From: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Date: 2022-08-17 21:47:38
This series is based on torvalds/master.
The series is split up like so:
- Patch 1 is a simple fixup which we should take in any case (even by itself).
- Patches 2-5 add the feature, configurable selftest support, and docs.
Why not ...?
============
- Why not /proc/[pid]/userfaultfd? Two main points (additional discussion [1]):
- /proc/[pid]/* files are all owned by the user/group of the process, and
they don't really support chmod/chown. So, without extending procfs it
doesn't solve the problem this series is trying to solve.
- The main argument *for* this was to support creating UFFDs for remote
processes. But, that use case clearly calls for CAP_SYS_PTRACE, so to
support this we could just use the UFFD syscall as-is.
- Why not use a syscall? Access to syscalls is generally controlled by
capabilities. We don't have a capability which is used for userfaultfd access
without also granting more / other permissions as well, and adding a new
capability was rejected [2].
- It's possible a LSM could be used to control access instead, but I have
some concerns. I don't think this approach would be as easy to use,
particularly if we were to try to solve this with something heavyweight
like SELinux. Maybe we could pursue adding a new LSM specifically for
this user case, but it may be too narrow of a case to justify that.
Changelog
=========
v5->v6:
- Modified selftest to exit with KSFT_SKIP *only* when features are
unsupported, exiting with 1 in other error cases. [Mike]
- Improved wording in two spots in the documentation. [Mike]
- Picked up some Acked-by's.
v4->v5:
- Call userfaultfd_syscall_allowed() directly in the syscall, so we don't
have to plumb a flag into new_userfaultfd(). [Nadav]
- Refactored run_vmtests.sh to loop over UFFD test mods. [Nadav]
- Reworded cover letter.
- Picked up some Acked-by's.
v3->v4:
- Picked up an Acked-by on 5/5.
- Updated cover letter to cover "why not ...".
- Refactored userfaultfd_allowed() into userfaultfd_syscall_allowed(). [Peter]
- Removed obsolete comment from a previous version. [Peter]
- Refactored userfaultfd_open() in selftest. [Peter]
- Reworded admin-guide documentation. [Mike, Peter]
- Squashed 2 commits adding /dev/userfaultfd to selftest and making selftest
configurable. [Peter]
- Added "syscall" test modifier (the default behavior) to selftest. [Peter]
v2->v3:
- Rebased onto linux-next/akpm-base, in order to be based on top of the
run_vmtests.sh refactor which was merged previously.
- Picked up some Reviewed-by's.
- Fixed ioctl definition (_IO instead of _IOWR), and stopped using
compat_ptr_ioctl since it is unneeded for ioctls which don't take a pointer.
- Removed the "handle_kernel_faults" bool, simplifying the code. The result is
logically equivalent, but simpler.
- Fixed userfaultfd selftest so it returns KSFT_SKIP appropriately.
- Reworded documentation per Shuah's feedback on v2.
- Improved example usage for userfaultfd selftest.
v1->v2:
- Add documentation update.
- Test *both* userfaultfd(2) and /dev/userfaultfd via the selftest.
[1]: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-mm/cover/20220719195628.3415852-1-axelrasmussen@google.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/686276b9-4530-2045-6bd8-170e5943abe4@schaufler-ca.com/T/
Axel Rasmussen (5):
selftests: vm: add hugetlb_shared userfaultfd test to run_vmtests.sh
userfaultfd: add /dev/userfaultfd for fine grained access control
userfaultfd: selftests: modify selftest to use /dev/userfaultfd
userfaultfd: update documentation to describe /dev/userfaultfd
selftests: vm: add /dev/userfaultfd test cases to run_vmtests.sh
Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst | 41 ++++++++++-
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst | 3 +
fs/userfaultfd.c | 73 ++++++++++++++-----
include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 4 ++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh | 15 ++--
tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++---
6 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
--
2.37.1.595.g718a3a8f04-goog
From: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Date: 2022-08-17 21:47:55
This not being included was just a simple oversight. There are certain
features (like minor fault support) which are only enabled on shared
mappings, so without including hugetlb_shared we actually lose a
significant amount of test coverage.
Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
@@ -121,9 +121,11 @@ run_test ./gup_test -a run_test./gup_test-ct-F0x10190x1000 run_test./userfaultfdanon2016-# Test requires source and destination huge pages. Size of source-# (half_ufd_size_MB) is passed as argument to test.+# Hugetlb tests require source and destination huge pages. Pass in half the+# size ($half_ufd_size_MB), which is used for *each*. run_test./userfaultfdhugetlb"$half_ufd_size_MB"32+run_test./userfaultfdhugetlb_shared"$half_ufd_size_MB"32"$mnt"/uffd-test+rm-f"$mnt"/uffd-test run_test./userfaultfdshmem2016#cleanup
From: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Date: 2022-08-17 21:47:57
Historically, it has been shown that intercepting kernel faults with
userfaultfd (thereby forcing the kernel to wait for an arbitrary amount
of time) can be exploited, or at least can make some kinds of exploits
easier. So, in 37cd0575b8 "userfaultfd: add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY" we
changed things so, in order for kernel faults to be handled by
userfaultfd, either the process needs CAP_SYS_PTRACE, or this sysctl
must be configured so that any unprivileged user can do it.
In a typical implementation of a hypervisor with live migration (take
QEMU/KVM as one such example), we do indeed need to be able to handle
kernel faults. But, both options above are less than ideal:
- Toggling the sysctl increases attack surface by allowing any
unprivileged user to do it.
- Granting the live migration process CAP_SYS_PTRACE gives it this
ability, but *also* the ability to "observe and control the
execution of another process [...], and examine and change [its]
memory and registers" (from ptrace(2)). This isn't something we need
or want to be able to do, so granting this permission violates the
"principle of least privilege".
This is all a long winded way to say: we want a more fine-grained way to
grant access to userfaultfd, without granting other additional
permissions at the same time.
To achieve this, add a /dev/userfaultfd misc device. This device
provides an alternative to the userfaultfd(2) syscall for the creation
of new userfaultfds. The idea is, any userfaultfds created this way will
be able to handle kernel faults, without the caller having any special
capabilities. Access to this mechanism is instead restricted using e.g.
standard filesystem permissions.
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <redacted>
Acked-by: Nadav Amit <redacted>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
---
fs/userfaultfd.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 4 ++
2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
@@ -415,13 +416,8 @@ vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fault *vmf, unsigned long reason)if(ctx->features&UFFD_FEATURE_SIGBUS)gotoout;-if((vmf->flags&FAULT_FLAG_USER)==0&&-ctx->flags&UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY){-printk_once(KERN_WARNING"uffd: Set unprivileged_userfaultfd "-"sysctl knob to 1 if kernel faults must be handled "-"without obtaining CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability\n");+if(!(vmf->flags&FAULT_FLAG_USER)&&(ctx->flags&UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY))gotoout;-}/**Ifit'salreadyreleaseddon'tgetit.Thisavoidstoloop
@@ -2052,20 +2048,11 @@ static void init_once_userfaultfd_ctx(void *mem)seqcount_spinlock_init(&ctx->refile_seq,&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);}-SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd,int,flags)+staticintnew_userfaultfd(intflags){structuserfaultfd_ctx*ctx;intfd;-if(!sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd&&-(flags&UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY)==0&&-!capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)){-printk_once(KERN_WARNING"uffd: Set unprivileged_userfaultfd "-"sysctl knob to 1 if kernel faults must be handled "-"without obtaining CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability\n");-return-EPERM;-}-BUG_ON(!current->mm);/* Check the UFFD_* constants for consistency. */
