From: Alexander Steffen <hidden> Date: 2017-09-04 17:36:53
tpm_transmit() does not offer an explicit interface to indicate the number
of valid bytes in the communication buffer. Instead, it relies on the
commandSize field in the TPM header that is encoded within the buffer.
Therefore, ensure that a) enough data has been written to the buffer, so
that the commandSize field is present and b) the commandSize field does not
announce more data than has been written to the buffer.
This should have been fixed with CVE-2011-1161 long ago, but apparently
a correct version of that patch never made it into the kernel.
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen <redacted>
---
v2:
- Moved all changes to tpm_common_write in a single patch.
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.7.4
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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <hidden> Date: 2017-09-05 19:06:05
On Mon, Sep 04, 2017 at 07:36:42PM +0200, Alexander Steffen wrote:
quoted hunk
tpm_transmit() does not offer an explicit interface to indicate the number
of valid bytes in the communication buffer. Instead, it relies on the
commandSize field in the TPM header that is encoded within the buffer.
Therefore, ensure that a) enough data has been written to the buffer, so
that the commandSize field is present and b) the commandSize field does not
announce more data than has been written to the buffer.
This should have been fixed with CVE-2011-1161 long ago, but apparently
a correct version of that patch never made it into the kernel.
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen <redacted>
---
v2:
- Moved all changes to tpm_common_write in a single patch.
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <redacted>
There's now some delay getting patches to my git tree because next week
is conference week and I have lots of stuff to do before I depart
Finland. I'm sorry about that.
At latest I push these during the plane trip (I can remotely access
test machines with plane internet connection, not the first time I'm
doing this).
/Jarkko
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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <hidden> Date: 2017-09-06 12:42:39
On Mon, Sep 04, 2017 at 07:36:42PM +0200, Alexander Steffen wrote:
quoted hunk
tpm_transmit() does not offer an explicit interface to indicate the number
of valid bytes in the communication buffer. Instead, it relies on the
commandSize field in the TPM header that is encoded within the buffer.
Therefore, ensure that a) enough data has been written to the buffer, so
that the commandSize field is present and b) the commandSize field does not
announce more data than has been written to the buffer.
This should have been fixed with CVE-2011-1161 long ago, but apparently
a correct version of that patch never made it into the kernel.
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen <redacted>
---
v2:
- Moved all changes to tpm_common_write in a single patch.
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <hidden> Date: 2017-09-06 12:50:38
On Wed, Sep 06, 2017 at 03:42:33PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Mon, Sep 04, 2017 at 07:36:42PM +0200, Alexander Steffen wrote:
quoted
tpm_transmit() does not offer an explicit interface to indicate the number
of valid bytes in the communication buffer. Instead, it relies on the
commandSize field in the TPM header that is encoded within the buffer.
Therefore, ensure that a) enough data has been written to the buffer, so
that the commandSize field is present and b) the commandSize field does not
announce more data than has been written to the buffer.
This should have been fixed with CVE-2011-1161 long ago, but apparently
a correct version of that patch never made it into the kernel.
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen <redacted>
---
v2:
- Moved all changes to tpm_common_write in a single patch.
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Just when I started to implement this that the bug fix itself does not
have yet the right semantics.
It should be just add a new check:
if (in_size != be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 2))))
return -EINVAL;
The existing check is correct. This was missing. The reason for this is
that we process whatever is in the in_size bytes as a full command.
Sorry I didn't notice before I started to implement a test case.
/Jarkko
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On Wed, Sep 06, 2017 at 03:42:33PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
On Mon, Sep 04, 2017 at 07:36:42PM +0200, Alexander Steffen wrote:
quoted
tpm_transmit() does not offer an explicit interface to indicate the
number of valid bytes in the communication buffer. Instead, it
relies on the commandSize field in the TPM header that is encoded within
the buffer.
quoted
quoted
Therefore, ensure that a) enough data has been written to the
buffer, so that the commandSize field is present and b) the
commandSize field does not announce more data than has been written
to the buffer.
quoted
quoted
This should have been fixed with CVE-2011-1161 long ago, but
apparently a correct version of that patch never made it into the kernel.
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen <redacted>
---
v2:
- Moved all changes to tpm_common_write in a single patch.
