(no subject)
From: Itay Iellin <hidden>
Date: 2021-08-16 05:55:34
Bcc: Subject: fs/binfmt_elf: Integer Overflow vulnerability report Reply-To: I'm sharing a report of an integer overflow vulnerability I found (in fs/binfmt_elf.c). I sent and discussed this vulnerability report with members of security@kernel.org. I'm raising this for public discussion, with approval from Greg (greg@kroah.com). On Sun, Aug 01, 2021 at 04:30:30PM +0300, Itay Iellin wrote:
quoted hunk
In fs/binfmt_elf.c, line 1193, e_entry value can be overflowed. This potentially allows to create a fake entry point field for an ELF file. The local variable e_entry is set to elf_ex->e_entry + load_bias. Given an ET_DYN ELF file, without a PT_INTERP program header, with an elf_ex->e_entry field in the ELF header, which equals to 0xffffffffffffffff(in x86_64 for example), and a load_bias which is greater than 0, e_entry(the local variable) overflows. This bypasses the check of BAD_ADDR macro in line 1241. It is possible to set a large enough NO-OP(NOP) sled, before the actual code, modify the elf_ex->e_entry field so that elf_ex->e_entry+load_bias will be in the range where the NO-OP sled is mapped(because the offset of the PT_LOAD program header of the text segment can be controlled). This is practically a guess, because load_bias is randomized, the ELF file can be loaded a large amount of times until elf_ex->e_entry + load_bias is in the range of the NO-OP sled. To conclude, this bug potentially allows the creation of a "fake" entry point field in the ELF file header. Suggested git diff: Add a BAD_ADDR test to elf_ex->e_entry to prevent from using an overflowed elf_entry value. Signed-off-by: Itay Iellin <redacted> --- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c index 439ed81e755a..b59dcd5857db 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) kfree(interp_elf_phdata); } else { elf_entry = e_entry; - if (BAD_ADDR(elf_entry)) { + if (BAD_ADDR(elf_entry) || BAD_ADDR(elf_ex->e_entry)) { retval = -EINVAL; goto out_free_dentry; }-- 2.32.0
I am not attaching the replies to my initial report from the discussion with members of security@kernel.org, only when or if I will be given permission from the repliers to do so. Itay Iellin