*Whenunpatching,thefuncsarealreadyinthefunc_stackandsoare+*alreadyvisibletotheftracehandler.+*/+klp_for_each_object(patch,obj)+klp_for_each_func(obj,func)+func->transition=true;+}++/*+*Thisfunctioncanbecalledinthemiddleofanexistingtransitionto+*reversethedirectionofthetargetpatchstate.Thiscanbedoneto+*effectivelycancelanexistingenableordisableoperationifthereareany+*taskswhicharestuckintheinitialpatchstate.+*/+voidklp_reverse_transition(void)+{+unsignedintcpu;+structtask_struct*g,*task;++klp_transition_patch->enabled=!klp_transition_patch->enabled;++klp_target_state=!klp_target_state;++/*+*ClearallTIF_PATCH_PENDINGflagstopreventracescausedby+*klp_update_patch_state()runninginparallelwith+*klp_start_transition().+*/+read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+for_each_process_thread(g,task)+clear_tsk_thread_flag(task,TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)+clear_tsk_thread_flag(idle_task(cpu),TIF_PATCH_PENDING);++/* Let any remaining calls to klp_update_patch_state() complete */+synchronize_rcu();++klp_start_transition();+}++/* Called from copy_process() during fork */+voidklp_copy_process(structtask_struct*child)+{+child->patch_state=current->patch_state;++/* TIF_PATCH_PENDING gets copied in setup_thread_stack() */+}
@@ -69,6 +71,21 @@ static int livepatch_init(void){intret;+if(!klp_have_reliable_stack()&&!patch.immediate){+/*+*WARNING:Beverycarefulwhenusing'patch.immediate'in+*yourpatches.It'soktouseitforsimplepatcheslike+*this,butformorecomplexpatcheswhichchangefunction+*semantics,lockingsemantics,ordatastructures,itmaynot+*besafe.Useofthisoptionwillalsopreventremovalof+*thepatch.+*+*SeeDocumentation/livepatch/livepatch.txtformoredetails.+*/+patch.immediate=true;+pr_notice("The consistency model isn't supported for your architecture. Bypassing safety mechanisms and applying the patch immediately.\n");+}+ret=klp_register_patch(&patch);if(ret)returnret;
From: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Date: 2017-02-02 11:51:22
!!! This is the right version. I am sorry again for the confusion. !!!
quoted hunk
Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the
foundation which will eventually enable us to patch those ~10% of
security patches which change function or data semantics. This is the
biggest remaining piece needed to make livepatch more generally useful.
diff --git a/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt b/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txtindex 7f04e13..fb00d66 100644--- a/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt+++ b/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt
+3.1 Adding consistency model support to new architectures
+---------------------------------------------------------
+
+For adding consistency model support to new architectures, there are a
+few options:
+
+1) Add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. This means porting objtool, and
+ for non-DWARF unwinders, also making sure there's a way for the stack
+ tracing code to detect interrupts on the stack.
+
+2) Alternatively, figure out a way to patch kthreads without stack
+ checking. If all kthreads sleep in the same place, then we can
+ designate that place as a patching point. I think Petr M has been
+ working on that?
Here is version with some more details:
Alternatively, every kthread has to explicitely switch
current->patch_state on a safe place. Kthreads are typically
"infinite" loops that do some action repeatedly. The safe
location is between the loops when there are no locks
taken and all data structures are in a well defined state.
The location is clear when using the workqueues or the kthread worker
API. These kthreads process "independent" works in a generic loop.
It is much more complicated with kthreads using a custom loop.
There the safe place must be carefully localized case by case.
quoted hunk
+ In that case, arches without+ HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE would still be able to use the+ non-stack-checking parts of the consistency model:++ a) patching user tasks when they cross the kernel/user space+ boundary; and++ b) patching kthreads and idle tasks at their designated patch points.++ This option isn't as good as option 1 because it requires signaling+ most of the tasks to patch them.
Kthreads need to be waken because most of them ignore signals.
And idle tasks might need to be explicitely scheduled if there
is too big load. Mirek knows more about this.
Well, I am not sure if you want to get into such details.
quoted hunk
+ But it could still be a good backup+ option for those architectures which don't have reliable stack traces+ yet.++In the meantime, patches for such architectures can bypass the+consistency model by setting klp_patch.immediate to true.
I would add that this is perfectly fine for patches that do not
change semantic of the patched functions. In practice, this is
usable in about 90% of security and critical fixes.
quoted hunk
4. Livepatch module
@@ -134,7 +242,7 @@ Documentation/livepatch/module-elf-format.txt for more details. 4.2. Metadata-------------+------------- The patch is described by several structures that split the information into three levels:
@@ -239,9 +347,15 @@ Registered patches might be enabled either by calling klp_enable_patch() or by writing '1' to /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/enabled. The system will start using the new implementation of the patched functions at this stage.-In particular, if an original function is patched for the first time, a-function specific struct klp_ops is created and an universal ftrace handler-is registered.+When a patch is enabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where+tasks are converging to the patched state. This is indicated by a value+of '1' in /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/transition. Once all tasks have+been patched, the 'transition' value changes to '0'. For more+information about this process, see the "Consistency model" section.++If an original function is patched for the first time, a function+specific struct klp_ops is created and an universal ftrace handler is+registered. Functions might be patched multiple times. The ftrace handler is registered only once for the given function. Further patches just add an entry to the
@@ -261,6 +375,12 @@ by writing '0' to /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/enabled. At this stage either the code from the previously enabled patch or even the original code gets used.+When a patch is disabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where+tasks are converging to the unpatched state. This is indicated by a+value of '1' in /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/transition. Once all tasks+have been unpatched, the 'transition' value changes to '0'. For more+information about this process, see the "Consistency model" section.+ Here all the functions (struct klp_func) associated with the to-be-disabled patch are removed from the corresponding struct klp_ops. The ftrace handler is unregistered and the struct klp_ops is freed when the func_stack list
@@ -1973,6 +1973,9 @@ struct task_struct {/* A live task holds one reference. */atomic_tstack_refcount;#endif+#ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH+intpatch_state;+#endif/* CPU-specific state of this task */structthread_structthread;/*
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ static void klp_find_object_module(struct klp_object *obj)mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);}-/* klp_mutex must be held by caller */staticboolklp_is_patch_registered(structklp_patch*patch){structklp_patch*mypatch;
@@ -281,20 +280,25 @@ static int klp_write_object_relocations(struct module *pmod,staticint__klp_disable_patch(structklp_patch*patch){-structklp_object*obj;+if(klp_transition_patch)+return-EBUSY;/* enforce stacking: only the last enabled patch can be disabled */if(!list_is_last(&patch->list,&klp_patches)&&list_next_entry(patch,list)->enabled)return-EBUSY;-pr_notice("disabling patch '%s'\n",patch->mod->name);+klp_init_transition(patch,KLP_UNPATCHED);-klp_for_each_object(patch,obj){-if(obj->patched)-klp_unpatch_object(obj);-}+/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheklp_target_statewritein+*klp_init_transition()andtheTIF_PATCH_PENDINGwritesin+*klp_start_transition()toensurethatklp_update_patch_state()+*doesn'tsetatask->patch_statetoKLP_UNDEFINED.+*/+smp_wmb();
The description is not clear. The klp_target_state manipulation
is synchronized by another barrier inside klp_init_transition().
A similar barrier is in __klp_enable_patch() and it is correctly
described there:
It enforces the order of the func->transition writes in
klp_init_transition() and the ops->func_stack writes in
klp_patch_object(). The corresponding barrier is in
klp_ftrace_handler().
But we do not modify ops->func_stack in __klp_disable_patch().
So we need another explanation.
Huh, I spent few hours thinking about it. I am almost sure
that it is not needed. But I am not 100% sure. The many times
rewriten summary looks like:
/*
* Enforce the order of func->transtion write in
* klp_init_transition() against TIF_PATCH_PENDING writes
* in klp_start_transition(). It makes sure that
* klp_ftrace_hadler() will see func->transition set
* after the task is migrated by klp_update_patch_state().
*
* The barrier probably is not needed because the task
* must not be migrated when being inside klp_ftrace_handler()
* and there is another full barrier in
* klp_update_patch_state().
* But this is slow path and better be safe than sorry.
*/
smp_wmb();
@@ -337,6 +341,9 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) struct klp_object *obj; int ret;+ if (klp_transition_patch)+ return -EBUSY;+ if (WARN_ON(patch->enabled)) return -EINVAL;
@@ -347,22 +354,37 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) pr_notice("enabling patch '%s'\n", patch->mod->name);+ klp_init_transition(patch, KLP_PATCHED);++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the func->transition writes in+ * klp_init_transition() and the ops->func_stack writes in+ * klp_patch_object(), so that klp_ftrace_handler() will see the+ * func->transition updates before the handler is registered and the+ * new funcs become visible to the handler.+ */+ smp_wmb();+ klp_for_each_object(patch, obj) { if (!klp_is_object_loaded(obj)) continue; ret = klp_patch_object(obj);- if (ret)- goto unregister;+ if (ret) {+ pr_warn("failed to enable patch '%s'\n",+ patch->mod->name);++ klp_unpatch_objects(patch);
We should call here synchronize_rcu() here as we do
in klp_try_complete_transition(). Some of the affected
functions might have more versions on the stack and we
need to make sure that klp_ftrace_handler() will _not_
see the removed patch on the stack.
Alternatively, we could move all the code around
klp_unpatch_objects() from klp_try_complete_transition()
into klp_complete_transition(), see below.
@@ -544,6 +581,7 @@ static int klp_init_func(struct klp_object *obj, struct klp_func *func) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&func->stack_node); func->patched = false;+ func->transition = false; /* The format for the sysfs directory is <function,sympos> where sympos * is the nth occurrence of this symbol in kallsyms for the patched
@@ -740,6 +778,16 @@ int klp_register_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) return -ENODEV; /*+ * Architectures without reliable stack traces have to set+ * patch->immediate because there's currently no way to patch kthreads+ * with the consistency model.+ */+ if (!klp_have_reliable_stack() && !patch->immediate) {+ pr_err("This architecture doesn't have support for the livepatch consistency model.\n");+ return -ENOSYS;+ }++ /* * A reference is taken on the patch module to prevent it from being * unloaded. Right now, we don't allow patch modules to unload since * there is currently no method to determine if a thread is still
@@ -788,7 +836,11 @@ int klp_module_coming(struct module *mod) goto err; }- if (!patch->enabled)+ /*+ * Only patch the module if the patch is enabled or is+ * in transition.+ */+ if (!patch->enabled && patch != klp_transition_patch)
We need the same change also in klp_module_going().
quoted hunk
break;
pr_notice("applying patch '%s' to loading module '%s'\n",
@@ -54,15 +55,58 @@ static void notrace klp_ftrace_handler(unsigned long ip,{structklp_ops*ops;structklp_func*func;+intpatch_state;ops=container_of(fops,structklp_ops,fops);rcu_read_lock();+func=list_first_or_null_rcu(&ops->func_stack,structklp_func,stack_node);++/*+*funcshouldneverbeNULLbecausepreemptionshouldbedisabledhere+*andunregister_ftrace_function()doestheequivalentofa+*synchronize_sched()beforethefunc_stackremoval.+*/+if(WARN_ON_ONCE(!func))+gotounlock;++/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheops->func_stackandfunc->transitionreads.+*Thecorrespondingwritebarrierisin__klp_enable_patch().+*/+smp_rmb();
I was curious why the comment did not mention __klp_disable_patch().
It was related to the hours of thinking. I would like to avoid this
in the future and add a comment like.
* This barrier probably is not needed when the patch is being
* disabled. The patch is removed from the stack in
* klp_try_complete_transition() and there we need to call
* rcu_synchronize() to prevent seeing the patch on the stack
* at all.
*
* Well, it still might be needed to see func->transition
* when the patch is removed and the task is migrated. See
* the write barrier in __klp_disable_patch().
quoted hunk
+ if (unlikely(func->transition)) {++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the func->transition and+ * current->patch_state reads. Otherwise we could read an+ * out-of-date task state and pick the wrong function. The+ * corresponding write barriers are in klp_init_transition()+ * and __klp_disable_patch().+ */+ smp_rmb();
IMHO, the corresponding barrier is in klp_init_transition().
