--- v16
+++ v28
@@ -1,114 +1,490 @@
-Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
-lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
-callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
-for IMA and audit.
+Change the security_task_getsecid_subj() and
+security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in
+a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
+LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
+possible secids for possible reporting.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
-Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
-cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
+Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++-
- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +---
- security/security.c | 11 +++++++++--
- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+ drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +-----
+ include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++---
+ kernel/audit.c | 16 +++-----
+ kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-
+ kernel/auditsc.c | 25 ++++++------
+ net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++-
+ net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++-
+ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 +++--
+ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 56 +++++++++++++++------------
+ security/security.c | 25 +++++++++---
+ 10 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
+index 3e97a6de5e80..96dd728809ef 100644
+--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
++++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
+@@ -2710,7 +2710,6 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
+ t->priority = task_nice(current);
+
+ if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
+- u32 secid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+ size_t added_size;
+
+@@ -2723,16 +2722,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
+ * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that
+ * case well anyway.
+ */
+- security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid);
+- /*
+- * Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will
+- * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init
+- * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob
+- * get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(),
+- * which means that the one expected by
+- * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set.
+- */
+- lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
++ security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &blob);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ if (ret) {
+ return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
-index cbc02e13e4b4..3f07ba240ec5 100644
+index 886128899d5f..4070cef152f7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
-@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
- int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
- int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
- int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
--void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
-+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
- int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
- int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
- int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
-@@ -947,9 +947,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
+@@ -500,8 +500,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
+ int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
+ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
+-void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
++void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
++void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
+ int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
+ int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
+ int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
+@@ -1197,14 +1197,16 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
--static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
-+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
-+ struct lsmblob *blob)
+-static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
++static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
++ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
}
- static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
++static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
++ struct lsmblob *blob)
+ {
+- *secid = 0;
++ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
+ }
+
+ static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
+index 22286163e93e..d92c7b894183 100644
+--- a/kernel/audit.c
++++ b/kernel/audit.c
+@@ -2139,19 +2139,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned len;
+ int error;
+- u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid);
+- if (!sid)
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++ if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
+ return 0;
+
+- /*
+- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid.
+- * This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted
+- * to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set.
+- */
+- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error != -EINVAL)
+@@ -2359,6 +2352,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
+ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+ {
+ kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
+ (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
+@@ -2369,7 +2363,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
+ audit_sig_uid = auid;
+ else
+ audit_sig_uid = uid;
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_sig_sid);
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
++ audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ }
+
+ return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
+diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
+index 6a04d762d272..1ba14a7a38f7 100644
+--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
++++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
+@@ -1330,7 +1330,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
+ for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+ pid_t pid;
+- u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ switch (f->type) {
+@@ -1362,8 +1361,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
+ security_task_getsecid_subj(current,
+- &sid);
+- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
++ &blob);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
+ &blob, f->type, f->op,
+ f->lsm_rules);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
-index e64f73cd5bc4..5d4ce44bff91 100644
+index b4d214b21b97..50e3f2f4cb49 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
-@@ -1938,13 +1938,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
- const struct dentry *dentry,
- struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
- {
+@@ -477,7 +477,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ {
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ int i, need_sid = 1;
+- u32 sid;
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+ unsigned int sessionid;
+
+@@ -674,17 +673,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ logged upon error */
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
+ if (need_sid) {
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid);
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &blob);
+ need_sid = 0;
+ }
+- /*
+- * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob
+- * to sid. This is temporary until
+- * security_task_getsecid() is converted to
+- * provide a lsmblob, which happens later in
+- * this patch set.
