# RE: \[PATCH 04/11\] iov\_iter: explicitly check for CHECK\_IOVEC\_ONLY in rw\_copy\_check\_uvector

- From: David Laight \<hidden\>
- Date: 2020-09-21 15:05:41 
- List: linux-security-module
- Page: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-security-module/2020/09/189278
- Thread: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-arm-kernel/2020/09/189245/t.md

```text
From: Christoph Hellwig
> Sent: 21 September 2020 15:34
> 
> Explicitly check for the magic value insted of implicitly relying on
> its numeric representation.   Also drop the rather pointless unlikely
> annotation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> ---
>  lib/iov_iter.c | 5 ++---
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c
> index d7e72343c360eb..a64867501a7483 100644
> --- a/lib/iov_iter.c
> +++ b/lib/iov_iter.c
> @@ -1709,8 +1709,7 @@ static ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type,
>  			ret = -EINVAL;
>  			goto out;
>  		}
> -		if (type >= 0
> -		    && unlikely(!access_ok(buf, len))) {
> +		if (type != CHECK_IOVEC_ONLY && !access_ok(buf, len)) {
>  			ret = -EFAULT;
>  			goto out;
>  		}
> @@ -1824,7 +1823,7 @@ static ssize_t compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(int type,
>  		}
>  		if (len < 0)	/* size_t not fitting in compat_ssize_t .. */
>  			goto out;
> -		if (type >= 0 &&
> +		if (type != CHECK_IOVEC_ONLY &&
>  		    !access_ok(compat_ptr(buf), len)) {
>  			ret = -EFAULT;
>  			goto out;
> --
> 2.28.0

I've actually no idea:
1) Why there is an access_ok() check here.
   It will be repeated by the user copy functions.
2) Why it isn't done when called from mm/process_vm_access.c.
   Ok, the addresses refer to a different process, but they
   must still be valid user addresses.

Is 2 a legacy from when access_ok() actually checked that the
addresses were mapped into the process's address space?

	David

-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK
Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)

```