The barrier in __klp_disable_patch() is questionable. Anyway,
it has a different purpose.
quoted hunk
+ patch_state = current->patch_state;++ WARN_ON_ONCE(patch_state == KLP_UNDEFINED);++ if (patch_state == KLP_UNPATCHED) {+ /*+ * Use the previously patched version of the function.+ * If no previous patches exist, continue with the+ * original function.+ */+ func = list_entry_rcu(func->stack_node.next,+ struct klp_func, stack_node);++ if (&func->stack_node == &ops->func_stack)+ goto unlock;+ }+ }+ klp_arch_set_pc(regs, (unsigned long)func->new_func); unlock: rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -0,0 +1,525 @@+/*+*transition.c-KernelLivePatchingtransitionfunctions+*+*Copyright(C)2015-2016JoshPoimboeuf<jpoimboe@redhat.com>+*+*Thisprogramisfreesoftware;youcanredistributeitand/or+*modifyitunderthetermsoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*aspublishedbytheFreeSoftwareFoundation;eitherversion2+*oftheLicense,or(atyouroption)anylaterversion.+*+*Thisprogramisdistributedinthehopethatitwillbeuseful,+*butWITHOUTANYWARRANTY;withouteventheimpliedwarrantyof+*MERCHANTABILITYorFITNESSFORAPARTICULARPURPOSE.Seethe+*GNUGeneralPublicLicenseformoredetails.+*+*YoushouldhavereceivedacopyoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*alongwiththisprogram;ifnot,see<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.+*/++#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt++#include<linux/cpu.h>+#include<linux/stacktrace.h>+#include"patch.h"+#include"transition.h"+#include"../sched/sched.h"++#define MAX_STACK_ENTRIES 100+#define STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE 128++externstructmutexklp_mutex;++structklp_patch*klp_transition_patch;++staticintklp_target_state=KLP_UNDEFINED;++/*+*Thisworkcanbeperformedperiodicallytofinishpatchingorunpatchingany+*"straggler"taskswhichfailedtotransitioninthefirstattempt.+*/+staticvoidklp_try_complete_transition(void);+staticvoidklp_transition_work_fn(structwork_struct*work)+{+mutex_lock(&klp_mutex);++if(klp_transition_patch)+klp_try_complete_transition();++mutex_unlock(&klp_mutex);+}+staticDECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(klp_transition_work,klp_transition_work_fn);++/*+*Thetransitiontothetargetpatchstateiscomplete.Cleanupthedata+*structures.+*/+voidklp_complete_transition(void)+{+structklp_object*obj;+structklp_func*func;+structtask_struct*g,*task;+unsignedintcpu;++if(klp_transition_patch->immediate)+gotodone;++klp_for_each_object(klp_transition_patch,obj)+klp_for_each_func(obj,func)+func->transition=false;++/* Prevent klp_ftrace_handler() from seeing KLP_UNDEFINED state */+if(klp_target_state==KLP_PATCHED)+synchronize_rcu();
I forgot why this is done only when the patch is beeing enabled.
It is because klp_unpatch_objects() and rcu_synchronize() is called
in klp_try_complete_transition() when klp_target_state ==
KLP_UNPATCHED.
I would suggest to move the code below the "success" label from
klp_try_complete_transtion() to klp_complete_transition().
It will get the two related things close to each other.
Also it would fix the missing rcu_synchronize() in
the error path in __klp_enable_patch(), see above.
quoted hunk
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task) {+ WARN_ON_ONCE(test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING));+ task->patch_state = KLP_UNDEFINED;+ }+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {+ task = idle_task(cpu);+ WARN_ON_ONCE(test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING));+ task->patch_state = KLP_UNDEFINED;+ }++done:+ klp_target_state = KLP_UNDEFINED;+ klp_transition_patch = NULL;+}++/*+ * Switch the patched state of the task to the set of functions in the target+ * patch state.+ *+ * NOTE: If task is not 'current', the caller must ensure the task is inactive.+ * Otherwise klp_ftrace_handler() might read the wrong 'patch_state' value.+ */+void klp_update_patch_state(struct task_struct *task)+{+ rcu_read_lock();++ /*+ * This test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag() call also serves as a read+ * barrier to enforce the order of the TIF_PATCH_PENDING and+ * klp_target_state reads. The corresponding write barrier is in+ * __klp_disable_patch().
The corresponding barrier is in klp_init_transition(), see below.
In each case, we need the corresponding write barrier in both enable
and disable paths. They both set klp_target_state and
TIF_PATCH_PENDING. The write barrier in klp_init_transition() perfectly
fits the purpose.
quoted hunk
+ */+ if (test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING))+ task->patch_state = READ_ONCE(klp_target_state);++ rcu_read_unlock();+}++/*+ * Determine whether the given stack trace includes any references to a+ * to-be-patched or to-be-unpatched function.+ */+static int klp_check_stack_func(struct klp_func *func,+ struct stack_trace *trace)+{+ unsigned long func_addr, func_size, address;+ struct klp_ops *ops;+ int i;++ if (func->immediate)+ return 0;++ for (i = 0; i < trace->nr_entries; i++) {+ address = trace->entries[i];++ if (klp_target_state == KLP_UNPATCHED) {+ /*+ * Check for the to-be-unpatched function+ * (the func itself).+ */+ func_addr = (unsigned long)func->new_func;+ func_size = func->new_size;+ } else {+ /*+ * Check for the to-be-patched function+ * (the previous func).+ */+ ops = klp_find_ops(func->old_addr);++ if (list_is_singular(&ops->func_stack)) {+ /* original function */+ func_addr = func->old_addr;+ func_size = func->old_size;+ } else {+ /* previously patched function */+ struct klp_func *prev;++ prev = list_next_entry(func, stack_node);+ func_addr = (unsigned long)prev->new_func;+ func_size = prev->new_size;+ }+ }++ if (address >= func_addr && address < func_addr + func_size)+ return -EAGAIN;+ }++ return 0;+}++/*+ * Determine whether it's safe to transition the task to the target patch state+ * by looking for any to-be-patched or to-be-unpatched functions on its stack.+ */+static int klp_check_stack(struct task_struct *task, char *err_buf)+{+ static unsigned long entries[MAX_STACK_ENTRIES];+ struct stack_trace trace;+ struct klp_object *obj;+ struct klp_func *func;+ int ret;++ trace.skip = 0;+ trace.nr_entries = 0;+ trace.max_entries = MAX_STACK_ENTRIES;+ trace.entries = entries;+ ret = save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable(task, &trace);+ WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -ENOSYS);+ if (ret) {+ snprintf(err_buf, STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+ "%s: %s:%d has an unreliable stack\n",+ __func__, task->comm, task->pid);+ return ret;+ }++ klp_for_each_object(klp_transition_patch, obj) {+ if (!obj->patched)+ continue;+ klp_for_each_func(obj, func) {+ ret = klp_check_stack_func(func, &trace);+ if (ret) {+ snprintf(err_buf, STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+ "%s: %s:%d is sleeping on function %s\n",+ __func__, task->comm, task->pid,+ func->old_name);+ return ret;+ }+ }+ }++ return 0;+}++/*+ * Try to safely switch a task to the target patch state. If it's currently+ * running, or it's sleeping on a to-be-patched or to-be-unpatched function, or+ * if the stack is unreliable, return false.+ */+static bool klp_try_switch_task(struct task_struct *task)+{+ struct rq *rq;+ struct rq_flags flags;+ int ret;+ bool success = false;+ char err_buf[STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE];++ err_buf[0] = '\0';++ /* check if this task has already switched over */+ if (task->patch_state == klp_target_state)+ return true;++ /*+ * For arches which don't have reliable stack traces, we have to rely+ * on other methods (e.g., switching tasks at kernel exit).+ */+ if (!klp_have_reliable_stack())+ return false;++ /*+ * Now try to check the stack for any to-be-patched or to-be-unpatched+ * functions. If all goes well, switch the task to the target patch+ * state.+ */+ rq = task_rq_lock(task, &flags);++ if (task_running(rq, task) && task != current) {+ snprintf(err_buf, STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+ "%s: %s:%d is running\n", __func__, task->comm,+ task->pid);+ goto done;+ }++ ret = klp_check_stack(task, err_buf);+ if (ret)+ goto done;++ success = true;++ clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ task->patch_state = klp_target_state;++done:+ task_rq_unlock(rq, task, &flags);++ /*+ * Due to console deadlock issues, pr_debug() can't be used while+ * holding the task rq lock. Instead we have to use a temporary buffer+ * and print the debug message after releasing the lock.+ */+ if (err_buf[0] != '\0')+ pr_debug("%s", err_buf);++ return success;++}++/*+ * Try to switch all remaining tasks to the target patch state by walking the+ * stacks of sleeping tasks and looking for any to-be-patched or+ * to-be-unpatched functions. If such functions are found, the task can't be+ * switched yet.+ *+ * If any tasks are still stuck in the initial patch state, schedule a retry.+ */+static void klp_try_complete_transition(void)+{+ unsigned int cpu;+ struct task_struct *g, *task;+ bool complete = true;++ WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state == KLP_UNDEFINED);++ /*+ * If the patch can be applied or reverted immediately, skip the+ * per-task transitions.+ */+ if (klp_transition_patch->immediate)+ goto success;++ /*+ * Try to switch the tasks to the target patch state by walking their+ * stacks and looking for any to-be-patched or to-be-unpatched+ * functions. If such functions are found on a stack, or if the stack+ * is deemed unreliable, the task can't be switched yet.+ *+ * Usually this will transition most (or all) of the tasks on a system+ * unless the patch includes changes to a very common function.+ */+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task)+ if (!klp_try_switch_task(task))+ complete = false;+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ /*+ * Ditto for the idle "swapper" tasks.+ */+ get_online_cpus();+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {+ task = idle_task(cpu);+ if (cpu_online(cpu)) {+ if (!klp_try_switch_task(task))+ complete = false;+ } else if (task->patch_state != klp_target_state) {+ /* offline idle tasks can be switched immediately */+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ task->patch_state = klp_target_state;+ }+ }+ put_online_cpus();++ /*+ * Some tasks weren't able to be switched over. Try again later and/or+ * wait for other methods like kernel exit switching.+ */+ if (!complete) {+ schedule_delayed_work(&klp_transition_work,+ round_jiffies_relative(HZ));+ return;+ }++success:++ if (klp_target_state == KLP_UNPATCHED) {+ /*+ * All tasks have transitioned to KLP_UNPATCHED so we can now+ * remove the new functions from the func_stack.+ */+ klp_unpatch_objects(klp_transition_patch);++ /*+ * Make sure klp_ftrace_handler() sees that the functions have+ * been removed from ops->func_stack before we clear+ * func->transition. Otherwise it may pick the wrong+ * transition.+ */
I was a bit confused by the comment. It might be my problem. I just
wonder if might be more clear with somethink like:
/*
* Make sure klp_ftrace_handler() can not longer see functions
* from this patch on the stack. Otherwise it may use
* the being-removed function after func->transition is cleared.
*/
quoted hunk
+ synchronize_rcu();+ }++ pr_notice("'%s': %s complete\n", klp_transition_patch->mod->name,+ klp_target_state == KLP_PATCHED ? "patching" : "unpatching");++ /* we're done, now cleanup the data structures */+ klp_complete_transition();+}++/*+ * Start the transition to the specified target patch state so tasks can begin+ * switching to it.+ */+void klp_start_transition(void)+{+ struct task_struct *g, *task;+ unsigned int cpu;++ WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state == KLP_UNDEFINED);++ pr_notice("'%s': %s...\n", klp_transition_patch->mod->name,+ klp_target_state == KLP_PATCHED ? "patching" : "unpatching");++ /*+ * If the patch can be applied or reverted immediately, skip the+ * per-task transitions.+ */+ if (klp_transition_patch->immediate)
We should call klp_try_complete_transition() here. Otherwise, it will
never be called and the transition will never get completed.
Alternative solution would be to move klp_try_complete_transition()
from klp_start_transition() and explicitely call it from
__klp_disable_patch() and klp_enable_patch(). It would actually
solve one issue with klp_revert_patch(), see below.
I kind of like the alternative solution. I hope that it was not
me who suggested to move klp_try_complete_transition() into
klp_start_transtion().
quoted hunk
+ return;++ /*+ * Mark all normal tasks as needing a patch state update. They'll+ * switch either in klp_try_complete_transition() or as they exit the+ * kernel.+ */+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task)+ if (task->patch_state != klp_target_state)+ set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ /*+ * Mark all idle tasks as needing a patch state update. They'll switch+ * either in klp_try_complete_transition() or at the idle loop switch+ * point.+ */+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {+ task = idle_task(cpu);+ if (task->patch_state != klp_target_state)+ set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ }++ klp_try_complete_transition();+}++/*+ * Initialize the global target patch state and all tasks to the initial patch+ * state, and initialize all function transition states to true in preparation+ * for patching or unpatching.+ */+void klp_init_transition(struct klp_patch *patch, int state)+{+ struct task_struct *g, *task;+ unsigned int cpu;+ struct klp_object *obj;+ struct klp_func *func;+ int initial_state = !state;++ WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state != KLP_UNDEFINED);++ klp_transition_patch = patch;++ /*+ * Set the global target patch state which tasks will switch to. This+ * has no effect until the TIF_PATCH_PENDING flags get set later.+ */+ klp_target_state = state;++ /*+ * If the patch can be applied or reverted immediately, skip the+ * per-task transitions.+ */+ if (patch->immediate)+ return;++ /*+ * Initialize all tasks to the initial patch state to prepare them for+ * switching to the target state.+ */+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task) {+ WARN_ON_ONCE(task->patch_state != KLP_UNDEFINED);+ task->patch_state = initial_state;+ }+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ /*+ * Ditto for the idle "swapper" tasks.+ */+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {+ task = idle_task(cpu);+ WARN_ON_ONCE(task->patch_state != KLP_UNDEFINED);+ task->patch_state = initial_state;+ }++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the task->patch_state initializations and the+ * func->transition updates to ensure that, in the enable path,+ * klp_ftrace_handler() doesn't see a func in transition with a+ * task->patch_state of KLP_UNDEFINED.
