Thread (148 messages) 148 messages, 17 authors, 2022-06-09

Re: [PATCH 07/35] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages

From: Dave Hansen <hidden>
Date: 2022-02-08 01:07:44
Also in: linux-api, linux-arch, linux-mm, lkml

On 1/30/22 13:18, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
The x86 family of processors do not directly create read-only and Dirty
PTEs.  These PTEs are created by software.
That's not strictly correct.

There's nothing in the architecture today to prevent the CPU from
creating Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs.  In fact, some CPUs do this in weird
situations.  It wouldn't be wrong to say:

	Processors sometimes directly create read-only and Dirty PTEs.

which is the opposite of what is written above.  This is why the CET
spec has the blurb about shadow-stack-supporting CPUs promise not to do
this any more.
One such case is that kernel
read-only pages are historically setup as Dirty.
				   ^ set up
New processors that support Shadow Stack regard read-only and Dirty PTEs as
shadow stack pages.
This also isn't *quite* correct.  It's not just having a new processor,
it includes enabling shadow stacks.
This results in ambiguity between shadow stack and kernel read-only
pages.  To resolve this, removed Dirty from kernel read- only pages.
One thing that's not clear from the spec: does this cause an *actual*
problem?  For instance, does setting:

	IA32_U_CET.SH_STK_EN=1
but
	IA32_S_CET.SH_STK_EN=0

means that shadow stacks are enforced in user *MODE* or on
user-paging-permission (U=0) PTEs?

I think it's modes, but it would be nice to be clear.  *BUT*, if this is
accurate, doesn't it also mean that this patch is not strictly necessary?

Don't get me wrong, the patch is probably still a good idea, but let's
make sure we get the exact reasoning clear.
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