@@ -2098,8 +2085,62 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)returnfd;}+staticinlinebooluserfaultfd_syscall_allowed(intflags)+{+/* Userspace-only page faults are always allowed */+if(flags&UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY)+returntrue;++/*+*Theuserisrequestingauserfaultfdwhichcanhandlekernelfaults.+*Privilegedusersarealwaysallowedtodothis.+*/+if(capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))+returntrue;++/* Otherwise, access to kernel fault handling is sysctl controlled. */+returnsysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd;+}++SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd,int,flags)+{+if(!userfaultfd_syscall_allowed(flags))+return-EPERM;++returnnew_userfaultfd(flags);+}++staticintuserfaultfd_dev_open(structinode*inode,structfile*file)+{+return0;+}++staticlonguserfaultfd_dev_ioctl(structfile*file,unsignedintcmd,unsignedlongflags)+{+if(cmd!=USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW)+return-EINVAL;++returnnew_userfaultfd(flags);+}++staticconststructfile_operationsuserfaultfd_dev_fops={+.open=userfaultfd_dev_open,+.unlocked_ioctl=userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,+.compat_ioctl=userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,+.owner=THIS_MODULE,+.llseek=noop_llseek,+};++staticstructmiscdeviceuserfaultfd_misc={+.minor=MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,+.name="userfaultfd",+.fops=&userfaultfd_dev_fops+};+staticint__inituserfaultfd_init(void){+WARN_ON(misc_register(&userfaultfd_misc));+userfaultfd_ctx_cachep=kmem_cache_create("userfaultfd_ctx_cache",sizeof(structuserfaultfd_ctx),0,
From: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Date: 2022-08-17 21:48:02
We clearly want to ensure both userfaultfd(2) and /dev/userfaultfd keep
working into the future, so just run the test twice, using each
interface.
Instead of always testing both userfaultfd(2) and /dev/userfaultfd,
let the user choose which to test.
As with other test features, change the behavior based on a new
command line flag. Introduce the idea of "test mods", which are
generic (not specific to a test type) modifications to the behavior of
the test. This is sort of borrowed from this RFC patch series [1], but
simplified a bit.
The benefit is, in "typical" configurations this test is somewhat slow
(say, 30sec or something). Testing both clearly doubles it, so it may
not always be desirable, as users are likely to use one or the other,
but never both, in the "real world".
[1]: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-mm/patch/20201129004548.1619714-14-namit@vmware.com/
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <redacted>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
@@ -77,6 +77,11 @@ static int bounces;#define TEST_SHMEM 3staticinttest_type;+#define UFFD_FLAGS (O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK | UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY)++/* test using /dev/userfaultfd, instead of userfaultfd(2) */+staticbooltest_dev_userfaultfd;+/* exercise the test_uffdio_*_eexist every ALARM_INTERVAL_SECS */#define ALARM_INTERVAL_SECS 10staticvolatilebooltest_uffdio_copy_eexist=true;
@@ -125,6 +130,8 @@ struct uffd_stats {constchar*examples="# Run anonymous memory test on 100MiB region with 99999 bounces:\n""./userfaultfd anon 100 99999\n\n"+"# Run the same anonymous memory test, but using /dev/userfaultfd:\n"+"./userfaultfd anon:dev 100 99999\n\n""# Run share memory test on 1GiB region with 99 bounces:\n""./userfaultfd shmem 1000 99\n\n""# Run hugetlb memory test on 256MiB region with 50 bounces:\n"
@@ -141,6 +148,14 @@ static void usage(void)"[hugetlbfs_file]\n\n");fprintf(stderr,"Supported <test type>: anon, hugetlb, ""hugetlb_shared, shmem\n\n");+fprintf(stderr,"'Test mods' can be joined to the test type string with a ':'. "+"Supported mods:\n");+fprintf(stderr,"\tsyscall - Use userfaultfd(2) (default)\n");+fprintf(stderr,"\tdev - Use /dev/userfaultfd instead of userfaultfd(2)\n");+fprintf(stderr,"\nExample test mod usage:\n");+fprintf(stderr,"# Run anonymous memory test with /dev/userfaultfd:\n");+fprintf(stderr,"./userfaultfd anon:dev 100 99999\n\n");+fprintf(stderr,"Examples:\n\n");fprintf(stderr,"%s",examples);exit(1);