+- */
+- lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ f->lsm_rules);
+@@ -2439,12 +2430,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
+ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
+ {
+ struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
+ context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
+ context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
++ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
++ context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+ }
+
+@@ -2460,6 +2454,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
+ struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
+ struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
+ kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
+ return 0;
+@@ -2471,7 +2466,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
+ ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
+ ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
++ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
++ ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
+ memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -2492,7 +2489,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
+ axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
+ axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
+ axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
+- security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
++ security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
++ axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
+ memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
+ axp->pid_count++;
+
+diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+index 5cbbc469ac7c..098d0a1a3330 100644
+--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
++++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+@@ -1564,11 +1564,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
+ int ret_val;
+ struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
+ struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
+ * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
+ * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info.secid);
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
++ audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
+ audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
+ audit_info.sessionid = 0;
+
+diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+index 6190cbf94bf0..aa31f7bf79ee 100644
+--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
++++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
+ */
+ static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+ {
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsmblob blob;
+
- name->ino = inode->i_ino;
- name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- name->mode = inode->i_mode;
- name->uid = inode->i_uid;
- name->gid = inode->i_gid;
- name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
-- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
-+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
-+ /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
-+ name->osid = blob.secid[0];
- if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
- name->fcap_ver = -1;
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
++ audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
+ audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+ audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+ }
+diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+index ef9dcfce45d4..e3d903d6e5e7 100644
+--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
++++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+@@ -71,14 +71,16 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
+ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
+ {
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ if (!ima_appraise)
+ return 0;
+
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func,
+- mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
++ return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
++ blob.secid[0], func, mask,
++ IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+index 287b90509006..29befd24b945 100644
+--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
++++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+@@ -388,12 +388,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
+ */
+ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+ {
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+- 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
++ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
++ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+@@ -419,9 +420,9 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
+ char *pathbuf = NULL;
+ const char *pathname = NULL;
+ struct inode *inode;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+ int result = 0;
+ int action;
+- u32 secid;
+ int pcr;
+
+ /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
+@@ -429,11 +430,12 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
+ !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
+ return 0;
+
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
+ inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
++ /* scaffolding */
+ action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
+- current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+- &pcr, &template, NULL);
++ current_cred(), blob.secid[0], MAY_EXEC,
++ MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL);
+
+ /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
+ if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
+@@ -469,10 +471,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+- MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
++ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
++ NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+@@ -493,10 +497,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+ */
+ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+ {
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
++ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
+ mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
+ MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
+ }
+@@ -672,7 +677,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+ bool contents)
+ {
+ enum ima_hooks func;
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /*
+ * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
+@@ -692,8 +697,9 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+
+ /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
+ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
++ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL,
+ 0, MAY_READ, func);
+ }
+
+@@ -722,7 +728,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+ {
+ enum ima_hooks func;
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ /* permit signed certs */
+ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
+@@ -735,9 +741,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+ }
+
+ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
+- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+- MAY_READ, func);
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
++ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
++ size, MAY_READ, func);
+ }
+
+ /**
+@@ -859,7 +866,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+ int violation = 0;
+ int action = 0;
+- u32 secid;
++ struct lsmblob blob;
+
+ if (!ima_policy_flag)
return;
-diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
-index 55cca6a57178..594cf716a16b 100644
---- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
-+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
-@@ -481,7 +481,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
- return false;
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- int rc = 0;
-- u32 osid;
- struct lsmblob lsmdata;
-
- if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
-@@ -494,8 +493,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
- case LSM_OBJ_USER:
- case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
- case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
-- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
-- lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid);
-+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &lsmdata);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
- rule->lsm[i].type,
- Audit_equal,
+@@ -879,9 +886,10 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ * buffer measurements.
+ */
+ if (func) {
+- security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
++ security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
++ /* scaffolding */
+ action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
+- secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
++ blob.secid[0], 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+ func_data);
+ if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
+ return;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
-index 58c8866d2871..8cced3fc9ad3 100644
+index c38816ef9778..458fded340ab 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
-@@ -1418,9 +1418,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-
--void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
-+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
- {
-- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+@@ -1904,17 +1904,30 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+ return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
+ }
+
+-void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
++void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
+ {
+- *secid = 0;
+- call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
-+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
++ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_subj,
++ list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
-+ hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
++ hp->hook.task_getsecid_subj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
-
- int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj);
+
+-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
++void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
+ {
+- *secid = 0;
+- call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
++ struct security_hook_list *hp;
++
++ lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
++ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid_obj, list) {
++ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
++ continue;
++ hp->hook.task_getsecid_obj(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
++ }
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
+
--
-2.24.1
+2.31.1