Re: [PATCH 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation
From: Evan Green <hidden>
Date: 2022-08-04 22:03:19
Also in:
keyrings, linux-doc, linux-integrity, linux-pm, lkml
On Wed, Aug 3, 2022 at 5:59 PM Jarkko Sakkinen [off-list ref] wrote:
On Tue, Aug 02, 2022 at 11:36:43AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:quoted
On Mon, Aug 1, 2022 at 3:33 PM Evan Green [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
One more bump here, as we'd really love to get encrypted hibernation to a form upstream would accept if at all possible. We were considering landing this in our Chrome OS tree for now, then coming back in a couple months with a "we've been baking this ourselves and it's going so great, oooh yeah". I'm not sure if upstream would find that compelling or not. But in any case, some guidance towards making this more upstream friendly would be well appreciated. One thing I realized in attempting to pick this myself is that the trusted key blob format has moved to ASN.1. So I should really move the creation ticket to the new ASN.1 format (if I can figure out the right OID for that piece), which would allow me to drop a lot of the ugly stuff in tpm2_unpack_blob(). Maybe if I get no other comments I'll work on that and resend.I've been revamping my TPM-backed verified hibernation implementation based on this work, so I'd definitely be enthusiastic about it being mergeable.BTW, is it tested with QEMU + swtpm?
For myself, so far I've been testing on a recent Intel Chromebook. The H1 (aka cr50) security chip on modern chromebooks implements a subset [1] of TPM2.0, and is exposed through the standard TPM APIs in the kernel. I can make sure to test on Qemu as well, is there anything in particular I should look out for? -Evan [1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/tpm2/+/3373466
BR, Jarkko