It has one more purpose:
*
* Also enforce the order between klp_target_state and
* TIF_PATCH_PENDING. The corresponding read barrier is in
* klp_update_patch_state().
quoted hunk
+ */+ smp_wmb();++ /*+ * Set the func transition states so klp_ftrace_handler() will know to+ * switch to the transition logic.+ *+ * When patching, the funcs aren't yet in the func_stack and will be+ * made visible to the ftrace handler shortly by the calls to+ * klp_patch_object().+ *+ * When unpatching, the funcs are already in the func_stack and so are+ * already visible to the ftrace handler.+ */+ klp_for_each_object(patch, obj)+ klp_for_each_func(obj, func)+ func->transition = true;+}++/*+ * This function can be called in the middle of an existing transition to+ * reverse the direction of the target patch state. This can be done to+ * effectively cancel an existing enable or disable operation if there are any+ * tasks which are stuck in the initial patch state.+ */+void klp_reverse_transition(void)+{+ unsigned int cpu;+ struct task_struct *g, *task;++ klp_transition_patch->enabled = !klp_transition_patch->enabled;++ klp_target_state = !klp_target_state;++ /*+ * Clear all TIF_PATCH_PENDING flags to prevent races caused by+ * klp_update_patch_state() running in parallel with+ * klp_start_transition().+ */+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task)+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(idle_task(cpu), TIF_PATCH_PENDING);++ /* Let any remaining calls to klp_update_patch_state() complete */+ synchronize_rcu();++ klp_start_transition();
Hmm, we should not call klp_try_complete_transition() when
klp_start_transition() is called from here. I can't find a safe
way to cancel klp_transition_work() when we own klp_mutex.
It smells with a possible deadlock.
I suggest to move move klp_try_complete_transition() outside
klp_start_transition() and explicitely call it from
__klp_disable_patch() and __klp_enabled_patch().
This would fix also the problem with immediate patches, see
klp_start_transition().
quoted hunk
+}++/* Called from copy_process() during fork */+void klp_copy_process(struct task_struct *child)+{+ child->patch_state = current->patch_state;++ /* TIF_PATCH_PENDING gets copied in setup_thread_stack() */+}
@@ -69,6 +71,21 @@ static int livepatch_init(void){intret;+if(!klp_have_reliable_stack()&&!patch.immediate){+/*+*WARNING:Beverycarefulwhenusing'patch.immediate'in+*yourpatches.It'soktouseitforsimplepatcheslike+*this,butformorecomplexpatcheswhichchangefunction+*semantics,lockingsemantics,ordatastructures,itmaynot+*besafe.Useofthisoptionwillalsopreventremovalof+*thepatch.+*+*SeeDocumentation/livepatch/livepatch.txtformoredetails.+*/+patch.immediate=true;+pr_notice("The consistency model isn't supported for your architecture. Bypassing safety mechanisms and applying the patch immediately.\n");+}+ret=klp_register_patch(&patch);if(ret)returnret;
I am sorry that the review took me so long. I was interrupted several
times by other tasks. The logic is very complex. I wanted to
make sure that my comments are consistent and make sense.
Anyway, I think that we are getting close.
Best Regards,
Petr
From: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Date: 2017-02-02 14:37:43
On Wed 2017-02-01 14:02:43, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
On Thu, Jan 19, 2017 at 09:46:08AM -0600, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
quoted
Here's v4, based on linux-next/master. Mostly minor changes this time,
primarily due to Petr's v3 comments.
So far, the only review comments have been related to the first patch,
of which I just posted an updated version.
If there are no more comments, it would be great to get these patches in
for the 4.11 merge window. Any objections to that?
I have finished the review finally. We still need to address some
issues but I think that we are much more close now. I found only
few small problems. Othewise, the consistency handling looks pretty
consistent to me :-)
Best Regards,
Petr
From: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Date: 2017-02-02 14:39:05
On Wed, 1 Feb 2017, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
For live patching and possibly other use cases, a stack trace is only
useful if it can be assured that it's completely reliable. Add a new
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() function to achieve that.
Note that if the target task isn't the current task, and the target task
is allowed to run, then it could be writing the stack while the unwinder
is reading it, resulting in possible corruption. So the caller of
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() must ensure that the task is either
'current' or inactive.
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() relies on the x86 unwinder's detection
of pt_regs on the stack. If the pt_regs are not user-mode registers
from a syscall, then they indicate an in-kernel interrupt or exception
(e.g. preemption or a page fault), in which case the stack is considered
unreliable due to the nature of frame pointers.
It also relies on the x86 unwinder's detection of other issues, such as:
- corrupted stack data
- stack grows the wrong way
- stack walk doesn't reach the bottom
- user didn't provide a large enough entries array
Such issues are reported by checking unwind_error() and !unwind_done().
Also add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE so arch-independent code can
determine at build time whether the function is implemented.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <redacted>
Looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Miroslav
+ In that case, arches without+ HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE would still be able to use the+ non-stack-checking parts of the consistency model:++ a) patching user tasks when they cross the kernel/user space+ boundary; and++ b) patching kthreads and idle tasks at their designated patch points.++ This option isn't as good as option 1 because it requires signaling+ most of the tasks to patch them.
Kthreads need to be waken because most of them ignore signals.
And idle tasks might need to be explicitely scheduled if there
is too big load. Mirek knows more about this.
Yes, and we've already discussed it with Josh. The plan is not to do
anything now, because described situations should be rare and/or
theoretical only. It should be on our TODO lists though.
Well, I am not sure if you want to get into such details.
I would not bother about it.
[...]
quoted
+/*+ * Start the transition to the specified target patch state so tasks can begin+ * switching to it.+ */+void klp_start_transition(void)+{+ struct task_struct *g, *task;+ unsigned int cpu;++ WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state == KLP_UNDEFINED);++ pr_notice("'%s': %s...\n", klp_transition_patch->mod->name,+ klp_target_state == KLP_PATCHED ? "patching" : "unpatching");++ /*+ * If the patch can be applied or reverted immediately, skip the+ * per-task transitions.+ */+ if (klp_transition_patch->immediate)
We should call klp_try_complete_transition() here. Otherwise, it will
never be called and the transition will never get completed.
Alternative solution would be to move klp_try_complete_transition()
from klp_start_transition() and explicitely call it from
__klp_disable_patch() and klp_enable_patch(). It would actually
solve one issue with klp_revert_patch(), see below.
I kind of like the alternative solution. I hope that it was not
me who suggested to move klp_try_complete_transition() into
klp_start_transtion().
[...]
Hmm, we should not call klp_try_complete_transition() when
klp_start_transition() is called from here. I can't find a safe
way to cancel klp_transition_work() when we own klp_mutex.
It smells with a possible deadlock.
I suggest to move move klp_try_complete_transition() outside
klp_start_transition() and explicitely call it from
__klp_disable_patch() and __klp_enabled_patch().
This would fix also the problem with immediate patches, see
klp_start_transition().
I agree. I think the best would be to move klp_try_complete_transition()
out from klp_start_transition() and call it explicitly. This would solve
the immediate problem for free.
I agree we should not call klp_try_complete_transition() from
klp_reverse_transition() and leave it entirely to our delayed work. We
discussed this in the past and the counter argument was that explicit call
to klp_try_complete_transition() could make the process a bit faster.
Possibly true, but reversion is really slow path and I would not care
about speed at all. I think it is cleaner and perhaps safer.
Thanks,
Miroslav
@@ -25,6 +25,14 @@ Description: code is currently applied. Writing 0 will disable the patch while writing 1 will re-enable the patch.+What: /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/transition+Date: May 2016
'May 2016' looks strange, but maybe nobody cares about it...
@@ -134,7 +242,7 @@ Documentation/livepatch/module-elf-format.txt for more details. 4.2. Metadata-------------+-------------
klp_func and klp_patch have new members - immediate. Should be documented
here in "4.2. Metadata" section.
The section also contains this text under klp_patch bullet. It seems
oudated:
"Also if a more complex consistency model is supported then a selected
unit (thread, kernel as a whole) will see the new code from the entire
patch only when it is in a safe state."
We now have a more complex consistency model.
And finally, the section "Limitations" has this text under the first
bullet:
+ The patch must not change the semantic of the patched functions.
The current implementation guarantees only that either the old
or the new function is called. The functions are patched one
by one. It means that the patch must _not_ change the semantic
of the function.
I think it is confusing. The consistency model allows us to change the
semantic of a function. To certain degree. Of course, there are cases that
cannot be patched, or have to be patched carefully. For example if a
function takes a lock by calling foo_lock(), foo_lock() is not on a stack
afterwards. Then the locking semantics may be changed with a livepatch.
One has to make sure to patch also the caller foo_lock() to enforce the
consistency. And so on... But I do not consider a limitation of livepatch.
It is a feature of the consistency model, which is weaker than kGraft's or
kpatch's (or stronger. It depends on your point of view.)
So, I propose to remove this text and better describe the properties of
the consistency model above in the section 3. Maybe a quote from an old
mail thread (Nov 2014) would be sufficient. I don't remember what was
mentioned and what not.
What do you think?
This looks superfluous.
(checking my notes)... and that's it. Aside from the discussion in Petr's
subthread it looks good to me. Great job.
Thanks,
Miroslav
From: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Date: 2017-02-03 16:48:56
On Thu, 19 Jan 2017, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
From: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Currently we do not allow patch module to unload since there is no
method to determine if a task is still running in the patched code.
The consistency model gives us the way because when the unpatching
finishes we know that all tasks were marked as safe to call an original
function. Thus every new call to the function calls the original code
and at the same time no task can be somewhere in the patched code,
because it had to leave that code to be marked as safe.
We can safely let the patch module go after that.
Completion is used for synchronization between module removal and sysfs
infrastructure in a similar way to commit 942e443127e9 ("module: Fix
mod->mkobj.kobj potentially freed too early").
Note that we still do not allow the removal for immediate model, that is
no consistency model. The module refcount may increase in this case if
somebody disables and enables the patch several times. This should not
cause any harm.
With this change a call to try_module_get() is moved to
__klp_enable_patch from klp_register_patch to make module reference
counting symmetric (module_put() is in a patch disable path) and to
allow to take a new reference to a disabled module when being enabled.
Finally, we need to be very careful about possible races between
klp_unregister_patch(), kobject_put() functions and operations
on the related sysfs files.
kobject_put(&patch->kobj) must be called without klp_mutex. Otherwise,
it might be blocked by enabled_store() that needs the mutex as well.
In addition, enabled_store() must check if the patch was not
unregisted in the meantime.
There is no need to do the same for other kobject_put() callsites
at the moment. Their sysfs operations neiter take the lock nor
On Thu, Feb 02, 2017 at 12:51:16PM +0100, Petr Mladek wrote:
!!! This is the right version. I am sorry again for the confusion. !!!
quoted
Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the
foundation which will eventually enable us to patch those ~10% of
security patches which change function or data semantics. This is the
biggest remaining piece needed to make livepatch more generally useful.
diff --git a/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt b/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txtindex 7f04e13..fb00d66 100644--- a/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt+++ b/Documentation/livepatch/livepatch.txt
+3.1 Adding consistency model support to new architectures
+---------------------------------------------------------
+
+For adding consistency model support to new architectures, there are a
+few options:
+
+1) Add CONFIG_HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. This means porting objtool, and
+ for non-DWARF unwinders, also making sure there's a way for the stack
+ tracing code to detect interrupts on the stack.
+
+2) Alternatively, figure out a way to patch kthreads without stack
+ checking. If all kthreads sleep in the same place, then we can
+ designate that place as a patching point. I think Petr M has been
+ working on that?
Here is version with some more details:
Alternatively, every kthread has to explicitely switch
current->patch_state on a safe place. Kthreads are typically
"infinite" loops that do some action repeatedly. The safe
location is between the loops when there are no locks
taken and all data structures are in a well defined state.
The location is clear when using the workqueues or the kthread worker
API. These kthreads process "independent" works in a generic loop.
It is much more complicated with kthreads using a custom loop.
There the safe place must be carefully localized case by case.
Good clarification.
quoted
+ In that case, arches without+ HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE would still be able to use the+ non-stack-checking parts of the consistency model:++ a) patching user tasks when they cross the kernel/user space+ boundary; and++ b) patching kthreads and idle tasks at their designated patch points.++ This option isn't as good as option 1 because it requires signaling+ most of the tasks to patch them.
Kthreads need to be waken because most of them ignore signals.
And idle tasks might need to be explicitely scheduled if there
is too big load. Mirek knows more about this.
Well, I am not sure if you want to get into such details.
quoted
+ But it could still be a good backup+ option for those architectures which don't have reliable stack traces+ yet.++In the meantime, patches for such architectures can bypass the+consistency model by setting klp_patch.immediate to true.
I would add that this is perfectly fine for patches that do not
change semantic of the patched functions. In practice, this is
usable in about 90% of security and critical fixes.