@@ -383,13 +400,34 @@ static void assert_expected_ioctls_present(uint64_t mode, uint64_t ioctls)}}+staticint__userfaultfd_open_dev(void)+{+intfd,_uffd;++fd=open("/dev/userfaultfd",O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC);+if(fd<0)+errexit(KSFT_SKIP,"opening /dev/userfaultfd failed");++_uffd=ioctl(fd,USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW,UFFD_FLAGS);+if(_uffd<0)+errexit(errno==ENOTTY?KSFT_SKIP:1,+"creating userfaultfd failed");+close(fd);+return_uffd;+}+staticvoiduserfaultfd_open(uint64_t*features){structuffdio_apiuffdio_api;-uffd=syscall(__NR_userfaultfd,O_CLOEXEC|O_NONBLOCK|UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY);-if(uffd<0)-err("userfaultfd syscall not available in this kernel");+if(test_dev_userfaultfd)+uffd=__userfaultfd_open_dev();+else{+uffd=syscall(__NR_userfaultfd,UFFD_FLAGS);+if(uffd<0)+errexit(errno==ENOSYS?KSFT_SKIP:1,+"creating userfaultfd failed");+}uffd_flags=fcntl(uffd,F_GETFD,NULL);uffdio_api.api=UFFD_API;
@@ -1584,8 +1622,6 @@ unsigned long default_huge_page_size(void)staticvoidset_test_type(constchar*type){-uint64_tfeatures=UFFD_API_FEATURES;-if(!strcmp(type,"anon")){test_type=TEST_ANON;uffd_test_ops=&anon_uffd_test_ops;
@@ -1603,9 +1639,29 @@ static void set_test_type(const char *type)test_type=TEST_SHMEM;uffd_test_ops=&shmem_uffd_test_ops;test_uffdio_minor=true;-}else{-err("Unknown test type: %s",type);}+}++staticvoidparse_test_type_arg(constchar*raw_type)+{+char*buf=strdup(raw_type);+uint64_tfeatures=UFFD_API_FEATURES;++while(buf){+constchar*token=strsep(&buf,":");++if(!test_type)+set_test_type(token);+elseif(!strcmp(token,"dev"))+test_dev_userfaultfd=true;+elseif(!strcmp(token,"syscall"))+test_dev_userfaultfd=false;+else+err("unrecognized test mod '%s'",token);+}++if(!test_type)+err("failed to parse test type argument: '%s'",raw_type);if(test_type==TEST_HUGETLB)page_size=default_huge_page_size();
@@ -1653,7 +1709,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)err("failed to arm SIGALRM");alarm(ALARM_INTERVAL_SECS);-set_test_type(argv[1]);+parse_test_type_arg(argv[1]);nr_cpus=sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);nr_pages_per_cpu=atol(argv[2])*1024*1024/page_size/
From: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Date: 2022-08-17 21:48:17
Explain the different ways to create a new userfaultfd, and how access
control works for each way.
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst | 41 ++++++++++++++++++--
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst | 3 ++
2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
@@ -17,7 +17,10 @@ of the ``PROT_NONE+SIGSEGV`` trick. Design ======-Userfaults are delivered and resolved through the ``userfaultfd`` syscall.+Userspace creates a new userfaultfd, initializes it, and registers one or more+regions of virtual memory with it. Then, any page faults which occur within the+region(s) result in a message being delivered to the userfaultfd, notifying+userspace of the fault. The ``userfaultfd`` (aside from registering and unregistering virtual memory ranges) provides two primary functionalities:
@@ -34,12 +37,11 @@ The real advantage of userfaults if compared to regular virtual memory management of mremap/mprotect is that the userfaults in all their operations never involve heavyweight structures like vmas (in fact the``userfaultfd`` runtime load never takes the mmap_lock for writing).- Vmas are not suitable for page- (or hugepage) granular fault tracking when dealing with virtual address spaces that could span Terabytes. Too many vmas would be needed for that.-The ``userfaultfd`` once opened by invoking the syscall, can also be+The ``userfaultfd``, once created, can also be passed using unix domain sockets to a manager process, so the same manager process could handle the userfaults of a multitude of different processes without them being aware about what is going on
