Re: [PATCH 5/7] keys: Use key_get() instead of __key_get()
From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: 2024-08-27 18:24:22
Also in:
keyrings, lkml
On Wed Aug 21, 2024 at 3:36 PM EEST, David Howells wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Switch users of __key_get() over to key_get() so that they benefit from the future tracepointage thereof also and remove __key_get(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org --- Documentation/security/keys/core.rst | 1 - crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 6 +++--- include/linux/key.h | 6 ------ security/keys/keyring.c | 4 ++-- security/keys/process_keys.c | 15 ++++++--------- 5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst index 326b8a973828..0b179540d885 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst@@ -1217,7 +1217,6 @@ payload contents" for more information. * Extra references can be made to a key by calling one of the following functions:: - struct key *__key_get(struct key *key); struct key *key_get(struct key *key); Keys so references will need to be disposed of by calling key_put() whendiff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c index afcd4d101ac5..1ea7bfd4e5d7 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c@@ -267,20 +267,20 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) { if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[2], sig->auth_ids[2])) - key = __key_get(trusted); + key = key_get(trusted); } else if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) { const struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_id; auth_id = sig->auth_ids[0] ?: sig->auth_ids[1]; if (match_either_id(signer_ids, auth_id)) - key = __key_get(trusted); + key = key_get(trusted); } else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[1], sig->auth_ids[1]) && match_either_id(signer_ids, sig->auth_ids[0])) { - key = __key_get(trusted); + key = key_get(trusted); } } else { return -EOPNOTSUPP;diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 50a19e5f9e45..80d736813b89 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h@@ -304,12 +304,6 @@ extern void key_put(struct key *key); extern bool key_put_tag(struct key_tag *tag); extern void key_remove_domain(struct key_tag *domain_tag); -static inline struct key *__key_get(struct key *key) -{ - refcount_inc(&key->usage); - return key; -} - static inline void key_ref_put(key_ref_t key_ref) { key_put(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 7f02b913c560..e77d927f1d4d 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c@@ -1122,7 +1122,7 @@ key_ref_t find_key_to_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, kleave(" = NULL [x]"); return NULL; } - __key_get(key); + key_get(key); kleave(" = {%d}", key->serial); return make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); }@@ -1367,7 +1367,7 @@ int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key) void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, struct assoc_array_edit **_edit) { - __key_get(key); + key_get(key); assoc_array_insert_set_object(*_edit, keyring_key_to_ptr(key)); assoc_array_apply_edit(*_edit); *_edit = NULL;diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index b5d5333ab330..01291b2d0888 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring) if (IS_ERR(keyring)) return PTR_ERR(keyring); } else { - __key_get(keyring); + key_get(keyring); } /* install the keyring */@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, } key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring; - __key_get(key); + key_get(key); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); break;@@ -658,8 +658,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, goto reget_creds; } - key = ctx.cred->process_keyring; - __key_get(key); + key = key_get(ctx.cred->process_keyring); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); break;@@ -688,8 +687,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, goto reget_creds; } - key = ctx.cred->session_keyring; - __key_get(key); + key = key_get(ctx.cred->session_keyring); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); break;@@ -717,7 +715,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, if (!key) goto error; - __key_get(key); + key_get(key); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); break;@@ -732,8 +730,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, key = NULL; } else { rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; - key = rka->dest_keyring; - __key_get(key); + key = key_get(rka->dest_keyring); } up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem); if (!key)
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> BR, Jarkko