# \[PATCH v5 next 1/5\] modules:capabilities: add request\_module\_cap()

- From: Alan Cox \<hidden\>
- Date: 2017-11-29 13:47:37 
- List: linux-security-module
- Page: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-security-module/2017/11/5144247
- Thread: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-security-module/2017/11/5141590/t.md

```text
On Tue, 28 Nov 2017 13:39:58 -0800
Kees Cook [ref] wrote:

> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 1:16 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez [ref] wrote:
> > And *all* auto-loading uses aliases? What's the difference between auto-loading
> > and direct-loading?  
> 
> The difference is the process privileges. Unprivilged autoloading
> (e.g. int n_hdlc = N_HDLC; ioctl(fd,
> TIOCSETD, &n_hdlc)), triggers a privileged call to finit_module()
> under CAP_SYS_MODULE.

If you have CAP_SYS_DAC you can rename any module to ppp.ko and ask the
network manager (which has the right permissions) to init a ppp
connection. Capabilities alone are simply not enough to do any kind of
useful protection on a current system and the Linux capability model is
broken architecturally and not fixable because fixing it would break lots
of real systems.

I really don't care what the module loading rules end up with and whether
we add CAP_SYS_YET_ANOTHER_MEANINGLESS_FLAG but what is actually needed
is to properly incorporate it into securiy ruiles for whatever LSM you
are using.

Alan
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
```