@@ -50,6 +52,39 @@ is a corner case that would currently return ``-EBUSY``). API ===+Creating a userfaultfd+----------------------++There are two ways to create a new userfaultfd, each of which provide ways to+restrict access to this functionality (since historically userfaultfds which+handle kernel page faults have been a useful tool for exploiting the kernel).++The first way, supported since userfaultfd was introduced, is the+userfaultfd(2) syscall. Access to this is controlled in several ways:++- Any user can always create a userfaultfd which traps userspace page faults+ only. Such a userfaultfd can be created using the userfaultfd(2) syscall+ with the flag UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY.++- In order to also trap kernel page faults for the address space, either the+ process needs the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability, or the system must have+ vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd set to 1. By default, vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd+ is set to 0.++The second way, added to the kernel more recently, is by opening+/dev/userfaultfd and issuing a USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW ioctl to it. This method+yields equivalent userfaultfds to the userfaultfd(2) syscall.++Unlike userfaultfd(2), access to /dev/userfaultfd is controlled via normal+filesystem permissions (user/group/mode), which gives fine grained access to+userfaultfd specifically, without also granting other unrelated privileges at+the same time (as e.g. granting CAP_SYS_PTRACE would do). Users who have access+to /dev/userfaultfd can always create userfaultfds that trap kernel page faults;+vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd is not considered.++Initializing a userfaultfd+--------------------------+ When first opened the ``userfaultfd`` must be enabled invoking the``UFFDIO_API`` ioctl specifying a ``uffdio_api.api`` value set to ``UFFD_API`` (or a later API version) which will specify the ``read/POLLIN`` protocol
@@ -926,6 +926,9 @@ calls without any restrictions. The default value is 0.+Another way to control permissions for userfaultfd is to use+/dev/userfaultfd instead of userfaultfd(2). See+Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst. user_reserve_kbytes ===================
From: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Date: 2022-08-17 21:48:19
This new mode was recently added to the userfaultfd selftest. We want to
exercise both userfaultfd(2) as well as /dev/userfaultfd, so add both
test cases to the script.
Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh | 17 ++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
@@ -120,13 +120,16 @@ run_test ./gup_test -a# Dump pages 0, 19, and 4096, using pin_user_pages: run_test./gup_test-ct-F0x10190x1000-run_test./userfaultfdanon2016-# Hugetlb tests require source and destination huge pages. Pass in half the-# size ($half_ufd_size_MB), which is used for *each*.-run_test./userfaultfdhugetlb"$half_ufd_size_MB"32-run_test./userfaultfdhugetlb_shared"$half_ufd_size_MB"32"$mnt"/uffd-test-rm-f"$mnt"/uffd-test-run_test./userfaultfdshmem2016+uffd_mods=(""":dev")+formodin"${uffd_mods[@]}";do+run_test./userfaultfdanon${mod}2016+# Hugetlb tests require source and destination huge pages. Pass in half+# the size ($half_ufd_size_MB), which is used for *each*.+run_test./userfaultfdhugetlb${mod}"$half_ufd_size_MB"32+run_test./userfaultfdhugetlb_shared${mod}"$half_ufd_size_MB"32"$mnt"/uffd-test+rm-f"$mnt"/uffd-test+run_test./userfaultfdshmem${mod}2016+done#cleanup umount"$mnt"
On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 02:47:25PM -0700, Axel Rasmussen wrote:
quoted hunk
static int __init userfaultfd_init(void) {+ WARN_ON(misc_register(&userfaultfd_misc));
Please no.
Spell this out and properly error out if there is an issue:
int ret;
ret = misc_register(&userfaultfd_misc);
if (ret)
return ret;
Handle issues properly, don't paper over them with WARN_ON().
thanks,
greg k-h
On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 02:47:25PM -0700, Axel Rasmussen wrote:
quoted hunk
+static int userfaultfd_dev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)+{+ return 0;
If your open does nothing, no need to list it here at all, right?
quoted hunk
+}++static long userfaultfd_dev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long flags)+{+ if (cmd != USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW)+ return -EINVAL;++ return new_userfaultfd(flags);+}++static const struct file_operations userfaultfd_dev_fops = {+ .open = userfaultfd_dev_open,+ .unlocked_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,+ .compat_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,
Why do you need to set compat_ioctl? Shouldn't it just default to the
existing one?
