Inter-revision diff: patch 11

Comparing v29 (message) to v30 (message)

--- v29
+++ v30
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
-lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
-callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
-for IMA and audit.
+Change the security_task_getsecid_subj() and
+security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in
+a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
+LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
+possible secids for possible reporting.
 
 Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
 Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
@@ -10,107 +11,475 @@
 Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
 Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
 Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
+Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
 ---
- include/linux/security.h            |  7 ++++---
- kernel/auditsc.c                    |  6 +++++-
- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  4 +---
- security/security.c                 | 11 +++++++++--
- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+ drivers/android/binder.c              |  6 +--
+ include/linux/security.h              | 14 ++++---
+ kernel/audit.c                        | 16 +++-----
+ kernel/auditfilter.c                  |  4 +-
+ kernel/auditsc.c                      | 25 ++++++------
+ net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c     |  5 ++-
+ net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h          |  6 ++-
+ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 12 +++---
+ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 55 +++++++++++++++------------
+ security/security.c                   | 25 +++++++++---
+ 10 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
 
+diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
+index 01cef18f942f..780c7e265f3a 100644
+--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
++++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
+@@ -2718,16 +2718,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
+ 	t->priority = task_nice(current);
+ 
+ 	if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
+-		u32 secid;
+ 		struct lsmblob blob;
+ 		size_t added_size;
++		u32 secid;
+ 
+ 		security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
+ 		/*
+-		 * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
++		 * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will
+ 		 * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
+ 		 * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
+-		 * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
++		 * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(),
+ 		 * which means that the one expected by
+ 		 * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
+ 		 */
 diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
-index de70742c30d6..5a336fa10818 100644
+index 42c99237786b..efd6e88d57b1 100644
 --- a/include/linux/security.h
 +++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
- 			       void **buffer, bool alloc);
- int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
- int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
--void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
-+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
- int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
- int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
- int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
-@@ -1006,9 +1006,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
+@@ -503,8 +503,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
+ int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
+ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
+-void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
++void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
++void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
+ int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
+ int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
+ int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
+@@ -1206,14 +1206,16 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
  	return 0;
  }
  
--static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
-+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
-+					   struct lsmblob *blob)
+-static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
++static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
++					       struct lsmblob *blob)
  {
 -	*secid = 0;
 +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
  }
  
