# Re: \[PATCH\] userns: Let LSMs deny the CAP\_SETFCAP snapshot for mapping uid 0

- From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
- Date: 2026-11-10 14:48:18 
- List: linux-security-module
- Page: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-security-module/2026/11/17906970
- Thread: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-security-module/2026/11/17906889/t.md

```text
> Commit db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0")
> records in parent_could_setfcap whether the creator of a user namespace
> had CAP_SETFCAP, because a creator writing its own uid_map only has
> capabilities in the new namespace.  The snapshot uses cap_raised(), so a
> task whose LSM policy denies CAP_SETFCAP can still map uid 0 in a
> namespace it creates.
> 
> Use security_capable() against the parent namespace instead: the
> creator's credentials still belong to it at this point, so commoncap
> returns the same result, and only LSM denials are added.
> 
> Do not audit this check: creating a user namespace does not use
> CAP_SETFCAP, and most namespaces never map uid 0.  The uid_map write
> that later fails has no LSM audit record.
> 
> Checking CAP_SETFCAP when the map is written would not work: the
> writer's credentials then belong to the new namespace, where commoncap
> grants the creator all capabilities.
> 
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: <redacted>
> Fixes: db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110144205.2404088-1-mic@digikod.net?part=1

```
