From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Date: 2021-07-29 13:50:24
Booting a KVM host in protected mode with kmemleak quickly results
in a pretty bad crash, as kmemleak doesn't know that the HYP sections
have been taken away.
Make the unregistration from kmemleak part of marking the sections
as HYP-private. The rest of the HYP-specific data is obtained via
the page allocator, which is not subjected to kmemleak.
Fixes: 90134ac9cabb ("KVM: arm64: Protect the .hyp sections from the host")
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <redacted>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.13
---
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
On Thursday 29 Jul 2021 at 14:50:16 (+0100), Marc Zyngier wrote:
quoted hunk
Booting a KVM host in protected mode with kmemleak quickly results
in a pretty bad crash, as kmemleak doesn't know that the HYP sections
have been taken away.
Make the unregistration from kmemleak part of marking the sections
as HYP-private. The rest of the HYP-specific data is obtained via
the page allocator, which is not subjected to kmemleak.
Fixes: 90134ac9cabb ("KVM: arm64: Protect the .hyp sections from the host")
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <redacted>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.13
---
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
At some point we should also look into unmapping these sections from
EL1 stage-1 as well, as that should lead to better error messages in
case the host accesses hyp-private memory some other way. But this
patch makes sense on its own, so:
Reviewed-by: Quentin Perret <redacted>
Thanks,
Quentin
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On Thu, Jul 29, 2021 at 02:50:16PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
quoted hunk
Booting a KVM host in protected mode with kmemleak quickly results
in a pretty bad crash, as kmemleak doesn't know that the HYP sections
have been taken away.
Make the unregistration from kmemleak part of marking the sections
as HYP-private. The rest of the HYP-specific data is obtained via
the page allocator, which is not subjected to kmemleak.
Fixes: 90134ac9cabb ("KVM: arm64: Protect the .hyp sections from the host")
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <redacted>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.13
---
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Using kmemleak_free_part() is fine in principle as this is not a slab
object. However, the above would call the function even for ranges that
are not tracked at all by kmemleak (text, idmap). Luckily Kmemleak won't
complain, unless you #define DEBUG in the file (initially I tried to
warn all the time but I couldn't fix all the callbacks).
If it was just the BSS, I would move the kmemleak_free_part() call to
finalize_hyp_mode() but there's the __hyp_rodata section as well.
I think we have some inconsistency with .hyp.rodata which falls under
_sdata.._edata while the kernel's own .rodata goes immediately after
_etext. Should we move __hyp_rodata outside _sdata.._edata as well? It
would benefit from the RO NX marking (probably more useful without the
protected mode). If this works, we'd only need to call kmemleak once for
the BSS.
--
Catalin
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On Thu, Jul 29, 2021 at 02:50:16PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
quoted
Booting a KVM host in protected mode with kmemleak quickly results
in a pretty bad crash, as kmemleak doesn't know that the HYP sections
have been taken away.
Make the unregistration from kmemleak part of marking the sections
as HYP-private. The rest of the HYP-specific data is obtained via
the page allocator, which is not subjected to kmemleak.
Fixes: 90134ac9cabb ("KVM: arm64: Protect the .hyp sections from the host")
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <redacted>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.13
---
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Using kmemleak_free_part() is fine in principle as this is not a slab
object. However, the above would call the function even for ranges that
are not tracked at all by kmemleak (text, idmap). Luckily Kmemleak won't
complain, unless you #define DEBUG in the file (initially I tried to
warn all the time but I couldn't fix all the callbacks).
Yeah, I had a look last week, and this fires everywhere (KVM only adds
a drop in an ocean of warnings).
If it was just the BSS, I would move the kmemleak_free_part() call to
finalize_hyp_mode() but there's the __hyp_rodata section as well.
I think we have some inconsistency with .hyp.rodata which falls under
_sdata.._edata while the kernel's own .rodata goes immediately after
_etext. Should we move __hyp_rodata outside _sdata.._edata as well? It
would benefit from the RO NX marking (probably more useful without the
protected mode). If this works, we'd only need to call kmemleak once for
the BSS.
That's a good idea, and pretty easy to implement. I'll post a respin
shortly.
Thanks,
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
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