Thread (21 messages) 21 messages, 5 authors, 2020-11-23

Re: [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data

From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Date: 2020-11-23 13:41:56
Also in: dm-devel, linux-security-module, lkml, selinux

Hi Pavel,

On Sun, 2020-11-22 at 22:00 +0100, Pavel Machek wrote:
Hi!
quoted
quoted
How is it supposed to be useful?

I'm pretty sure there are critical data that are not measured by
proposed module... and that are written under normal circumstances.
The goal of this series is to introduce the IMA hook
measure_critical_data() and the necessary policies to use it; and
illustrate that use with one example (SELinux). It is not scalable to
identify and update all the critical data sources to use the proposed
module at once.

A piecemeal approach to add more critical data measurement in subsequent
patches would be easy to implement and review.
Basically every other data structure in kernel is "critical" by your
definition, and you can't really measure them all; some of them change
rather often. Going piecemeal does not really help here.
Agreed, measuring data structures that change is not really applicable.
However, measuring data structures that once initialized don't change,
does make sense (similar concept to __ro_after_init).  The attestation
server doesn't need to know anything about the measurement, other than
more than a single measurement is indicative of a problem.

Mimi
Example of critical data structure: page table entries for process I
own.

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