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
index 610638a..ac25574 100644
I already had test cases that failed with some of my TPMs under some circumstances. I'll try to come up with a concise description of what those tests do or send you a patch directly for your tests. GitHub pull requests are okay for that repository? (I already have one waiting there.)
quoted
/Jarkko
Just when I started to implement this that the bug fix itself does not have yet
the right semantics.
It should be just add a new check:
if (in_size != be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 2))))
return -EINVAL;
The existing check is correct. This was missing. The reason for this is that we
process whatever is in the in_size bytes as a full command.
There are two problems with this solution:
1. You need to check for in_size < 6, otherwise you read data that has not been written there during that request. I haven't tested this, but I'd expect it to fail for example if you try to send the two commands "00 00 00 00 00 02" and "00 00". The first will be rejected with EINVAL, because 6 (in_size) != 2 (commandSize). But the second will pass that check, because now in_size happens to match the commandSize that has only been written to the buffer for the first command.
2. You may not reject commands where in_size > commandSize, because TIS/PTP require the TPM to throw away extra bytes (and process the command as usual), not fail the command. You can see that in the State Transition Table (Table 18 in TIS 1.3), line 20, with the TPM in Reception state and Expect=0, writing more data does not change the state ("Write is not expected. Drop write. TPM ignores this state transition."). Of course, since we do not pass on in_size, but only commandSize the TPM will never see those extra bytes, but the external behavior (for user space applications) is identical.
When you fix those two problems, you're probably back at my solution. The only other change I made (renaming TPM_BUFSIZE to sizeof(priv->data_buffer)) does not change anything, the values are identical. I just find it very confusing when you compare something against a magic constant to avoid buffer overflows in your memcpy. Using the buffer size directly is much more straightforward (and less prone to fail as soon as someone changes the structure definition).
Sorry I didn't notice before I started to implement a test case.
/Jarkko
Alexander
????{.n?+???????+%?????????w??{.n?+????{??????????v?^?)????w* jg???
???????j????G??????
???j:+v???w?j?m?????
??
?w?????f???h?????????
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <hidden> Date: 2017-09-07 16:47:03
On Wed, Sep 06, 2017 at 02:19:28PM +0000, Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com wrote:
quoted
On Wed, Sep 06, 2017 at 03:42:33PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
On Mon, Sep 04, 2017 at 07:36:42PM +0200, Alexander Steffen wrote:
quoted
tpm_transmit() does not offer an explicit interface to indicate the
number of valid bytes in the communication buffer. Instead, it
relies on the commandSize field in the TPM header that is encoded within
the buffer.
quoted
quoted
Therefore, ensure that a) enough data has been written to the
buffer, so that the commandSize field is present and b) the
commandSize field does not announce more data than has been written
to the buffer.
quoted
quoted
This should have been fixed with CVE-2011-1161 long ago, but
apparently a correct version of that patch never made it into the kernel.
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen <redacted>
---
v2:
- Moved all changes to tpm_common_write in a single patch.
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
index 610638a..ac25574 100644
I already had test cases that failed with some of my TPMs under some circumstances. I'll try to come up with a concise description of what those tests do or send you a patch directly for your tests. GitHub pull requests are okay for that repository? (I already have one waiting there.)
quoted
quoted
/Jarkko
Just when I started to implement this that the bug fix itself does not have yet
the right semantics.
It should be just add a new check:
if (in_size != be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 2))))
return -EINVAL;
The existing check is correct. This was missing. The reason for this is that we
process whatever is in the in_size bytes as a full command.
There are two problems with this solution:
1. You need to check for in_size < 6, otherwise you read data that has
not been written there during that request. I haven't tested this, but
I'd expect it to fail for example if you try to send the two commands
"00 00 00 00 00 02" and "00 00". The first will be rejected with
EINVAL, because 6 (in_size) != 2 (commandSize). But the second will
pass that check, because now in_size happens to match the commandSize
that has only been written to the buffer for the first command.
AFAIK tpm_transmit checks that the command has at least the header.