Another good one.
quoted
4. Livepatch module
@@ -134,7 +242,7 @@ Documentation/livepatch/module-elf-format.txt for more details. 4.2. Metadata-------------+------------- The patch is described by several structures that split the information into three levels:
@@ -239,9 +347,15 @@ Registered patches might be enabled either by calling klp_enable_patch() or by writing '1' to /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/enabled. The system will start using the new implementation of the patched functions at this stage.-In particular, if an original function is patched for the first time, a-function specific struct klp_ops is created and an universal ftrace handler-is registered.+When a patch is enabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where+tasks are converging to the patched state. This is indicated by a value+of '1' in /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/transition. Once all tasks have+been patched, the 'transition' value changes to '0'. For more+information about this process, see the "Consistency model" section.++If an original function is patched for the first time, a function+specific struct klp_ops is created and an universal ftrace handler is+registered. Functions might be patched multiple times. The ftrace handler is registered only once for the given function. Further patches just add an entry to the
@@ -261,6 +375,12 @@ by writing '0' to /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/enabled. At this stage either the code from the previously enabled patch or even the original code gets used.+When a patch is disabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where+tasks are converging to the unpatched state. This is indicated by a+value of '1' in /sys/kernel/livepatch/<name>/transition. Once all tasks+have been unpatched, the 'transition' value changes to '0'. For more+information about this process, see the "Consistency model" section.+ Here all the functions (struct klp_func) associated with the to-be-disabled patch are removed from the corresponding struct klp_ops. The ftrace handler is unregistered and the struct klp_ops is freed when the func_stack list
@@ -1973,6 +1973,9 @@ struct task_struct {/* A live task holds one reference. */atomic_tstack_refcount;#endif+#ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH+intpatch_state;+#endif/* CPU-specific state of this task */structthread_structthread;/*
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ static void klp_find_object_module(struct klp_object *obj)mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);}-/* klp_mutex must be held by caller */staticboolklp_is_patch_registered(structklp_patch*patch){structklp_patch*mypatch;
@@ -281,20 +280,25 @@ static int klp_write_object_relocations(struct module *pmod,staticint__klp_disable_patch(structklp_patch*patch){-structklp_object*obj;+if(klp_transition_patch)+return-EBUSY;/* enforce stacking: only the last enabled patch can be disabled */if(!list_is_last(&patch->list,&klp_patches)&&list_next_entry(patch,list)->enabled)return-EBUSY;-pr_notice("disabling patch '%s'\n",patch->mod->name);+klp_init_transition(patch,KLP_UNPATCHED);-klp_for_each_object(patch,obj){-if(obj->patched)-klp_unpatch_object(obj);-}+/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheklp_target_statewritein+*klp_init_transition()andtheTIF_PATCH_PENDINGwritesin+*klp_start_transition()toensurethatklp_update_patch_state()+*doesn'tsetatask->patch_statetoKLP_UNDEFINED.+*/+smp_wmb();
The description is not clear. The klp_target_state manipulation
is synchronized by another barrier inside klp_init_transition().
Yeah. I should also update the barrier comment in klp_init_transition()
to clarify that it also does this.
A similar barrier is in __klp_enable_patch() and it is correctly
described there:
It enforces the order of the func->transition writes in
klp_init_transition() and the ops->func_stack writes in
klp_patch_object(). The corresponding barrier is in
klp_ftrace_handler().
But we do not modify ops->func_stack in __klp_disable_patch().
So we need another explanation.
Huh, I spent few hours thinking about it. I am almost sure
that it is not needed. But I am not 100% sure. The many times
rewriten summary looks like:
/*
* Enforce the order of func->transtion write in
* klp_init_transition() against TIF_PATCH_PENDING writes
* in klp_start_transition(). It makes sure that
* klp_ftrace_hadler() will see func->transition set
* after the task is migrated by klp_update_patch_state().
*
* The barrier probably is not needed because the task
* must not be migrated when being inside klp_ftrace_handler()
* and there is another full barrier in
* klp_update_patch_state().
* But this is slow path and better be safe than sorry.
*/
smp_wmb();
This mostly makes sense, but I think the barrier *is* needed for
ordering func->transition and TIF_PATCH_PENDING writes for the rare case
where klp_ftrace_handler() is called right after
klp_update_patch_state(), which could be possible in the idle loop, for
example.
CPU0 CPU1
__klp_disable_patch()
klp_init_transition()
func->transition = true;
(...no barrier...)
klp_start_transition()
set TIF_PATCH_PENDING
klp_update_patch_state()
if (test_and_clear(TIF_PATCH_PENDING))
task->patch_state = KLP_UNPATCHED;
...
klp_ftrace_handler()
smp_rmb();
if (unlikely(func->transition)) <--- false (patched)
...
klp_ftrace_handler()
smp_rmb();
if (unlikely(func->transition)) <--- true (unpatched)
So how about:
/*
* Enforce the order of the func->transition writes in
* klp_init_transition() and the TIF_PATCH_PENDING writes in
* klp_start_transition(). In the rare case where klp_ftrace_handler()
* is called shortly after klp_update_patch_state() switches the task,
* this ensures the handler sees func->transition is set.
*/
smp_wmb();
@@ -337,6 +341,9 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) struct klp_object *obj; int ret;+ if (klp_transition_patch)+ return -EBUSY;+ if (WARN_ON(patch->enabled)) return -EINVAL;
@@ -347,22 +354,37 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) pr_notice("enabling patch '%s'\n", patch->mod->name);+ klp_init_transition(patch, KLP_PATCHED);++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the func->transition writes in+ * klp_init_transition() and the ops->func_stack writes in+ * klp_patch_object(), so that klp_ftrace_handler() will see the+ * func->transition updates before the handler is registered and the+ * new funcs become visible to the handler.+ */+ smp_wmb();+ klp_for_each_object(patch, obj) { if (!klp_is_object_loaded(obj)) continue; ret = klp_patch_object(obj);- if (ret)- goto unregister;+ if (ret) {+ pr_warn("failed to enable patch '%s'\n",+ patch->mod->name);++ klp_unpatch_objects(patch);
We should call here synchronize_rcu() here as we do
in klp_try_complete_transition(). Some of the affected
functions might have more versions on the stack and we
need to make sure that klp_ftrace_handler() will _not_
see the removed patch on the stack.
Even if the handler sees the new func on the stack, the
task->patch_state is still KLP_UNPATCHED, so it will still choose the
previous version of the function. Or did I miss your point?
Alternatively, we could move all the code around
klp_unpatch_objects() from klp_try_complete_transition()
into klp_complete_transition(), see below.
But klp_target_state is KLP_PATCHED so the synchronize_rcu() at the end
of klp_try_complete_transition() wouldn't get called anyway.
@@ -544,6 +581,7 @@ static int klp_init_func(struct klp_object *obj, struct klp_func *func) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&func->stack_node); func->patched = false;+ func->transition = false; /* The format for the sysfs directory is <function,sympos> where sympos * is the nth occurrence of this symbol in kallsyms for the patched
@@ -740,6 +778,16 @@ int klp_register_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) return -ENODEV; /*+ * Architectures without reliable stack traces have to set+ * patch->immediate because there's currently no way to patch kthreads+ * with the consistency model.+ */+ if (!klp_have_reliable_stack() && !patch->immediate) {+ pr_err("This architecture doesn't have support for the livepatch consistency model.\n");+ return -ENOSYS;+ }++ /* * A reference is taken on the patch module to prevent it from being * unloaded. Right now, we don't allow patch modules to unload since * there is currently no method to determine if a thread is still
@@ -788,7 +836,11 @@ int klp_module_coming(struct module *mod) goto err; }- if (!patch->enabled)+ /*+ * Only patch the module if the patch is enabled or is+ * in transition.+ */+ if (!patch->enabled && patch != klp_transition_patch)
We need the same change also in klp_module_going().
Ok.
quoted
break;
pr_notice("applying patch '%s' to loading module '%s'\n",
@@ -54,15 +55,58 @@ static void notrace klp_ftrace_handler(unsigned long ip,{structklp_ops*ops;structklp_func*func;+intpatch_state;ops=container_of(fops,structklp_ops,fops);rcu_read_lock();+func=list_first_or_null_rcu(&ops->func_stack,structklp_func,stack_node);++/*+*funcshouldneverbeNULLbecausepreemptionshouldbedisabledhere+*andunregister_ftrace_function()doestheequivalentofa+*synchronize_sched()beforethefunc_stackremoval.+*/+if(WARN_ON_ONCE(!func))+gotounlock;++/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheops->func_stackandfunc->transitionreads.+*Thecorrespondingwritebarrierisin__klp_enable_patch().+*/+smp_rmb();
I was curious why the comment did not mention __klp_disable_patch().
It was related to the hours of thinking. I would like to avoid this
in the future and add a comment like.
* This barrier probably is not needed when the patch is being
* disabled. The patch is removed from the stack in
* klp_try_complete_transition() and there we need to call
* rcu_synchronize() to prevent seeing the patch on the stack
* at all.
*
* Well, it still might be needed to see func->transition
* when the patch is removed and the task is migrated. See
* the write barrier in __klp_disable_patch().
Agreed, though as you mentioned earlier, there's also the implicit
barrier in klp_update_patch_state(), which would execute first in such a
scenario. So I think I'll update the barrier comments in
klp_update_patch_state().
quoted
+ if (unlikely(func->transition)) {++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the func->transition and+ * current->patch_state reads. Otherwise we could read an+ * out-of-date task state and pick the wrong function. The+ * corresponding write barriers are in klp_init_transition()+ * and __klp_disable_patch().+ */+ smp_rmb();
IMHO, the corresponding barrier is in klp_init_transition().
The barrier in __klp_disable_patch() is questionable. Anyway,
it has a different purpose.
Agreed.
quoted
+ patch_state = current->patch_state;++ WARN_ON_ONCE(patch_state == KLP_UNDEFINED);++ if (patch_state == KLP_UNPATCHED) {+ /*+ * Use the previously patched version of the function.+ * If no previous patches exist, continue with the+ * original function.+ */+ func = list_entry_rcu(func->stack_node.next,+ struct klp_func, stack_node);++ if (&func->stack_node == &ops->func_stack)+ goto unlock;+ }+ }+ klp_arch_set_pc(regs, (unsigned long)func->new_func); unlock: rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -0,0 +1,525 @@+/*+*transition.c-KernelLivePatchingtransitionfunctions+*+*Copyright(C)2015-2016JoshPoimboeuf<jpoimboe@redhat.com>+*+*Thisprogramisfreesoftware;youcanredistributeitand/or+*modifyitunderthetermsoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*aspublishedbytheFreeSoftwareFoundation;eitherversion2+*oftheLicense,or(atyouroption)anylaterversion.+*+*Thisprogramisdistributedinthehopethatitwillbeuseful,+*butWITHOUTANYWARRANTY;withouteventheimpliedwarrantyof+*MERCHANTABILITYorFITNESSFORAPARTICULARPURPOSE.Seethe+*GNUGeneralPublicLicenseformoredetails.+*+*YoushouldhavereceivedacopyoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*alongwiththisprogram;ifnot,see<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.+*/++#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt++#include<linux/cpu.h>+#include<linux/stacktrace.h>+#include"patch.h"+#include"transition.h"+#include"../sched/sched.h"++#define MAX_STACK_ENTRIES 100+#define STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE 128++externstructmutexklp_mutex;++structklp_patch*klp_transition_patch;++staticintklp_target_state=KLP_UNDEFINED;++/*+*Thisworkcanbeperformedperiodicallytofinishpatchingorunpatchingany+*"straggler"taskswhichfailedtotransitioninthefirstattempt.+*/+staticvoidklp_try_complete_transition(void);+staticvoidklp_transition_work_fn(structwork_struct*work)+{+mutex_lock(&klp_mutex);++if(klp_transition_patch)+klp_try_complete_transition();++mutex_unlock(&klp_mutex);+}+staticDECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(klp_transition_work,klp_transition_work_fn);++/*+*Thetransitiontothetargetpatchstateiscomplete.Cleanupthedata+*structures.+*/+voidklp_complete_transition(void)+{+structklp_object*obj;+structklp_func*func;+structtask_struct*g,*task;+unsignedintcpu;++if(klp_transition_patch->immediate)+gotodone;++klp_for_each_object(klp_transition_patch,obj)+klp_for_each_func(obj,func)+func->transition=false;++/* Prevent klp_ftrace_handler() from seeing KLP_UNDEFINED state */+if(klp_target_state==KLP_PATCHED)+synchronize_rcu();
I forgot why this is done only when the patch is beeing enabled.
It is because klp_unpatch_objects() and rcu_synchronize() is called
in klp_try_complete_transition() when klp_target_state ==
KLP_UNPATCHED.
I would suggest to move the code below the "success" label from
klp_try_complete_transtion() to klp_complete_transition().
It will get the two related things close to each other.
Also it would fix the missing rcu_synchronize() in
the error path in __klp_enable_patch(), see above.
As I mentioned, I don't see how that will fix the __klp_enable_patch()
error path, nor can I see why it needs fixing in the first place.
Regardless, it does seem like a good idea to move the end of
klp_try_complete_transition() into klp_complete_transition().
quoted
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task) {+ WARN_ON_ONCE(test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING));+ task->patch_state = KLP_UNDEFINED;+ }+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {+ task = idle_task(cpu);+ WARN_ON_ONCE(test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING));+ task->patch_state = KLP_UNDEFINED;+ }++done:+ klp_target_state = KLP_UNDEFINED;+ klp_transition_patch = NULL;+}++/*+ * Switch the patched state of the task to the set of functions in the target+ * patch state.+ *+ * NOTE: If task is not 'current', the caller must ensure the task is inactive.+ * Otherwise klp_ftrace_handler() might read the wrong 'patch_state' value.+ */+void klp_update_patch_state(struct task_struct *task)+{+ rcu_read_lock();++ /*+ * This test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag() call also serves as a read+ * barrier to enforce the order of the TIF_PATCH_PENDING and+ * klp_target_state reads. The corresponding write barrier is in+ * __klp_disable_patch().
The corresponding barrier is in klp_init_transition(), see below.
In each case, we need the corresponding write barrier in both enable
and disable paths. They both set klp_target_state and
TIF_PATCH_PENDING. The write barrier in klp_init_transition() perfectly
fits the purpose.