And why is this a device node at all? Shouldn't the syscall handle all
of this (to be honest, I didn't read anything but the misc code, sorry.)
thanks,
greg k-h
On Thu, Aug 18, 2022 at 08:26:38AM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 02:47:25PM -0700, Axel Rasmussen wrote:
quoted
+static int userfaultfd_dev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)+{+ return 0;
If your open does nothing, no need to list it here at all, right?
quoted
+}++static long userfaultfd_dev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long flags)+{+ if (cmd != USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW)+ return -EINVAL;++ return new_userfaultfd(flags);+}++static const struct file_operations userfaultfd_dev_fops = {+ .open = userfaultfd_dev_open,+ .unlocked_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,+ .compat_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,
Why do you need to set compat_ioctl? Shouldn't it just default to the
existing one?
And why is this a device node at all? Shouldn't the syscall handle all
of this (to be honest, I didn't read anything but the misc code, sorry.)
Ah, read the documentation now. Seems you want to make it easier for
people to get permissions on a system. Doesn't seem wise, but hey, it's
not my feature...
thanks,
greg k-h
From: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Date: 2022-08-18 17:23:46
On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 11:32 PM Greg KH [off-list ref] wrote:
On Thu, Aug 18, 2022 at 08:26:38AM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
quoted
On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 02:47:25PM -0700, Axel Rasmussen wrote:
quoted
+static int userfaultfd_dev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)+{+ return 0;
If your open does nothing, no need to list it here at all, right?
quoted
+}++static long userfaultfd_dev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long flags)+{+ if (cmd != USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW)+ return -EINVAL;++ return new_userfaultfd(flags);+}++static const struct file_operations userfaultfd_dev_fops = {+ .open = userfaultfd_dev_open,+ .unlocked_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,+ .compat_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,
Why do you need to set compat_ioctl? Shouldn't it just default to the
existing one?
And why is this a device node at all? Shouldn't the syscall handle all
of this (to be honest, I didn't read anything but the misc code, sorry.)
Ah, read the documentation now. Seems you want to make it easier for
people to get permissions on a system. Doesn't seem wise, but hey, it's
not my feature...
Thanks for taking a look Greg!
WIth the syscall, the only way to get access to this feature is to
have CAP_SYS_PTRACE. Which gives you access to this, *plus* a bunch
more stuff.
My basic goal is to grant access to just this feature by itself, not
really just to make it easier to access. I think a device node is the
simplest way to achieve that (see the cover letter for considered
alternatives).
The other feedback looks like good simplification to me - I'll send
another version with those changes. I have to admit this is the first
time I've messed with misc device nodes, so apologies for being overly
explicit. :)
From: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Date: 2022-08-19 20:12:53
On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 11:26 PM Greg KH [off-list ref] wrote:
On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 02:47:25PM -0700, Axel Rasmussen wrote:
quoted
+static int userfaultfd_dev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)+{+ return 0;
If your open does nothing, no need to list it here at all, right?
quoted
+}++static long userfaultfd_dev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long flags)+{+ if (cmd != USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW)+ return -EINVAL;++ return new_userfaultfd(flags);+}++static const struct file_operations userfaultfd_dev_fops = {+ .open = userfaultfd_dev_open,+ .unlocked_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,+ .compat_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,
Why do you need to set compat_ioctl? Shouldn't it just default to the
existing one?
I took some more time looking at this today, and I think it actually
has to be the way it is.
I didn't find anywhere we noticed compat_ioctl unset, and default to
the "normal" one (e.g. see the compat ioctl syscall definition in
fs/ioctl.c). It looks to me like it really does need some value. It's
common to use compat_ptr_ioctl for this, but since we're interpreting
the arg as a scalar not as a pointer, doing that here would be
incorrect.
It looks like there are other existing examples that do it the same
way, e.g. seccomp_notify_ops in linux/seccomp.c.
And why is this a device node at all? Shouldn't the syscall handle all
of this (to be honest, I didn't read anything but the misc code, sorry.)
thanks,
greg k-h