^
ffffffff8896d480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffffffff8896d500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=================================
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
syzbot is reporting OOB read at fbcon_resize() [1], for
commit 39b3cffb8cf31117 ("fbcon: prevent user font height or width change
from causing potential out-of-bounds access") is by error using
registered_fb[con2fb_map[vc->vc_num]]->fbcon_par->p->userfont (which was
set to non-zero) instead of fb_display[vc->vc_num].userfont (which remains
zero for that display).
We could remove tricky userfont flag [2], for we can determine it by
comparing address of the font data and addresses of built-in font data.
But since that commit is failing to fix the original OOB read [3], this
patch keeps the change minimal in case we decide to revert altogether.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?idëcbbb6576958a496500fee9cf7aa83ea00b5920
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=Patch&x030853900000
[3] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?idoba8c186d97cf1011ab17660e633b1cc4e080c9
Reported-by: syzbot <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: 39b3cffb8cf31117 ("fbcon: prevent user font height or width change from causing potential out-of-bounds access")
Cc: George Kennedy <redacted>
---
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Greg, will you pick up this patch?
It seems that finding the real cause of [3] and actually fixing [3] will be difficult.
Since I can't reproduce [3] locally, I will have to try flood of "#syz test" requests
for debug printk() patches.
On 2020/09/11 7:57, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
quoted hunk
syzbot is reporting OOB read at fbcon_resize() [1], for
commit 39b3cffb8cf31117 ("fbcon: prevent user font height or width change
from causing potential out-of-bounds access") is by error using
registered_fb[con2fb_map[vc->vc_num]]->fbcon_par->p->userfont (which was
set to non-zero) instead of fb_display[vc->vc_num].userfont (which remains
zero for that display).
We could remove tricky userfont flag [2], for we can determine it by
comparing address of the font data and addresses of built-in font data.
But since that commit is failing to fix the original OOB read [3], this
patch keeps the change minimal in case we decide to revert altogether.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?idëcbbb6576958a496500fee9cf7aa83ea00b5920
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=Patch&x030853900000
[3] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?idoba8c186d97cf1011ab17660e633b1cc4e080c9
Reported-by: syzbot <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: 39b3cffb8cf31117 ("fbcon: prevent user font height or width change from causing potential out-of-bounds access")
Cc: George Kennedy <redacted>
---
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
From: Daniel Vetter <hidden> Date: 2020-09-16 07:44:53
On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 09:01:06AM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
Greg, will you pick up this patch?
It seems that finding the real cause of [3] and actually fixing [3] will be difficult.
Since I can't reproduce [3] locally, I will have to try flood of "#syz test" requests
for debug printk() patches.
Grasping for straws, but have you retested with the scrollback code
removed already? That was full of fail and we outright deleted it:
50145474f6ef ("fbcon: remove soft scrollback code")
Cheers, Daniel
On 2020/09/11 7:57, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
quoted
syzbot is reporting OOB read at fbcon_resize() [1], for
commit 39b3cffb8cf31117 ("fbcon: prevent user font height or width change
from causing potential out-of-bounds access") is by error using
registered_fb[con2fb_map[vc->vc_num]]->fbcon_par->p->userfont (which was
set to non-zero) instead of fb_display[vc->vc_num].userfont (which remains
zero for that display).
We could remove tricky userfont flag [2], for we can determine it by
comparing address of the font data and addresses of built-in font data.
But since that commit is failing to fix the original OOB read [3], this
patch keeps the change minimal in case we decide to revert altogether.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?idëcbbb6576958a496500fee9cf7aa83ea00b5920
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=Patch&x030853900000
[3] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?idoba8c186d97cf1011ab17660e633b1cc4e080c9
Reported-by: syzbot <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: 39b3cffb8cf31117 ("fbcon: prevent user font height or width change from causing potential out-of-bounds access")
Cc: George Kennedy <redacted>
---
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 09:01:06AM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
Greg, will you pick up this patch?
It seems that finding the real cause of [3] and actually fixing [3] will be difficult.
Since I can't reproduce [3] locally, I will have to try flood of "#syz test" requests
for debug printk() patches.
I agree with Daniel here, can you retest these against Linus's latest
tree please?
thanks,
greg k-h
On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 09:01:06AM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
quoted
Greg, will you pick up this patch?
It seems that finding the real cause of [3] and actually fixing [3] will be difficult.
Since I can't reproduce [3] locally, I will have to try flood of "#syz test" requests
for debug printk() patches.
I agree with Daniel here, can you retest these against Linus's latest
tree please?
syzbot already reproduced these bugs using the latest commit. ;-)
You can find
ci-upstream-kasan-gce-root 2020/09/15 15:18 upstream fc4f28bb
record for "KASAN: global-out-of-bounds Read in bit_putcs" and
ci-upstream-kasan-gce-root 2020/09/16 09:54 upstream fc4f28bb
record for "KASAN: global-out-of-bounds Read in fbcon_resize".
On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 07:06:31PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
On 2020/09/16 17:26, Greg KH wrote:
quoted
On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 09:01:06AM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
quoted
Greg, will you pick up this patch?
It seems that finding the real cause of [3] and actually fixing [3] will be difficult.
Since I can't reproduce [3] locally, I will have to try flood of "#syz test" requests
for debug printk() patches.
I agree with Daniel here, can you retest these against Linus's latest
tree please?
syzbot already reproduced these bugs using the latest commit. ;-)
You can find
ci-upstream-kasan-gce-root 2020/09/15 15:18 upstream fc4f28bb
record for "KASAN: global-out-of-bounds Read in bit_putcs" and
ci-upstream-kasan-gce-root 2020/09/16 09:54 upstream fc4f28bb
record for "KASAN: global-out-of-bounds Read in fbcon_resize".