2. You may not reject commands where in_size > commandSize, because
TIS/PTP require the TPM to throw away extra bytes (and process the
command as usual), not fail the command. You can see that in the State
Transition Table (Table 18 in TIS 1.3), line 20, with the TPM in
Reception state and Expect=0, writing more data does not change the
state ("Write is not expected. Drop write. TPM ignores this state
transition."). Of course, since we do not pass on in_size, but only
commandSize the TPM will never see those extra bytes, but the external
behavior (for user space applications) is identical.
OK, this is more relevant. What is the legit case to send extra bytes?
/Jarkko
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To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
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On Wed, Sep 06, 2017 at 02:19:28PM +0000,
Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com wrote:
quoted
quoted
On Wed, Sep 06, 2017 at 03:42:33PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
On Mon, Sep 04, 2017 at 07:36:42PM +0200, Alexander Steffen wrote:
quoted
tpm_transmit() does not offer an explicit interface to indicate the
number of valid bytes in the communication buffer. Instead, it
relies on the commandSize field in the TPM header that is encoded
within
quoted
quoted
the buffer.
quoted
quoted
Therefore, ensure that a) enough data has been written to the
buffer, so that the commandSize field is present and b) the
commandSize field does not announce more data than has been
written
quoted
quoted
to the buffer.
quoted
quoted
This should have been fixed with CVE-2011-1161 long ago, but
apparently a correct version of that patch never made it into the
kernel.
quoted
quoted
quoted
quoted
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen
[off-list ref]
quoted
quoted
quoted
quoted
---
v2:
- Moved all changes to tpm_common_write in a single patch.
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
index 610638a..ac25574 100644
I already had test cases that failed with some of my TPMs under some
circumstances. I'll try to come up with a concise description of what those
tests do or send you a patch directly for your tests. GitHub pull requests are
okay for that repository? (I already have one waiting there.)
quoted
quoted
quoted
/Jarkko
Just when I started to implement this that the bug fix itself does not have
yet
quoted
quoted
the right semantics.
It should be just add a new check:
if (in_size != be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 2))))
return -EINVAL;
The existing check is correct. This was missing. The reason for this is that
we
quoted
quoted
process whatever is in the in_size bytes as a full command.
There are two problems with this solution:
1. You need to check for in_size < 6, otherwise you read data that has
not been written there during that request. I haven't tested this, but
I'd expect it to fail for example if you try to send the two commands
"00 00 00 00 00 02" and "00 00". The first will be rejected with
EINVAL, because 6 (in_size) != 2 (commandSize). But the second will
pass that check, because now in_size happens to match the commandSize
that has only been written to the buffer for the first command.
AFAIK tpm_transmit checks that the command has at least the header.
This was only a simple example, it will fail with other values as well. Just add 8 to both size fields and append 8 null bytes, and you will pass the length check in tpm_transmit but still have incorrect data. Also, it is probably no good style to omit checks for obvious errors, just because an unrelated check in a completely different location also happens to catch the problem under some circumstances. tpm_common_write discards the relevant information (in_size), so all other parts of the code need to be able to rely on it to have validated it properly.
quoted
2. You may not reject commands where in_size > commandSize, because
TIS/PTP require the TPM to throw away extra bytes (and process the
command as usual), not fail the command. You can see that in the State
Transition Table (Table 18 in TIS 1.3), line 20, with the TPM in
Reception state and Expect=0, writing more data does not change the
state ("Write is not expected. Drop write. TPM ignores this state
transition."). Of course, since we do not pass on in_size, but only
commandSize the TPM will never see those extra bytes, but the external
behavior (for user space applications) is identical.
OK, this is more relevant. What is the legit case to send extra bytes?
For me: testing that my TPM implementation behaves correctly :) I can run the same test cases against the TPM using the Linux driver and several other, unrelated means. I'd like to avoid having special cases for communication paths in there, just because in one case I have a more direct channel to the TPM whereas in the other the Linux driver interferes with the communication and rejects the data before the TPM sees it. For "normal" usage from Linux applications this is not relevant, but it does not break anything either.
I've just noticed that the v2 patch is broken, because the code incorrectly tries to access data from user space. Interestingly, the tests worked fine on x86_64 and aarch64, only armv7l was broken (and that result somehow got lost, so I assumed that the patch was fine). I'll send a fixed patch soon.
Alexander
????{.n?+???????+%?????????w??{.n?+????{??????????v?^?)????w* jg???
???????j????G??????
???j:+v???w?j?m?????
