--- v38
+++ v33
@@ -1,303 +1,484 @@
-Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
-and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
-modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
-allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
-filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
-that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
-to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
-security module to use for a particular rule.
+Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
+security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in
+a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
+LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
+possible secids for possible reporting.
+Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
-To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
-To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
+Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 +++-
- include/linux/security.h | 14 +++---
- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- security/security.c | 35 +++++++++++---
- 4 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+ drivers/android/binder.c | 6 +--
+ include/linux/security.h | 13 ++++---
+ kernel/audit.c | 16 +++-----
+ kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-
+ kernel/auditsc.c | 25 ++++++------
+ net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++-
+ net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++-
+ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 12 +++---
+ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 55 +++++++++++++++------------
+ security/security.c | 25 +++++++++---
+ 10 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
-diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
-index db17fc8a0c9f..bac75acc24ba 100644
---- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
-+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
-@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
- [uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
- [fowner=] [fgroup=]]
- lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
-- [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
-+ [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=] [lsm=]]
- option: [digest_type=] [template=] [permit_directio]
- [appraise_type=] [appraise_flag=]
- [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
-@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ Description:
-
- measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
-
-+ It is possible to explicitly specify which security
-+ module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
-+ module specified is not active on the system the rule
-+ will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
-+ security module registered on the system will be assumed.
-+
- Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
-
- measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
+diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
+index 381a4fddd4a5..bae8440ffc73 100644
+--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
++++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
+@@ -2980,16 +2980,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
+ t->priority = task_nice(current);
+
+ if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
+- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+ size_t added_size;
++ u32 secid;
+
+ security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
+ /*
+- * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
++ * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will
+ * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
+ * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
+- * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
++ * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(),
+ * which means that the one expected by
+ * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
+ */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
-index 0f0fb2077f41..6ee00f3a10a7 100644
+index 1814516509ec..5f20c0c68f67 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -2012,25 +2012,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
- #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
-
- #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
--int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
--int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
--void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
-+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
-+ int lsmslot);
-+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
-+ int lsmslot);
-+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot);
-
- #else
-
- static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
-- void **lsmrule)
-+ void **lsmrule, int lsmslot)
- {
+@@ -502,8 +502,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
+ int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
+ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
+-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid);
+-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
++void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob);
++void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
+ int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
+ int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
+ int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
+@@ -1199,14 +1199,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
- static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-- void *lsmrule)
-+ void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
- {
+-static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
++static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob)
+ {
+- *secid = 0;
++ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ }
+
+-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
++static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
++ struct lsmblob *blob)
+ {
+- *secid = 0;
++ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ }
+
+ static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
+index 40d8cb824eae..17ac6e74b5bd 100644
+--- a/kernel/audit.c
++++ b/kernel/audit.c
+@@ -2154,19 +2154,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned len;
+ int error;
+- u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
+- if (!sid)
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
++ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
+ return 0;
+
+- /*
+- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
+- * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
+- * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
+- */
+- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+
+ if (error) {
+@@ -2375,6 +2368,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
+ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+ {
+ kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
+ (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
+@@ -2385,7 +2379,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+ audit_sig_uid = auid;
+ else
+ audit_sig_uid = uid;
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_sid);
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
++ /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
++ audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ }
+
+ return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
+diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
+index 15cd4fe35e9c..39ded5cb2429 100644
+--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
++++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
+@@ -1339,7 +1339,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
+ struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+ pid_t pid;
+- u32 sid;
+
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_PID:
+@@ -1369,8 +1368,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ if (f->lsm_str) {
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
+- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules);
+diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
+index 598e0de45b04..2570bf5979e0 100644
+--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
++++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
+@@ -467,7 +467,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ {
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ int i, need_sid = 1;
+- u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+ unsigned int sessionid;
+
+@@ -676,17 +675,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ * here even though it always refs
+ * @current's creds
+ */
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ need_sid = 0;
+ }
+- /*
+- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+- * to sid. This is temporary until
+- * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
+- * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
+- * this patch set.
+- */
+- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ &f->lsm_rules);
+@@ -2712,12 +2703,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
+ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
+ {
+ struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
+ context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
+ context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
++ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
++ context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+ }
+
+@@ -2733,6 +2727,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
+ struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
+ struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
+ kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
+ return 0;
+@@ -2744,7 +2739,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
+ ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
+ ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
++ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
++ ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -2765,7 +2762,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
+ axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
+ axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
++ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
++ axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
+ memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+ axp->pid_count++;
+
+diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+index 0a99663e6edb..c86df6ead742 100644
+--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
++++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+@@ -1562,11 +1562,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
+ int ret_val;
+ struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
+ struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
+ * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
+ * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid);
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
++ /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
++ audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
+ audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
+ audit_info.sessionid = 0;
+
+diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+index d6c5b31eb4eb..3d5610ed5f0e 100644
+--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
++++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
+ */
+ static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+ {
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid);
++ struct lsmblob blob;
++
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
++ /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
++ audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
+ audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+ audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+ }
+diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+index 17232bbfb9f9..217d20c60e1d 100644
+--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
++++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+@@ -71,15 +71,17 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
+ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
+ {
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ if (!ima_appraise)
+ return 0;
+
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid,
+- func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
+- NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
++ /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
++ return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
++ blob.secid[0], func, mask,
++ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL,
++ NULL);
+ }
+
+ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+index 8c6e4514d494..6abbaa97bbeb 100644
+--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
++++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+@@ -405,12 +405,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
+ */
+ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+ {
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
++ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
++ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
++ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ }
+
return 0;
- }
-
--static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
-+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
- { }
-
- #endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
-diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
-index a8802b8da946..3ca046129ff0 100644
---- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
-+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
-@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
- void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
- char *args_p; /* audit value */
- int type; /* audit type */
-+ int rules_lsm; /* which LSM rule applies to */
-+ bool lsm_specific; /* true if lsm is specified */
- } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
- char *fsname;
- struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
-@@ -285,6 +287,30 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
- }
- __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
-
-+static int default_rules_lsm __ro_after_init = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
-+
-+static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
-+{
-+ const char *oldstr;
-+ int newdrl;
-+
-+ newdrl = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
-+ if (newdrl >= 0) {
-+ default_rules_lsm = newdrl;
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+
-+ oldstr = lsm_slot_to_name(default_rules_lsm);
-+ if (oldstr) {
-+ pr_err("default ima rule lsm \"%s\" not registered, continue using \"%s\"",
-+ str, oldstr);
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
-+
- static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
- {
- struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
-@@ -356,7 +382,8 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-- ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
-+ ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule,
-+ entry->lsm[i].rules_lsm);
- kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+@@ -436,9 +437,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
+ char *pathbuf = NULL;
+ const char *pathname = NULL;
+ struct inode *inode;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+ int result = 0;
+ int action;
+- u32 secid;
+ int pcr;
+
+ /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
+@@ -446,11 +447,11 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
+ !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
+ return 0;
+
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
+ inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
+ action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
+- current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+- &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
++ current_cred(), blob.secid[0], MAY_EXEC,
++ MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
+
+ /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
+ if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
+@@ -486,10 +487,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
++ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
++ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
++ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+@@ -510,10 +513,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ */
+ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+ {
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
++ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
++ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
+ mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
+ MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
+ }
+@@ -689,7 +693,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+ bool contents)
+ {
+ enum ima_hooks func;
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /*
+ * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
+@@ -709,8 +713,9 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+
+ /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
+ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
++ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
++ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL,
+ 0, MAY_READ, func);
+ }
+
+@@ -739,7 +744,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+ {
+ enum ima_hooks func;
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /* permit signed certs */
+ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
+@@ -752,9 +757,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
- }
-@@ -407,7 +434,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
-
- ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
- nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
-- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
-+ &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
-+ entry->lsm[i].rules_lsm);
- if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
- pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
- nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
-@@ -623,14 +651,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
- Audit_equal,
-- rule->lsm[i].rule);
-+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
-+ rule->lsm[i].rules_lsm);
- break;
- case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
- case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
- case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
- Audit_equal,
-- rule->lsm[i].rule);
-+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
-+ rule->lsm[i].rules_lsm);
- break;
- default:
- break;
-@@ -1026,7 +1056,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
- Opt_digest_type,
- Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
- Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
-- Opt_label, Opt_err
-+ Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
- };
-
- static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
-@@ -1074,6 +1104,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
- {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
- {Opt_template, "template=%s"},
- {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
-+ {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
- {Opt_label, "label=%s"},
- {Opt_err, NULL}
- };
-@@ -1093,7 +1124,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
- entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
- result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
- entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
-- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
-+ &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
-+ entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules_lsm);
- if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
- pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
- entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
-@@ -1833,6 +1865,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
- &(template_desc->num_fields));
- entry->template = template_desc;
- break;
-+ case Opt_lsm: {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
-+ if (result < 0) {
-+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
-+ entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
-+ result = -EINVAL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-+ entry->lsm[i].rules_lsm = result;
-+ entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific = true;
-+ }
-+ result = 0;
-+ break;
-+ }
- case Opt_err:
- ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
- result = -EINVAL;
-@@ -1878,6 +1927,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
- struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
- ssize_t result, len;
- int audit_info = 0;
-+ int i;
-
- p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
- len = strlen(p) + 1;
-@@ -1895,6 +1945,11 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
-
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
-
-+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-+ entry->lsm[i].rules_lsm = default_rules_lsm;
-+ entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific = false;
-+ }
-+
- result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
- if (result) {
- ima_free_rule(entry);
-@@ -2205,6 +2260,9 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
- entry->lsm[i].args_p);
- break;
- }
-+ if (entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific)
-+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm),
-+ lsm_slot_to_name(entry->lsm[i].rules_lsm));
- seq_puts(m, " ");
- }
- }
+
+ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+- MAY_READ, func);
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
++ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
++ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
++ size, MAY_READ, func);
+ }
+
+ /**
+@@ -882,7 +888,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+ int violation = 0;
+ int action = 0;
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+@@ -905,9 +911,10 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ * buffer measurements.
+ */
+ if (func) {
+- security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
++ security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob);
++ /* scaffolding */
+ action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
+- secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
++ blob.secid[0], 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+ func_data, NULL);
+ if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
+ return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
-index 2c197c25746c..b74debe82d82 100644
+index 815200684bcf..e33fa677181d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -2745,19 +2745,42 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
- * the audit subsystem.
- */
--int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
-+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
-+ int lsmslot)
- {
-- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+@@ -1909,17 +1909,30 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+ return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
+ }
+
+-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
++void security_current_getsecid_subj(struct lsmblob *blob)
+ {
+- *secid = 0;
+- call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
-+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list)
-+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
-+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
-+ lsmrule);
-+
-+ return 0;
- }
-
--void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
-+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
- {
-- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
++ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
++ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.current_getsecid_subj,
++ list) {
++ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
++ continue;
++ hp->hook.current_getsecid_subj(&blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
++ }
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
+
+-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
++void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
+ {
+- *secid = 0;
+- call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
-+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
-+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot) {
-+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
-+ return;
-+ }
++ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
++ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_obj, list) {
++ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
++ continue;
++ hp->hook.task_getsecid_obj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
-
--int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
-+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
-+ int lsmslot)
- {
-- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
-+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
-+
-+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list)
-+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
-+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
-+ lsmrule);
-+
-+ return 0;
- }
- #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
--
-2.37.3
+2.31.1