Thread (16 messages) 16 messages, 6 authors, 2022-08-06

Re: [PATCH 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation

From: Evan Green <hidden>
Date: 2022-08-04 22:03:19
Also in: keyrings, linux-doc, linux-integrity, linux-pm, lkml

On Wed, Aug 3, 2022 at 5:59 PM Jarkko Sakkinen [off-list ref] wrote:
On Tue, Aug 02, 2022 at 11:36:43AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
quoted
On Mon, Aug 1, 2022 at 3:33 PM Evan Green [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
One more bump here, as we'd really love to get encrypted hibernation
to a form upstream would accept if at all possible. We were
considering landing this in our Chrome OS tree for now, then coming
back in a couple months with a "we've been baking this ourselves and
it's going so great, oooh yeah". I'm not sure if upstream would find
that compelling or not. But in any case, some guidance towards making
this more upstream friendly would be well appreciated.

One thing I realized in attempting to pick this myself is that the
trusted key blob format has moved to ASN.1. So I should really move
the creation ticket to the new ASN.1 format (if I can figure out the
right OID for that piece), which would allow me to drop a lot of the
ugly stuff in tpm2_unpack_blob(). Maybe if I get no other comments
I'll work on that and resend.
I've been revamping my TPM-backed verified hibernation implementation
based on this work, so I'd definitely be enthusiastic about it being
mergeable.
BTW, is it tested with QEMU + swtpm?
For myself, so far I've been testing on a recent Intel Chromebook. The
H1 (aka cr50) security chip on modern chromebooks implements a subset
[1] of TPM2.0, and is exposed through the standard TPM APIs in the
kernel. I can make sure to test on Qemu as well, is there anything in
particular I should look out for?

-Evan

[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/tpm2/+/3373466
BR, Jarkko
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