??
?w?????f???h?????????
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <hidden> Date: 2017-09-08 21:34:15
On Fri, Sep 08, 2017 at 02:26:42PM +0000, Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com wrote:
quoted
On Wed, Sep 06, 2017 at 02:19:28PM +0000,
Alexander.Steffen at infineon.com wrote:
quoted
quoted
On Wed, Sep 06, 2017 at 03:42:33PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
On Mon, Sep 04, 2017 at 07:36:42PM +0200, Alexander Steffen wrote:
quoted
tpm_transmit() does not offer an explicit interface to indicate the
number of valid bytes in the communication buffer. Instead, it
relies on the commandSize field in the TPM header that is encoded
within
quoted
quoted
the buffer.
quoted
quoted
Therefore, ensure that a) enough data has been written to the
buffer, so that the commandSize field is present and b) the
commandSize field does not announce more data than has been
written
quoted
quoted
to the buffer.
quoted
quoted
This should have been fixed with CVE-2011-1161 long ago, but
apparently a correct version of that patch never made it into the
kernel.
quoted
quoted
quoted
quoted
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen
[off-list ref]
quoted
quoted
quoted
quoted
---
v2:
- Moved all changes to tpm_common_write in a single patch.
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c
index 610638a..ac25574 100644
I already had test cases that failed with some of my TPMs under some
circumstances. I'll try to come up with a concise description of what those
tests do or send you a patch directly for your tests. GitHub pull requests are
okay for that repository? (I already have one waiting there.)
quoted
quoted
quoted
/Jarkko
Just when I started to implement this that the bug fix itself does not have
yet
quoted
quoted
the right semantics.
It should be just add a new check:
if (in_size != be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 2))))
return -EINVAL;
The existing check is correct. This was missing. The reason for this is that
we
quoted
quoted
process whatever is in the in_size bytes as a full command.
There are two problems with this solution:
1. You need to check for in_size < 6, otherwise you read data that has
not been written there during that request. I haven't tested this, but
I'd expect it to fail for example if you try to send the two commands
"00 00 00 00 00 02" and "00 00". The first will be rejected with
EINVAL, because 6 (in_size) != 2 (commandSize). But the second will
pass that check, because now in_size happens to match the commandSize
that has only been written to the buffer for the first command.
AFAIK tpm_transmit checks that the command has at least the header.
This was only a simple example, it will fail with other values as
well. Just add 8 to both size fields and append 8 null bytes, and you
will pass the length check in tpm_transmit but still have incorrect
data. Also, it is probably no good style to omit checks for obvious
errors, just because an unrelated check in a completely different
location also happens to catch the problem under some circumstances.
tpm_common_write discards the relevant information (in_size), so all
other parts of the code need to be able to rely on it to have
validated it properly.
I think any check should be done only in one place at the level where
it is required.
quoted
quoted
2. You may not reject commands where in_size > commandSize, because
TIS/PTP require the TPM to throw away extra bytes (and process the
command as usual), not fail the command. You can see that in the State
Transition Table (Table 18 in TIS 1.3), line 20, with the TPM in
Reception state and Expect=0, writing more data does not change the
state ("Write is not expected. Drop write. TPM ignores this state
transition."). Of course, since we do not pass on in_size, but only
commandSize the TPM will never see those extra bytes, but the external
behavior (for user space applications) is identical.
OK, this is more relevant. What is the legit case to send extra bytes?
For me: testing that my TPM implementation behaves correctly :) I can
run the same test cases against the TPM using the Linux driver and
several other, unrelated means. I'd like to avoid having special cases
for communication paths in there, just because in one case I have a
more direct channel to the TPM whereas in the other the Linux driver
interferes with the communication and rejects the data before the TPM
sees it. For "normal" usage from Linux applications this is not
relevant, but it does not break anything either.
I've just noticed that the v2 patch is broken, because the code
incorrectly tries to access data from user space. Interestingly, the
tests worked fine on x86_64 and aarch64, only armv7l was broken (and
that result somehow got lost, so I assumed that the patch was fine).
I'll send a fixed patch soon.
Alexander
So what benefit do we get allowing garbage after the TPM command to
be sent? I think it makes more sense to allow only the command data
to be sent.
/Jarkko
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