Agreed.
quoted
+ */+ if (test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING))+ task->patch_state = READ_ONCE(klp_target_state);++ rcu_read_unlock();+}++/*+ * Determine whether the given stack trace includes any references to a+ * to-be-patched or to-be-unpatched function.+ */+static int klp_check_stack_func(struct klp_func *func,+ struct stack_trace *trace)+{+ unsigned long func_addr, func_size, address;+ struct klp_ops *ops;+ int i;++ if (func->immediate)+ return 0;++ for (i = 0; i < trace->nr_entries; i++) {+ address = trace->entries[i];++ if (klp_target_state == KLP_UNPATCHED) {+ /*+ * Check for the to-be-unpatched function+ * (the func itself).+ */+ func_addr = (unsigned long)func->new_func;+ func_size = func->new_size;+ } else {+ /*+ * Check for the to-be-patched function+ * (the previous func).+ */+ ops = klp_find_ops(func->old_addr);++ if (list_is_singular(&ops->func_stack)) {+ /* original function */+ func_addr = func->old_addr;+ func_size = func->old_size;+ } else {+ /* previously patched function */+ struct klp_func *prev;++ prev = list_next_entry(func, stack_node);+ func_addr = (unsigned long)prev->new_func;+ func_size = prev->new_size;+ }+ }++ if (address >= func_addr && address < func_addr + func_size)+ return -EAGAIN;+ }++ return 0;+}++/*+ * Determine whether it's safe to transition the task to the target patch state+ * by looking for any to-be-patched or to-be-unpatched functions on its stack.+ */+static int klp_check_stack(struct task_struct *task, char *err_buf)+{+ static unsigned long entries[MAX_STACK_ENTRIES];+ struct stack_trace trace;+ struct klp_object *obj;+ struct klp_func *func;+ int ret;++ trace.skip = 0;+ trace.nr_entries = 0;+ trace.max_entries = MAX_STACK_ENTRIES;+ trace.entries = entries;+ ret = save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable(task, &trace);+ WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -ENOSYS);+ if (ret) {+ snprintf(err_buf, STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+ "%s: %s:%d has an unreliable stack\n",+ __func__, task->comm, task->pid);+ return ret;+ }++ klp_for_each_object(klp_transition_patch, obj) {+ if (!obj->patched)+ continue;+ klp_for_each_func(obj, func) {+ ret = klp_check_stack_func(func, &trace);+ if (ret) {+ snprintf(err_buf, STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+ "%s: %s:%d is sleeping on function %s\n",+ __func__, task->comm, task->pid,+ func->old_name);+ return ret;+ }+ }+ }++ return 0;+}++/*+ * Try to safely switch a task to the target patch state. If it's currently+ * running, or it's sleeping on a to-be-patched or to-be-unpatched function, or+ * if the stack is unreliable, return false.+ */+static bool klp_try_switch_task(struct task_struct *task)+{+ struct rq *rq;+ struct rq_flags flags;+ int ret;+ bool success = false;+ char err_buf[STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE];++ err_buf[0] = '\0';++ /* check if this task has already switched over */+ if (task->patch_state == klp_target_state)+ return true;++ /*+ * For arches which don't have reliable stack traces, we have to rely+ * on other methods (e.g., switching tasks at kernel exit).+ */+ if (!klp_have_reliable_stack())+ return false;++ /*+ * Now try to check the stack for any to-be-patched or to-be-unpatched+ * functions. If all goes well, switch the task to the target patch+ * state.+ */+ rq = task_rq_lock(task, &flags);++ if (task_running(rq, task) && task != current) {+ snprintf(err_buf, STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE,+ "%s: %s:%d is running\n", __func__, task->comm,+ task->pid);+ goto done;+ }++ ret = klp_check_stack(task, err_buf);+ if (ret)+ goto done;++ success = true;++ clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ task->patch_state = klp_target_state;++done:+ task_rq_unlock(rq, task, &flags);++ /*+ * Due to console deadlock issues, pr_debug() can't be used while+ * holding the task rq lock. Instead we have to use a temporary buffer+ * and print the debug message after releasing the lock.+ */+ if (err_buf[0] != '\0')+ pr_debug("%s", err_buf);++ return success;++}++/*+ * Try to switch all remaining tasks to the target patch state by walking the+ * stacks of sleeping tasks and looking for any to-be-patched or+ * to-be-unpatched functions. If such functions are found, the task can't be+ * switched yet.+ *+ * If any tasks are still stuck in the initial patch state, schedule a retry.+ */+static void klp_try_complete_transition(void)+{+ unsigned int cpu;+ struct task_struct *g, *task;+ bool complete = true;++ WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state == KLP_UNDEFINED);++ /*+ * If the patch can be applied or reverted immediately, skip the+ * per-task transitions.+ */+ if (klp_transition_patch->immediate)+ goto success;++ /*+ * Try to switch the tasks to the target patch state by walking their+ * stacks and looking for any to-be-patched or to-be-unpatched+ * functions. If such functions are found on a stack, or if the stack+ * is deemed unreliable, the task can't be switched yet.+ *+ * Usually this will transition most (or all) of the tasks on a system+ * unless the patch includes changes to a very common function.+ */+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task)+ if (!klp_try_switch_task(task))+ complete = false;+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ /*+ * Ditto for the idle "swapper" tasks.+ */+ get_online_cpus();+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {+ task = idle_task(cpu);+ if (cpu_online(cpu)) {+ if (!klp_try_switch_task(task))+ complete = false;+ } else if (task->patch_state != klp_target_state) {+ /* offline idle tasks can be switched immediately */+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ task->patch_state = klp_target_state;+ }+ }+ put_online_cpus();++ /*+ * Some tasks weren't able to be switched over. Try again later and/or+ * wait for other methods like kernel exit switching.+ */+ if (!complete) {+ schedule_delayed_work(&klp_transition_work,+ round_jiffies_relative(HZ));+ return;+ }++success:++ if (klp_target_state == KLP_UNPATCHED) {+ /*+ * All tasks have transitioned to KLP_UNPATCHED so we can now+ * remove the new functions from the func_stack.+ */+ klp_unpatch_objects(klp_transition_patch);++ /*+ * Make sure klp_ftrace_handler() sees that the functions have+ * been removed from ops->func_stack before we clear+ * func->transition. Otherwise it may pick the wrong+ * transition.+ */
I was a bit confused by the comment. It might be my problem. I just
wonder if might be more clear with somethink like:
/*
* Make sure klp_ftrace_handler() can not longer see functions
* from this patch on the stack. Otherwise it may use
* the being-removed function after func->transition is cleared.
*/
Ok.
quoted
+ synchronize_rcu();+ }++ pr_notice("'%s': %s complete\n", klp_transition_patch->mod->name,+ klp_target_state == KLP_PATCHED ? "patching" : "unpatching");++ /* we're done, now cleanup the data structures */+ klp_complete_transition();+}++/*+ * Start the transition to the specified target patch state so tasks can begin+ * switching to it.+ */+void klp_start_transition(void)+{+ struct task_struct *g, *task;+ unsigned int cpu;++ WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state == KLP_UNDEFINED);++ pr_notice("'%s': %s...\n", klp_transition_patch->mod->name,+ klp_target_state == KLP_PATCHED ? "patching" : "unpatching");++ /*+ * If the patch can be applied or reverted immediately, skip the+ * per-task transitions.+ */+ if (klp_transition_patch->immediate)
We should call klp_try_complete_transition() here. Otherwise, it will
never be called and the transition will never get completed.
Alternative solution would be to move klp_try_complete_transition()
from klp_start_transition() and explicitely call it from
__klp_disable_patch() and klp_enable_patch(). It would actually
solve one issue with klp_revert_patch(), see below.
I kind of like the alternative solution. I hope that it was not
me who suggested to move klp_try_complete_transition() into
klp_start_transtion().
I'll go with your alternative solution. (BTW, moving the
klp_try_complete_transition() call was my idea. It was an "improvement"
I made as part of moving the klp_transition_work to transition.c.)
quoted
+ return;++ /*+ * Mark all normal tasks as needing a patch state update. They'll+ * switch either in klp_try_complete_transition() or as they exit the+ * kernel.+ */+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task)+ if (task->patch_state != klp_target_state)+ set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ /*+ * Mark all idle tasks as needing a patch state update. They'll switch+ * either in klp_try_complete_transition() or at the idle loop switch+ * point.+ */+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {+ task = idle_task(cpu);+ if (task->patch_state != klp_target_state)+ set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ }++ klp_try_complete_transition();+}++/*+ * Initialize the global target patch state and all tasks to the initial patch+ * state, and initialize all function transition states to true in preparation+ * for patching or unpatching.+ */+void klp_init_transition(struct klp_patch *patch, int state)+{+ struct task_struct *g, *task;+ unsigned int cpu;+ struct klp_object *obj;+ struct klp_func *func;+ int initial_state = !state;++ WARN_ON_ONCE(klp_target_state != KLP_UNDEFINED);++ klp_transition_patch = patch;++ /*+ * Set the global target patch state which tasks will switch to. This+ * has no effect until the TIF_PATCH_PENDING flags get set later.+ */+ klp_target_state = state;++ /*+ * If the patch can be applied or reverted immediately, skip the+ * per-task transitions.+ */+ if (patch->immediate)+ return;++ /*+ * Initialize all tasks to the initial patch state to prepare them for+ * switching to the target state.+ */+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task) {+ WARN_ON_ONCE(task->patch_state != KLP_UNDEFINED);+ task->patch_state = initial_state;+ }+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ /*+ * Ditto for the idle "swapper" tasks.+ */+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {+ task = idle_task(cpu);+ WARN_ON_ONCE(task->patch_state != KLP_UNDEFINED);+ task->patch_state = initial_state;+ }++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the task->patch_state initializations and the+ * func->transition updates to ensure that, in the enable path,+ * klp_ftrace_handler() doesn't see a func in transition with a+ * task->patch_state of KLP_UNDEFINED.
It has one more purpose:
*
* Also enforce the order between klp_target_state and
* TIF_PATCH_PENDING. The corresponding read barrier is in
* klp_update_patch_state().
Yes.
quoted
+ */+ smp_wmb();++ /*+ * Set the func transition states so klp_ftrace_handler() will know to+ * switch to the transition logic.+ *+ * When patching, the funcs aren't yet in the func_stack and will be+ * made visible to the ftrace handler shortly by the calls to+ * klp_patch_object().+ *+ * When unpatching, the funcs are already in the func_stack and so are+ * already visible to the ftrace handler.+ */+ klp_for_each_object(patch, obj)+ klp_for_each_func(obj, func)+ func->transition = true;+}++/*+ * This function can be called in the middle of an existing transition to+ * reverse the direction of the target patch state. This can be done to+ * effectively cancel an existing enable or disable operation if there are any+ * tasks which are stuck in the initial patch state.+ */+void klp_reverse_transition(void)+{+ unsigned int cpu;+ struct task_struct *g, *task;++ klp_transition_patch->enabled = !klp_transition_patch->enabled;++ klp_target_state = !klp_target_state;++ /*+ * Clear all TIF_PATCH_PENDING flags to prevent races caused by+ * klp_update_patch_state() running in parallel with+ * klp_start_transition().+ */+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task)+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(idle_task(cpu), TIF_PATCH_PENDING);++ /* Let any remaining calls to klp_update_patch_state() complete */+ synchronize_rcu();++ klp_start_transition();
Hmm, we should not call klp_try_complete_transition() when
klp_start_transition() is called from here. I can't find a safe
way to cancel klp_transition_work() when we own klp_mutex.
It smells with a possible deadlock.
I suggest to move move klp_try_complete_transition() outside
klp_start_transition() and explicitely call it from
__klp_disable_patch() and __klp_enabled_patch().
This would fix also the problem with immediate patches, see
klp_start_transition().
Agreed. I'll fix it as you suggest and I'll put the mod_delayed_work()
call in klp_reverse_transition() again.
quoted
+}++/* Called from copy_process() during fork */+void klp_copy_process(struct task_struct *child)+{+ child->patch_state = current->patch_state;++ /* TIF_PATCH_PENDING gets copied in setup_thread_stack() */+}
@@ -69,6 +71,21 @@ static int livepatch_init(void){intret;+if(!klp_have_reliable_stack()&&!patch.immediate){+/*+*WARNING:Beverycarefulwhenusing'patch.immediate'in+*yourpatches.It'soktouseitforsimplepatcheslike+*this,butformorecomplexpatcheswhichchangefunction+*semantics,lockingsemantics,ordatastructures,itmaynot+*besafe.Useofthisoptionwillalsopreventremovalof+*thepatch.+*+*SeeDocumentation/livepatch/livepatch.txtformoredetails.+*/+patch.immediate=true;+pr_notice("The consistency model isn't supported for your architecture. Bypassing safety mechanisms and applying the patch immediately.\n");+}+ret=klp_register_patch(&patch);if(ret)returnret;
I am sorry that the review took me so long. I was interrupted several
times by other tasks. The logic is very complex. I wanted to
make sure that my comments are consistent and make sense.
Anyway, I think that we are getting close.
Yeah, it does take a while to wrap your head around the code, especially
with respect to synchronization. If there's any way to simplify things,
I'm all for it. Thanks again for your excellent reviews.