- static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
++static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
++					      struct lsmblob *blob)
+ {
+-	*secid = 0;
++	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
+index 22286163e93e..d92c7b894183 100644
+--- a/kernel/audit.c
++++ b/kernel/audit.c
+@@ -2139,19 +2139,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+ 	char *ctx = NULL;
+ 	unsigned len;
+ 	int error;
+-	u32 sid;
+ 	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+-	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid);
+-	if (!sid)
++	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++	if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	/*
+-	 * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
+-	 * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
+-	 * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
+-	 */
+-	lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ 	error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ 	if (error) {
+ 		if (error != -EINVAL)
+@@ -2359,6 +2352,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
+ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+ {
+ 	kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+ 	if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
+ 	    (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
+@@ -2369,7 +2363,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+ 			audit_sig_uid = auid;
+ 		else
+ 			audit_sig_uid = uid;
+-		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_sig_sid);
++		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++		/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
++		audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
+diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
+index ffbd8396bdc9..de165c2cd55f 100644
+--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
++++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
+@@ -1340,7 +1340,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
+ 			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+ 			struct lsmblob blob;
+ 			pid_t pid;
+-			u32 sid;
+ 
+ 			switch (f->type) {
+ 			case AUDIT_PID:
+@@ -1371,8 +1370,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
+ 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ 				if (f->lsm_isset) {
+ 					security_task_getsecid_subj(current,
+-								    &sid);
+-					lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
++								    &blob);
+ 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ 						   &blob, f->type, f->op,
+ 						   &f->lsm_rules);
 diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
-index 50e3f2f4cb49..dcd1b988a2d3 100644
+index bba31349ae3e..7cd70a43408f 100644
 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
 +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
-@@ -1975,13 +1975,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
- 			     const struct dentry *dentry,
- 			     struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
- {
+@@ -467,7 +467,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ {
+ 	const struct cred *cred;
+ 	int i, need_sid = 1;
+-	u32 sid;
+ 	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 	unsigned int sessionid;
+ 
+@@ -667,17 +666,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ 			   logged upon error */
+ 			if (f->lsm_isset) {
+ 				if (need_sid) {
+-					security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid);
++					security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &blob);
+ 					need_sid = 0;
+ 				}
+-				/*
+-				 * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+-				 * to sid. This is temporary until
+-				 * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
+-				 * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
+-				 * this patch set.
+-				 */
+-				lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ 				result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ 							f->type, f->op,
+ 							&f->lsm_rules);
+@@ -2703,12 +2694,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
+ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
+ {
+ 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+ 	context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
+ 	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ 	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
+ 	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+-	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
++	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
++	/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
++	context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ 	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2724,6 +2718,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
+ 	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
+ 	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
+ 	kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+ 	if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
+ 		return 0;
+@@ -2735,7 +2730,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
+ 		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ 		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
+ 		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+-		security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
++		security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
++		/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
++		ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ 		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -2756,7 +2753,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
+ 	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ 	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
+ 	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+-	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
++	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
++	/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
++	axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
+ 	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+ 	axp->pid_count++;
+ 
+diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+index 51cb4fce5edf..15b53fc4e83f 100644
+--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
++++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+@@ -1562,11 +1562,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
+ 	int ret_val;
+ 	struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
+ 	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+ 	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
+ 	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
+ 	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
+-	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info.secid);
++	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++	/* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
++	audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
+ 	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
+ 	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
+ 
+diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+index 6190cbf94bf0..aa31f7bf79ee 100644
+--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
++++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
+  */
+ static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+ {
+-	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info->secid);
 +	struct lsmblob blob;
 +
- 	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
- 	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- 	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
- 	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
- 	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
- 	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
--	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
-+	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
-+	/* scaffolding until osid is updated */
-+	name->osid = blob.secid[0];
- 	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
- 		name->fcap_ver = -1;
- 		return;
-diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
-index 3d9f051edd20..67c7762b2533 100644
---- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
-+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
-@@ -620,7 +620,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
- 		return false;
- 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- 		int rc = 0;
--		u32 osid;
- 		struct lsmblob lsmdata;
- 
- 		if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule, i)) {
-@@ -633,8 +632,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
- 		case LSM_OBJ_USER:
- 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
- 		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
--			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
--			lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid);
-+			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &lsmdata);
- 			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type,
- 						   Audit_equal,
- 						   rule->lsm[i].rule);
++	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++	/* scaffolding until secid is converted */
++	audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
+ 	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+ 	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+ }
+diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+index dbba51583e7c..2fedda131a39 100644
+--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
++++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+@@ -71,15 +71,17 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
+ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+ 		      int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
+ {
+-	u32 secid;
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+ 	if (!ima_appraise)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+-	return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid,
+-				func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
+-				NULL, NULL, NULL);
++	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++	/* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
++	return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
++				blob.secid[0], func, mask,
++				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL,
++				NULL);
+ }
+ 
+ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+index 465865412100..c327f93d3962 100644
+--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
++++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+@@ -405,12 +405,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
+  */
+ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+ {
+-	u32 secid;
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+ 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
+-		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+-		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+-					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
++		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++		/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
++		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
++					   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -436,9 +437,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
+ 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
+ 	const char *pathname = NULL;
+ 	struct inode *inode;
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 	int result = 0;
+ 	int action;
+-	u32 secid;
+ 	int pcr;
+ 
+ 	/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
+@@ -446,11 +447,11 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
+ 	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
++	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ 	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
+ 	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
+-				current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+-				&pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
++				current_cred(), blob.secid[0], MAY_EXEC,
++				MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
+ 
+ 	/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
+ 	if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
+@@ -486,10 +487,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ {
+ 	int ret;
+ 	u32 secid;
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+-	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+-	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+-				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
++	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
++	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
++				  NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+@@ -510,10 +513,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+  */
+ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+ {
+-	u32 secid;
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+-	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
++	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
++	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
+ 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
+ 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
+ }
+@@ -689,7 +693,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+ 		  bool contents)
+ {
+ 	enum ima_hooks func;
+-	u32 secid;
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
+@@ -709,8 +713,9 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+ 
+ 	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
+ 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+-	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
++	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++	/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
++	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL,
+ 				   0, MAY_READ, func);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -739,7 +744,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+ 		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+ {
+ 	enum ima_hooks func;
+-	u32 secid;
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+ 	/* permit signed certs */
+ 	if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
+@@ -752,9 +757,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+-	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+-				   MAY_READ, func);
++	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
++	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
++				   size, MAY_READ, func);
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -882,7 +888,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ 	int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+ 	int violation = 0;
+ 	int action = 0;
+-	u32 secid;
++	struct lsmblob blob;
+ 
+ 	if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+@@ -905,9 +911,10 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ 	 * buffer measurements.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (func) {
+-		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
++		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++		/* scaffolding */
+ 		action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
+-					secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
++					blob.secid[0], 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+ 					func_data, NULL);
+ 		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
+ 			return -ENOENT;
 diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
-index 74a7fb981904..5fbcccbdbccd 100644
+index 2e74e5e88d64..1b9f33097216 100644
 --- a/security/security.c
 +++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -1549,9 +1549,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
- 
--void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
-+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
- {
--	call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+@@ -1906,17 +1906,30 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+ 	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
+ }
+ 
+-void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
++void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
+ {
+-	*secid = 0;
+-	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid);
 +	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 +
 +	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
-+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
++	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_subj,
++			     list) {
 +		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
 +			continue;
-+		hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
++		hp->hook.task_getsecid_subj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
 +	}
  }
- 
- int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj);
+ 
+-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
++void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
+ {
+-	*secid = 0;
+-	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
++	struct security_hook_list *hp;
++
++	lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
++	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_obj, list) {
++		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
++			continue;
++		hp->hook.task_getsecid_obj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
++	}
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
+ 
 -- 
 2.31.1
 
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