--
Josh
@@ -25,6 +25,14 @@ Description: code is currently applied. Writing 0 will disable the patch while writing 1 will re-enable the patch.+What: /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/transition+Date: May 2016
'May 2016' looks strange, but maybe nobody cares about it...
Will update the date to Feb 2017 and also the affected kernel version to
4.12.
@@ -134,7 +242,7 @@ Documentation/livepatch/module-elf-format.txt for more details. 4.2. Metadata-------------+-------------
klp_func and klp_patch have new members - immediate. Should be documented
here in "4.2. Metadata" section.
Agreed.
The section also contains this text under klp_patch bullet. It seems
oudated:
"Also if a more complex consistency model is supported then a selected
unit (thread, kernel as a whole) will see the new code from the entire
patch only when it is in a safe state."
We now have a more complex consistency model.
Agreed.
And finally, the section "Limitations" has this text under the first
bullet:
+ The patch must not change the semantic of the patched functions.
The current implementation guarantees only that either the old
or the new function is called. The functions are patched one
by one. It means that the patch must _not_ change the semantic
of the function.
I think it is confusing. The consistency model allows us to change the
semantic of a function. To certain degree. Of course, there are cases that
cannot be patched, or have to be patched carefully. For example if a
function takes a lock by calling foo_lock(), foo_lock() is not on a stack
afterwards. Then the locking semantics may be changed with a livepatch.
One has to make sure to patch also the caller foo_lock() to enforce the
consistency. And so on... But I do not consider a limitation of livepatch.
It is a feature of the consistency model, which is weaker than kGraft's or
kpatch's (or stronger. It depends on your point of view.)
So, I propose to remove this text and better describe the properties of
the consistency model above in the section 3. Maybe a quote from an old
mail thread (Nov 2014) would be sufficient. I don't remember what was
mentioned and what not.
What do you think?
I'll remove the above limitation.
I'm not sure how to improve the consistency model section. It already
has at least some mentions of changed function semantics and locking
semantics. I'll leave it alone for now, unless you have a specific
suggestion.
This is a minor whitespace fix -- remove a space before tab. I figured
I'd go ahead and fix it since I'm already changing some of the
surrounding code.
(checking my notes)... and that's it. Aside from the discussion in Petr's
subthread it looks good to me. Great job.
From: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Date: 2017-02-06 16:44:38
On Fri 2017-02-03 14:39:16, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
On Thu, Feb 02, 2017 at 12:51:16PM +0100, Petr Mladek wrote:
quoted
!!! This is the right version. I am sorry again for the confusion. !!!
quoted
static int __klp_disable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) {- struct klp_object *obj;+ if (klp_transition_patch)+ return -EBUSY; /* enforce stacking: only the last enabled patch can be disabled */ if (!list_is_last(&patch->list, &klp_patches) && list_next_entry(patch, list)->enabled) return -EBUSY;- pr_notice("disabling patch '%s'\n", patch->mod->name);+ klp_init_transition(patch, KLP_UNPATCHED);- klp_for_each_object(patch, obj) {- if (obj->patched)- klp_unpatch_object(obj);- }+ /*+ * Enforce the order of the klp_target_state write in+ * klp_init_transition() and the TIF_PATCH_PENDING writes in+ * klp_start_transition() to ensure that klp_update_patch_state()+ * doesn't set a task->patch_state to KLP_UNDEFINED.+ */+ smp_wmb();
The description is not clear. The klp_target_state manipulation
is synchronized by another barrier inside klp_init_transition().
Yeah. I should also update the barrier comment in klp_init_transition()
to clarify that it also does this.
quoted
A similar barrier is in __klp_enable_patch() and it is correctly
described there:
It enforces the order of the func->transition writes in
klp_init_transition() and the ops->func_stack writes in
klp_patch_object(). The corresponding barrier is in
klp_ftrace_handler().
But we do not modify ops->func_stack in __klp_disable_patch().
So we need another explanation.
Huh, I spent few hours thinking about it. I am almost sure
that it is not needed. But I am not 100% sure. The many times
rewriten summary looks like:
/*
* Enforce the order of func->transtion write in
* klp_init_transition() against TIF_PATCH_PENDING writes
* in klp_start_transition(). It makes sure that
* klp_ftrace_hadler() will see func->transition set
* after the task is migrated by klp_update_patch_state().
*
* The barrier probably is not needed because the task
* must not be migrated when being inside klp_ftrace_handler()
* and there is another full barrier in
* klp_update_patch_state().
* But this is slow path and better be safe than sorry.
*/
smp_wmb();
This mostly makes sense, but I think the barrier *is* needed for
ordering func->transition and TIF_PATCH_PENDING writes for the rare case
where klp_ftrace_handler() is called right after
klp_update_patch_state(), which could be possible in the idle loop, for
example.
CPU0 CPU1
__klp_disable_patch()
klp_init_transition()
func->transition = true;
(...no barrier...)
klp_start_transition()
set TIF_PATCH_PENDING
klp_update_patch_state()
if (test_and_clear(TIF_PATCH_PENDING))
task->patch_state = KLP_UNPATCHED;
...
klp_ftrace_handler()
smp_rmb();
if (unlikely(func->transition)) <--- false (patched)
...
klp_ftrace_handler()
smp_rmb();
if (unlikely(func->transition)) <--- true (unpatched)
You are right. I was able to find many scenarios where the barrier
was not needed. But it is needed in this one.
The first paragraph should be enough then:
/*
* Enforce the order of func->transition write in
* klp_init_transition() against TIF_PATCH_PENDING writes
* in klp_start_transition(). It makes sure that
* klp_ftrace_handler() will see func->transition set
* after the task is migrated by klp_update_patch_state().
*/
smp_wmb();
So how about:
/*
* Enforce the order of the func->transition writes in
* klp_init_transition() and the TIF_PATCH_PENDING writes in
* klp_start_transition(). In the rare case where klp_ftrace_handler()
* is called shortly after klp_update_patch_state() switches the task,
* this ensures the handler sees func->transition is set.
*/
smp_wmb();
@@ -337,6 +341,9 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) struct klp_object *obj; int ret;+ if (klp_transition_patch)+ return -EBUSY;+ if (WARN_ON(patch->enabled)) return -EINVAL;
@@ -347,22 +354,37 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) pr_notice("enabling patch '%s'\n", patch->mod->name);+ klp_init_transition(patch, KLP_PATCHED);++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the func->transition writes in+ * klp_init_transition() and the ops->func_stack writes in+ * klp_patch_object(), so that klp_ftrace_handler() will see the+ * func->transition updates before the handler is registered and the+ * new funcs become visible to the handler.+ */+ smp_wmb();+ klp_for_each_object(patch, obj) { if (!klp_is_object_loaded(obj)) continue; ret = klp_patch_object(obj);- if (ret)- goto unregister;+ if (ret) {+ pr_warn("failed to enable patch '%s'\n",+ patch->mod->name);++ klp_unpatch_objects(patch);
We should call here synchronize_rcu() here as we do
in klp_try_complete_transition(). Some of the affected
functions might have more versions on the stack and we
need to make sure that klp_ftrace_handler() will _not_
see the removed patch on the stack.
Even if the handler sees the new func on the stack, the
task->patch_state is still KLP_UNPATCHED, so it will still choose the
previous version of the function. Or did I miss your point?
The barrier is needed from exactly the same reason as the one
in klp_try_complete_transition()
CPU0 CPU1
__klp_enable_patch()
klp_init_transition()
for_each...
task->patch_state = KLP_UNPATCHED
for_each...
func->transition = true
klp_for_each_object()
klp_patch_object()
list_add_rcu()
klp_ftrace_handler()
func = list_first_...()
if (func->transition)
ret = klp_patch_object()
/* error */
if (ret) {
klp_unpatch_objects()
list_remove_rcu()
klp_complete_transition()
for_each_....
func->transition = true
for_each_....
task->patch_state = PATCH_UNDEFINED
patch_state = current->patch_state;
WARN_ON_ONCE(patch_state
==
KLP_UNDEFINED);
BANG: The warning is triggered.
=> we need to call rcu_synchronize(). It will make sure that
no ftrace handled will see the removed func on the stack
and we could clear all the other values.
quoted
Alternatively, we could move all the code around
klp_unpatch_objects() from klp_try_complete_transition()
into klp_complete_transition(), see below.
But klp_target_state is KLP_PATCHED so the synchronize_rcu() at the end
of klp_try_complete_transition() wouldn't get called anyway.
@@ -54,15 +55,58 @@ static void notrace klp_ftrace_handler(unsigned long ip,{structklp_ops*ops;structklp_func*func;+intpatch_state;ops=container_of(fops,structklp_ops,fops);rcu_read_lock();+func=list_first_or_null_rcu(&ops->func_stack,structklp_func,stack_node);++/*+*funcshouldneverbeNULLbecausepreemptionshouldbedisabledhere+*andunregister_ftrace_function()doestheequivalentofa+*synchronize_sched()beforethefunc_stackremoval.+*/+if(WARN_ON_ONCE(!func))+gotounlock;++/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheops->func_stackandfunc->transitionreads.+*Thecorrespondingwritebarrierisin__klp_enable_patch().+*/+smp_rmb();
I was curious why the comment did not mention __klp_disable_patch().
It was related to the hours of thinking. I would like to avoid this
in the future and add a comment like.
* This barrier probably is not needed when the patch is being
* disabled. The patch is removed from the stack in
* klp_try_complete_transition() and there we need to call
* rcu_synchronize() to prevent seeing the patch on the stack
* at all.
*
* Well, it still might be needed to see func->transition
* when the patch is removed and the task is migrated. See
* the write barrier in __klp_disable_patch().
Agreed, though as you mentioned earlier, there's also the implicit
barrier in klp_update_patch_state(), which would execute first in such a
scenario. So I think I'll update the barrier comments in
klp_update_patch_state().
You inspired me to a scenario with 3 CPUs:
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
__klp_disable_patch()
klp_init_transition()
func->transition = true
smp_wmb()
klp_start_transition()
set TIF_PATCH_PATCHPENDING
klp_update_patch_state()
task->patch_state
= KLP_UNPATCHED
smp_mb()
klp_ftrace_handler()
func = list_...
smp_rmb() /*needed?*/
if (func->transition)
We need to make sure the CPU3 sees func->transition set. Otherwise,
it would wrongly use the function from the patch.
So, the description might be:
* Enforce the order of the ops->func_stack and
* func->transition reads when the patch is enabled.
* The corresponding write barrier is in __klp_enable_patch().
*
* Also make sure that func->transition is visible before
* TIF_PATCH_PENDING_FLAG is set and the task might get
* migrated to KLP_UNPATCHED state. The corresponding
* write barrier is in __klp_disable_patch().
By other words, the read barrier here is needed from the same
reason as the write barrier in __klp_disable_patch().
quoted
quoted
+ if (unlikely(func->transition)) {++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the func->transition and+ * current->patch_state reads. Otherwise we could read an+ * out-of-date task state and pick the wrong function. The+ * corresponding write barriers are in klp_init_transition()+ * and __klp_disable_patch().+ */+ smp_rmb();
IMHO, the corresponding barrier is in klp_init_transition().
The barrier in __klp_disable_patch() is questionable. Anyway,
it has a different purpose.
@@ -0,0 +1,525 @@+/*+*transition.c-KernelLivePatchingtransitionfunctions+*+*Copyright(C)2015-2016JoshPoimboeuf<jpoimboe@redhat.com>+*+*Thisprogramisfreesoftware;youcanredistributeitand/or+*modifyitunderthetermsoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*aspublishedbytheFreeSoftwareFoundation;eitherversion2+*oftheLicense,or(atyouroption)anylaterversion.+*+*Thisprogramisdistributedinthehopethatitwillbeuseful,+*butWITHOUTANYWARRANTY;withouteventheimpliedwarrantyof+*MERCHANTABILITYorFITNESSFORAPARTICULARPURPOSE.Seethe+*GNUGeneralPublicLicenseformoredetails.+*+*YoushouldhavereceivedacopyoftheGNUGeneralPublicLicense+*alongwiththisprogram;ifnot,see<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.+*/++#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt++#include<linux/cpu.h>+#include<linux/stacktrace.h>+#include"patch.h"+#include"transition.h"+#include"../sched/sched.h"++#define MAX_STACK_ENTRIES 100+#define STACK_ERR_BUF_SIZE 128++externstructmutexklp_mutex;++structklp_patch*klp_transition_patch;++staticintklp_target_state=KLP_UNDEFINED;++/*+*Thisworkcanbeperformedperiodicallytofinishpatchingorunpatchingany+*"straggler"taskswhichfailedtotransitioninthefirstattempt.+*/+staticvoidklp_try_complete_transition(void);+staticvoidklp_transition_work_fn(structwork_struct*work)+{+mutex_lock(&klp_mutex);++if(klp_transition_patch)+klp_try_complete_transition();++mutex_unlock(&klp_mutex);+}+staticDECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(klp_transition_work,klp_transition_work_fn);++/*+*Thetransitiontothetargetpatchstateiscomplete.Cleanupthedata+*structures.+*/+voidklp_complete_transition(void)+{+structklp_object*obj;+structklp_func*func;+structtask_struct*g,*task;+unsignedintcpu;++if(klp_transition_patch->immediate)+gotodone;++klp_for_each_object(klp_transition_patch,obj)+klp_for_each_func(obj,func)+func->transition=false;++/* Prevent klp_ftrace_handler() from seeing KLP_UNDEFINED state */+if(klp_target_state==KLP_PATCHED)+synchronize_rcu();
I forgot why this is done only when the patch is beeing enabled.
It is because klp_unpatch_objects() and rcu_synchronize() is called
in klp_try_complete_transition() when klp_target_state ==
KLP_UNPATCHED.
I would suggest to move the code below the "success" label from
klp_try_complete_transtion() to klp_complete_transition().
It will get the two related things close to each other.
Also it would fix the missing rcu_synchronize() in
the error path in __klp_enable_patch(), see above.
As I mentioned, I don't see how that will fix the __klp_enable_patch()
error path, nor can I see why it needs fixing in the first place.
I hope that I have persuaded you :-)
Regardless, it does seem like a good idea to move the end of
klp_try_complete_transition() into klp_complete_transition().
quoted
quoted
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task) {+ WARN_ON_ONCE(test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING));+ task->patch_state = KLP_UNDEFINED;+ }+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {+ task = idle_task(cpu);+ WARN_ON_ONCE(test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING));+ task->patch_state = KLP_UNDEFINED;+ }++done:+ klp_target_state = KLP_UNDEFINED;+ klp_transition_patch = NULL;+}++/*+ * Switch the patched state of the task to the set of functions in the target+ * patch state.+ *+ * NOTE: If task is not 'current', the caller must ensure the task is inactive.+ * Otherwise klp_ftrace_handler() might read the wrong 'patch_state' value.+ */
[...]
quoted
quoted
+void klp_reverse_transition(void)+{+ unsigned int cpu;+ struct task_struct *g, *task;++ klp_transition_patch->enabled = !klp_transition_patch->enabled;++ klp_target_state = !klp_target_state;++ /*+ * Clear all TIF_PATCH_PENDING flags to prevent races caused by+ * klp_update_patch_state() running in parallel with+ * klp_start_transition().+ */+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task)+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(idle_task(cpu), TIF_PATCH_PENDING);++ /* Let any remaining calls to klp_update_patch_state() complete */+ synchronize_rcu();++ klp_start_transition();
Hmm, we should not call klp_try_complete_transition() when
klp_start_transition() is called from here. I can't find a safe
way to cancel klp_transition_work() when we own klp_mutex.
It smells with a possible deadlock.
I suggest to move move klp_try_complete_transition() outside
klp_start_transition() and explicitely call it from
__klp_disable_patch() and __klp_enabled_patch().
This would fix also the problem with immediate patches, see
klp_start_transition().
Agreed. I'll fix it as you suggest and I'll put the mod_delayed_work()
call in klp_reverse_transition() again.
There is one small catch. The mod_delayed_work() might cause that two
works might be scheduled:
+ one already running that is waiting for the klp_mutex
+ another one scheduled by that mod_delayed_work()
A solution would be to cancel the work from klp_transition_work_fn()
if the transition succeeds.
Another possibility would be to do nothing here. The work is
scheduled very often anyway.
Yeah, it does take a while to wrap your head around the code, especially
with respect to synchronization.
Yes. I am looking forward to get this done. But we are really close, IMHO.
I hope that my today's comments make sense. I am not in a good
condition. I need some rest or so.
Best Regards,
Petr
On Mon, Feb 06, 2017 at 05:44:31PM +0100, Petr Mladek wrote:
quoted
quoted
quoted
@@ -347,22 +354,37 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) pr_notice("enabling patch '%s'\n", patch->mod->name);+ klp_init_transition(patch, KLP_PATCHED);++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the func->transition writes in+ * klp_init_transition() and the ops->func_stack writes in+ * klp_patch_object(), so that klp_ftrace_handler() will see the+ * func->transition updates before the handler is registered and the+ * new funcs become visible to the handler.+ */+ smp_wmb();+ klp_for_each_object(patch, obj) { if (!klp_is_object_loaded(obj)) continue; ret = klp_patch_object(obj);- if (ret)- goto unregister;+ if (ret) {+ pr_warn("failed to enable patch '%s'\n",+ patch->mod->name);++ klp_unpatch_objects(patch);
We should call here synchronize_rcu() here as we do
in klp_try_complete_transition(). Some of the affected
functions might have more versions on the stack and we
need to make sure that klp_ftrace_handler() will _not_
see the removed patch on the stack.
Even if the handler sees the new func on the stack, the
task->patch_state is still KLP_UNPATCHED, so it will still choose the
previous version of the function. Or did I miss your point?
The barrier is needed from exactly the same reason as the one
in klp_try_complete_transition()
CPU0 CPU1
__klp_enable_patch()
klp_init_transition()
for_each...
task->patch_state = KLP_UNPATCHED
for_each...
func->transition = true
klp_for_each_object()
klp_patch_object()
list_add_rcu()
klp_ftrace_handler()
func = list_first_...()
if (func->transition)
ret = klp_patch_object()
/* error */
if (ret) {
klp_unpatch_objects()
list_remove_rcu()
klp_complete_transition()
for_each_....
func->transition = true
for_each_....
task->patch_state = PATCH_UNDEFINED
patch_state = current->patch_state;
WARN_ON_ONCE(patch_state
==
KLP_UNDEFINED);
BANG: The warning is triggered.
=> we need to call rcu_synchronize(). It will make sure that
no ftrace handled will see the removed func on the stack
and we could clear all the other values.
Makes sense.
Notice in this case that klp_target_state is KLP_PATCHED. Which means
that klp_complete_transition() would not call synchronize_rcu() at the
right time, nor would it call module_put(). It can be fixed with:
This assumes that the 'if (klp_target_state == KLP_UNPATCHED)' clause in
klp_try_complete_transition() gets moved to klp_complete_transition() as
you suggested.
@@ -54,15 +55,58 @@ static void notrace klp_ftrace_handler(unsigned long ip,{structklp_ops*ops;structklp_func*func;+intpatch_state;ops=container_of(fops,structklp_ops,fops);rcu_read_lock();+func=list_first_or_null_rcu(&ops->func_stack,structklp_func,stack_node);++/*+*funcshouldneverbeNULLbecausepreemptionshouldbedisabledhere+*andunregister_ftrace_function()doestheequivalentofa+*synchronize_sched()beforethefunc_stackremoval.+*/+if(WARN_ON_ONCE(!func))+gotounlock;++/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheops->func_stackandfunc->transitionreads.+*Thecorrespondingwritebarrierisin__klp_enable_patch().+*/+smp_rmb();
I was curious why the comment did not mention __klp_disable_patch().
It was related to the hours of thinking. I would like to avoid this
in the future and add a comment like.
* This barrier probably is not needed when the patch is being
* disabled. The patch is removed from the stack in
* klp_try_complete_transition() and there we need to call
* rcu_synchronize() to prevent seeing the patch on the stack
* at all.
*
* Well, it still might be needed to see func->transition
* when the patch is removed and the task is migrated. See
* the write barrier in __klp_disable_patch().
Agreed, though as you mentioned earlier, there's also the implicit
barrier in klp_update_patch_state(), which would execute first in such a
scenario. So I think I'll update the barrier comments in
klp_update_patch_state().
You inspired me to a scenario with 3 CPUs:
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
__klp_disable_patch()
klp_init_transition()
func->transition = true
smp_wmb()
klp_start_transition()
set TIF_PATCH_PATCHPENDING
klp_update_patch_state()
task->patch_state
= KLP_UNPATCHED
smp_mb()
klp_ftrace_handler()
func = list_...
smp_rmb() /*needed?*/
if (func->transition)
I think this isn't possible. Remember the comment I added to
klp_update_patch_state():
* NOTE: If task is not 'current', the caller must ensure the task is inactive.
* Otherwise klp_ftrace_handler() might read the wrong 'patch_state' value.
Right now klp_update_patch_state() is only called for current.
klp_ftrace_handler() on CPU2 would be running in the context of a
different task.
We need to make sure the CPU3 sees func->transition set. Otherwise,
it would wrongly use the function from the patch.
So, the description might be:
* Enforce the order of the ops->func_stack and
* func->transition reads when the patch is enabled.
* The corresponding write barrier is in __klp_enable_patch().
*
* Also make sure that func->transition is visible before
* TIF_PATCH_PENDING_FLAG is set and the task might get
* migrated to KLP_UNPATCHED state. The corresponding
* write barrier is in __klp_disable_patch().
By other words, the read barrier here is needed from the same
reason as the write barrier in __klp_disable_patch().
quoted
quoted
quoted
+void klp_reverse_transition(void)+{+ unsigned int cpu;+ struct task_struct *g, *task;++ klp_transition_patch->enabled = !klp_transition_patch->enabled;++ klp_target_state = !klp_target_state;++ /*+ * Clear all TIF_PATCH_PENDING flags to prevent races caused by+ * klp_update_patch_state() running in parallel with+ * klp_start_transition().+ */+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task)+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(idle_task(cpu), TIF_PATCH_PENDING);++ /* Let any remaining calls to klp_update_patch_state() complete */+ synchronize_rcu();++ klp_start_transition();
Hmm, we should not call klp_try_complete_transition() when
klp_start_transition() is called from here. I can't find a safe
way to cancel klp_transition_work() when we own klp_mutex.
It smells with a possible deadlock.
I suggest to move move klp_try_complete_transition() outside
klp_start_transition() and explicitely call it from
__klp_disable_patch() and __klp_enabled_patch().
This would fix also the problem with immediate patches, see
klp_start_transition().
Agreed. I'll fix it as you suggest and I'll put the mod_delayed_work()
call in klp_reverse_transition() again.
There is one small catch. The mod_delayed_work() might cause that two
works might be scheduled:
+ one already running that is waiting for the klp_mutex
+ another one scheduled by that mod_delayed_work()
A solution would be to cancel the work from klp_transition_work_fn()
if the transition succeeds.
Another possibility would be to do nothing here. The work is
scheduled very often anyway.
Yes, I think I'll do this, for the sake of simplicity.
--
Josh
From: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Date: 2017-02-07 08:21:54
quoted
And finally, the section "Limitations" has this text under the first
bullet:
+ The patch must not change the semantic of the patched functions.
The current implementation guarantees only that either the old
or the new function is called. The functions are patched one
by one. It means that the patch must _not_ change the semantic
of the function.
I think it is confusing. The consistency model allows us to change the
semantic of a function. To certain degree. Of course, there are cases that
cannot be patched, or have to be patched carefully. For example if a
function takes a lock by calling foo_lock(), foo_lock() is not on a stack
afterwards. Then the locking semantics may be changed with a livepatch.
One has to make sure to patch also the caller foo_lock() to enforce the
consistency. And so on... But I do not consider a limitation of livepatch.
It is a feature of the consistency model, which is weaker than kGraft's or
kpatch's (or stronger. It depends on your point of view.)
So, I propose to remove this text and better describe the properties of
the consistency model above in the section 3. Maybe a quote from an old
mail thread (Nov 2014) would be sufficient. I don't remember what was
mentioned and what not.
What do you think?
I'll remove the above limitation.
I'm not sure how to improve the consistency model section. It already
has at least some mentions of changed function semantics and locking
semantics. I'll leave it alone for now, unless you have a specific
suggestion.
Fair enough. Let's see if I can come up with something.
This is a minor whitespace fix -- remove a space before tab. I figured
I'd go ahead and fix it since I'm already changing some of the
surrounding code.
From: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Date: 2017-02-08 15:47:59
On Mon 2017-02-06 13:51:48, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
quoted hunk
On Mon, Feb 06, 2017 at 05:44:31PM +0100, Petr Mladek wrote:
quoted
quoted
quoted
quoted
@@ -347,22 +354,37 @@ static int __klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *patch) pr_notice("enabling patch '%s'\n", patch->mod->name);+ klp_init_transition(patch, KLP_PATCHED);++ /*+ * Enforce the order of the func->transition writes in+ * klp_init_transition() and the ops->func_stack writes in+ * klp_patch_object(), so that klp_ftrace_handler() will see the+ * func->transition updates before the handler is registered and the+ * new funcs become visible to the handler.+ */+ smp_wmb();+ klp_for_each_object(patch, obj) { if (!klp_is_object_loaded(obj)) continue; ret = klp_patch_object(obj);- if (ret)- goto unregister;+ if (ret) {+ pr_warn("failed to enable patch '%s'\n",+ patch->mod->name);++ klp_unpatch_objects(patch);
We should call here synchronize_rcu() here as we do
in klp_try_complete_transition(). Some of the affected
functions might have more versions on the stack and we
need to make sure that klp_ftrace_handler() will _not_
see the removed patch on the stack.
Even if the handler sees the new func on the stack, the
task->patch_state is still KLP_UNPATCHED, so it will still choose the
previous version of the function. Or did I miss your point?
The barrier is needed from exactly the same reason as the one
in klp_try_complete_transition()
CPU0 CPU1
__klp_enable_patch()
klp_init_transition()
for_each...
task->patch_state = KLP_UNPATCHED
for_each...
func->transition = true
klp_for_each_object()
klp_patch_object()
list_add_rcu()
klp_ftrace_handler()
func = list_first_...()
if (func->transition)
ret = klp_patch_object()
/* error */
if (ret) {
klp_unpatch_objects()
list_remove_rcu()
klp_complete_transition()
for_each_....
func->transition = true
for_each_....
task->patch_state = PATCH_UNDEFINED
patch_state = current->patch_state;
WARN_ON_ONCE(patch_state
==
KLP_UNDEFINED);
BANG: The warning is triggered.
=> we need to call rcu_synchronize(). It will make sure that
no ftrace handled will see the removed func on the stack
and we could clear all the other values.
Makes sense.
Notice in this case that klp_target_state is KLP_PATCHED. Which means
that klp_complete_transition() would not call synchronize_rcu() at the
right time, nor would it call module_put(). It can be fixed with:
This assumes that the 'if (klp_target_state == KLP_UNPATCHED)' clause in
klp_try_complete_transition() gets moved to klp_complete_transition() as
you suggested.
@@ -54,15 +55,58 @@ static void notrace klp_ftrace_handler(unsigned long ip,{structklp_ops*ops;structklp_func*func;+intpatch_state;ops=container_of(fops,structklp_ops,fops);rcu_read_lock();+func=list_first_or_null_rcu(&ops->func_stack,structklp_func,stack_node);++/*+*funcshouldneverbeNULLbecausepreemptionshouldbedisabledhere+*andunregister_ftrace_function()doestheequivalentofa+*synchronize_sched()beforethefunc_stackremoval.+*/+if(WARN_ON_ONCE(!func))+gotounlock;++/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheops->func_stackandfunc->transitionreads.+*Thecorrespondingwritebarrierisin__klp_enable_patch().+*/+smp_rmb();
I was curious why the comment did not mention __klp_disable_patch().
It was related to the hours of thinking. I would like to avoid this
in the future and add a comment like.
* This barrier probably is not needed when the patch is being
* disabled. The patch is removed from the stack in
* klp_try_complete_transition() and there we need to call
* rcu_synchronize() to prevent seeing the patch on the stack
* at all.
*
* Well, it still might be needed to see func->transition
* when the patch is removed and the task is migrated. See
* the write barrier in __klp_disable_patch().
Agreed, though as you mentioned earlier, there's also the implicit
barrier in klp_update_patch_state(), which would execute first in such a
scenario. So I think I'll update the barrier comments in
klp_update_patch_state().
You inspired me to a scenario with 3 CPUs:
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
__klp_disable_patch()
klp_init_transition()
func->transition = true
smp_wmb()
klp_start_transition()
set TIF_PATCH_PATCHPENDING
klp_update_patch_state()
task->patch_state
= KLP_UNPATCHED
smp_mb()
klp_ftrace_handler()
func = list_...
smp_rmb() /*needed?*/
if (func->transition)
I think this isn't possible. Remember the comment I added to
klp_update_patch_state():
* NOTE: If task is not 'current', the caller must ensure the task is inactive.
* Otherwise klp_ftrace_handler() might read the wrong 'patch_state' value.
Right now klp_update_patch_state() is only called for current.
klp_ftrace_handler() on CPU2 would be running in the context of a
different task.
I agree that it is impossible with the current code. In fact, I cannot
imagine a way to migrate the task where the barrier would be needed.
The question if we could/should somehow document it. Something like
* The barrier is not really needed when the patch is being
* disabled. The value of func->transition would change
* the result of this handled only after the task is migrated.
* But the conditions for the migration are very limited
* and practically include a full barrier, see
* klp_update_patch_state().
quoted
We need to make sure the CPU3 sees func->transition set. Otherwise,
it would wrongly use the function from the patch.
So, the description might be:
* Enforce the order of the ops->func_stack and
* func->transition reads when the patch is enabled.
* The corresponding write barrier is in __klp_enable_patch().
*
* Also make sure that func->transition is visible before
* TIF_PATCH_PENDING_FLAG is set and the task might get
* migrated to KLP_UNPATCHED state. The corresponding
* write barrier is in __klp_disable_patch().
By other words, the read barrier here is needed from the same
reason as the write barrier in __klp_disable_patch().
quoted
quoted
quoted
+void klp_reverse_transition(void)+{+ unsigned int cpu;+ struct task_struct *g, *task;++ klp_transition_patch->enabled = !klp_transition_patch->enabled;++ klp_target_state = !klp_target_state;++ /*+ * Clear all TIF_PATCH_PENDING flags to prevent races caused by+ * klp_update_patch_state() running in parallel with+ * klp_start_transition().+ */+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);+ for_each_process_thread(g, task)+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_PATCH_PENDING);+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);++ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(idle_task(cpu), TIF_PATCH_PENDING);++ /* Let any remaining calls to klp_update_patch_state() complete */+ synchronize_rcu();++ klp_start_transition();
Hmm, we should not call klp_try_complete_transition() when
klp_start_transition() is called from here. I can't find a safe
way to cancel klp_transition_work() when we own klp_mutex.
It smells with a possible deadlock.
I suggest to move move klp_try_complete_transition() outside
klp_start_transition() and explicitely call it from
__klp_disable_patch() and __klp_enabled_patch().
This would fix also the problem with immediate patches, see
klp_start_transition().
Agreed. I'll fix it as you suggest and I'll put the mod_delayed_work()
call in klp_reverse_transition() again.
There is one small catch. The mod_delayed_work() might cause that two
works might be scheduled:
+ one already running that is waiting for the klp_mutex
+ another one scheduled by that mod_delayed_work()
A solution would be to cancel the work from klp_transition_work_fn()
if the transition succeeds.
Another possibility would be to do nothing here. The work is
scheduled very often anyway.
Yes, I think I'll do this, for the sake of simplicity.
Sounds good to me.
I am sorry for the late reply. I am ill and work only limited
time.
Best Regards,
Petr
On Wed, Feb 08, 2017 at 04:47:50PM +0100, Petr Mladek wrote:
quoted
Notice in this case that klp_target_state is KLP_PATCHED. Which means
that klp_complete_transition() would not call synchronize_rcu() at the
right time, nor would it call module_put(). It can be fixed with:
As it turns out, klp_target_state isn't accessible from this file, so
I'll make a klp_cancel_transition() helper function which reverses
klp_target_state and calls klp_complete_transition().
quoted
This assumes that the 'if (klp_target_state == KLP_UNPATCHED)' clause in
klp_try_complete_transition() gets moved to klp_complete_transition() as
you suggested.
@@ -54,15 +55,58 @@ static void notrace klp_ftrace_handler(unsigned long ip,{structklp_ops*ops;structklp_func*func;+intpatch_state;ops=container_of(fops,structklp_ops,fops);rcu_read_lock();+func=list_first_or_null_rcu(&ops->func_stack,structklp_func,stack_node);++/*+*funcshouldneverbeNULLbecausepreemptionshouldbedisabledhere+*andunregister_ftrace_function()doestheequivalentofa+*synchronize_sched()beforethefunc_stackremoval.+*/+if(WARN_ON_ONCE(!func))+gotounlock;++/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheops->func_stackandfunc->transitionreads.+*Thecorrespondingwritebarrierisin__klp_enable_patch().+*/+smp_rmb();
I was curious why the comment did not mention __klp_disable_patch().
It was related to the hours of thinking. I would like to avoid this
in the future and add a comment like.
* This barrier probably is not needed when the patch is being
* disabled. The patch is removed from the stack in
* klp_try_complete_transition() and there we need to call
* rcu_synchronize() to prevent seeing the patch on the stack
* at all.
*
* Well, it still might be needed to see func->transition
* when the patch is removed and the task is migrated. See
* the write barrier in __klp_disable_patch().
Agreed, though as you mentioned earlier, there's also the implicit
barrier in klp_update_patch_state(), which would execute first in such a
scenario. So I think I'll update the barrier comments in
klp_update_patch_state().
You inspired me to a scenario with 3 CPUs:
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
__klp_disable_patch()
klp_init_transition()
func->transition = true
smp_wmb()
klp_start_transition()
set TIF_PATCH_PATCHPENDING
klp_update_patch_state()
task->patch_state
= KLP_UNPATCHED
smp_mb()
klp_ftrace_handler()
func = list_...
smp_rmb() /*needed?*/
if (func->transition)
I think this isn't possible. Remember the comment I added to
klp_update_patch_state():
* NOTE: If task is not 'current', the caller must ensure the task is inactive.
* Otherwise klp_ftrace_handler() might read the wrong 'patch_state' value.
Right now klp_update_patch_state() is only called for current.
klp_ftrace_handler() on CPU2 would be running in the context of a
different task.
I agree that it is impossible with the current code. In fact, I cannot
imagine a way to migrate the task where the barrier would be needed.
The question if we could/should somehow document it. Something like
* The barrier is not really needed when the patch is being
* disabled. The value of func->transition would change
* the result of this handled only after the task is migrated.
* But the conditions for the migration are very limited
* and practically include a full barrier, see
* klp_update_patch_state().
Well, I'd like to avoid over-commenting this issue. For v5 I've added
the following comment to klp_update_patch_state() -- see #2:
/*
* This test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag() call also serves as a read
* barrier (smp_rmb) for two cases:
*
* 1) Enforce the order of the TIF_PATCH_PENDING read and the
* klp_target_state read. The corresponding write barrier is in
* klp_init_transition().
*
* 2) Enforce the order of the TIF_PATCH_PENDING read and a future read
* of func->transition, if klp_ftrace_handler() is called later on
* the same CPU. See __klp_disable_patch().
*/
Is that sufficient? If not, I could maybe add another related comment
in klp_ftrace_handler() which refers to this comment.
--
Josh
From: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Date: 2017-02-09 10:25:11
On Wed 2017-02-08 10:46:36, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
On Wed, Feb 08, 2017 at 04:47:50PM +0100, Petr Mladek wrote:
quoted
quoted
Notice in this case that klp_target_state is KLP_PATCHED. Which means
that klp_complete_transition() would not call synchronize_rcu() at the
right time, nor would it call module_put(). It can be fixed with:
As it turns out, klp_target_state isn't accessible from this file, so
I'll make a klp_cancel_transition() helper function which reverses
klp_target_state and calls klp_complete_transition().
Sound good to me.
quoted
quoted
This assumes that the 'if (klp_target_state == KLP_UNPATCHED)' clause in
klp_try_complete_transition() gets moved to klp_complete_transition() as
you suggested.
@@ -54,15 +55,58 @@ static void notrace klp_ftrace_handler(unsigned long ip,{structklp_ops*ops;structklp_func*func;+intpatch_state;ops=container_of(fops,structklp_ops,fops);rcu_read_lock();+func=list_first_or_null_rcu(&ops->func_stack,structklp_func,stack_node);++/*+*funcshouldneverbeNULLbecausepreemptionshouldbedisabledhere+*andunregister_ftrace_function()doestheequivalentofa+*synchronize_sched()beforethefunc_stackremoval.+*/+if(WARN_ON_ONCE(!func))+gotounlock;++/*+*Enforcetheorderoftheops->func_stackandfunc->transitionreads.+*Thecorrespondingwritebarrierisin__klp_enable_patch().+*/+smp_rmb();
I was curious why the comment did not mention __klp_disable_patch().
It was related to the hours of thinking. I would like to avoid this
in the future and add a comment like.
* This barrier probably is not needed when the patch is being
* disabled. The patch is removed from the stack in
* klp_try_complete_transition() and there we need to call
* rcu_synchronize() to prevent seeing the patch on the stack
* at all.
*
* Well, it still might be needed to see func->transition
* when the patch is removed and the task is migrated. See
* the write barrier in __klp_disable_patch().
Agreed, though as you mentioned earlier, there's also the implicit
barrier in klp_update_patch_state(), which would execute first in such a
scenario. So I think I'll update the barrier comments in
klp_update_patch_state().
You inspired me to a scenario with 3 CPUs:
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
__klp_disable_patch()
klp_init_transition()
func->transition = true
smp_wmb()
klp_start_transition()
set TIF_PATCH_PATCHPENDING
klp_update_patch_state()
task->patch_state
= KLP_UNPATCHED
smp_mb()
klp_ftrace_handler()
func = list_...
smp_rmb() /*needed?*/
if (func->transition)
I think this isn't possible. Remember the comment I added to
klp_update_patch_state():
* NOTE: If task is not 'current', the caller must ensure the task is inactive.
* Otherwise klp_ftrace_handler() might read the wrong 'patch_state' value.
Right now klp_update_patch_state() is only called for current.
klp_ftrace_handler() on CPU2 would be running in the context of a
different task.
I agree that it is impossible with the current code. In fact, I cannot
imagine a way to migrate the task where the barrier would be needed.
The question if we could/should somehow document it. Something like
* The barrier is not really needed when the patch is being
* disabled. The value of func->transition would change
* the result of this handled only after the task is migrated.
* But the conditions for the migration are very limited
* and practically include a full barrier, see
* klp_update_patch_state().
Well, I'd like to avoid over-commenting this issue. For v5 I've added
the following comment to klp_update_patch_state() -- see #2:
/*
* This test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag() call also serves as a read
* barrier (smp_rmb) for two cases:
*
* 1) Enforce the order of the TIF_PATCH_PENDING read and the
* klp_target_state read. The corresponding write barrier is in
* klp_init_transition().
*
* 2) Enforce the order of the TIF_PATCH_PENDING read and a future read
* of func->transition, if klp_ftrace_handler() is called later on
* the same CPU. See __klp_disable_patch().
*/
Sounds good.
Is that sufficient? If not, I could maybe add another related comment
in klp_ftrace_handler() which refers to this comment.
It would be nice. I do not want over-commenting either. On the other
hand, the code is really complex and it is not easy to understand
all the relations. The comments should safe us a lot of pain in
the long term.
Thanks a lot for working on it
Best Regards,
Petr