# \[PATCH v16 00/11\] mm: introduce memfd\_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas (page 2 of 2)

- Subsystems: ARM64 PORT (AARCH64 ARCHITECTURE), ABI/API, FILESYSTEM DIRECT ACCESS (DAX), FILESYSTEMS (VFS and infrastructure), GENERIC INCLUDE/ASM HEADER FILES, HIBERNATION (aka Software Suspend, aka swsusp), KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK, MEMORY MANAGEMENT, MEMORY MANAGEMENT - CORE, MEMORY MANAGEMENT - GUP (GET USER PAGES), MEMORY MANAGEMENT - SECRETMEM, MEMORY MAPPING, PAGE CACHE, RISC-V ARCHITECTURE, SUSPEND TO RAM, THE REST, VMALLOC, X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT), X86 ENTRY CODE, X86 MM
- Maintainers: Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Dan Williams, Alexander Viro, Christian Brauner, Arnd Bergmann, "Rafael J. Wysocki", Shuah Khan, Shuah Khan, Andrew Morton, David Hildenbrand, Mike Rapoport, Liam R. Howlett, Lorenzo Stoakes, Matthew Wilcox, Jan Kara, Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt, Albert Ou, Linus Torvalds, Uladzislau Rezki, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
- Series: 11 patches touching 38 files, +947/-82
- Status: SUPERSEDED (Superseded by v20 posted 2021-05-18)
- Superseded by v20 (posted 2021-05-18).
- Revision v16 (19 revisions archived).
- List: linux-arm-kernel
- 78 messages, 10 authors
- Page: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-arm-kernel/2021/01/197897/t/2
- Previous page: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-arm-kernel/2021/01/197897/t.md

## Re: \[PATCH v16 07/11\] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation

- From: Mike Rapoport \<rppt@kernel.org\>
- Date: 2021-02-04 11:35:16 
- Message: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-arm-kernel/2021/02/199262.md

```text
On Wed, Feb 03, 2021 at 01:09:30PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Tue 02-02-21 10:55:40, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Tue, 2021-02-02 at 20:15 +0200, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > On Tue, Feb 02, 2021 at 03:34:29PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > > > On 02.02.21 15:32, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > 
> > Well the safest security statement is that we never expose the data to
> > the kernel because it's a very clean security statement and easy to
> > enforce. It's also the easiest threat model to analyse.   Once we do
> > start exposing the secret to the kernel it alters the threat profile
> > and the analysis and obviously potentially provides the ROP gadget to
> > an attacker to do the same. Instinct tells me that the loss of
> > security doesn't really make up for the ability to swap or migrate but
> > if there were a case for doing the latter, it would have to be a
> > security policy of the user (i.e. a user should be able to decide their
> > data is too sensitive to expose to the kernel).
> 
> The security/threat model should be documented in the changelog as
> well. I am not a security expert but I would tend to agree that not
> allowing even temporal mapping for data copying (in the kernel) is the
> most robust approach. Whether that is generally necessary for users I do
> not know.
> 
> From the API POV I think it makes sense to have two
> modes. NEVER_MAP_IN_KERNEL which would imply no migrateability, no
> copy_{from,to}_user, no gup or any other way for the kernel to access
> content of the memory. Maybe even zero the content on the last unmap to
> never allow any data leak. ALLOW_TEMPORARY would unmap the page from
> the direct mapping but it would still allow temporary mappings for
> data copying inside the kernel (thus allow CoW, copy*user, migration).
> Which one should be default and which an opt-in I do not know. A less
> restrictive mode to be default and the more restrictive an opt-in via
> flags makes a lot of sense to me though.

The default is already NEVER_MAP_IN_KERNEL, so there is no explicit flag
for this. ALLOW_TEMPORARY should be opt-in, IMHO, and we can add it on top
later on.

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

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```

## Re: \[PATCH v16 06/11\] mm: introduce memfd\_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

- From: Mike Rapoport \<rppt@kernel.org\>
- Date: 2021-02-04 11:37:33 
- Message: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-arm-kernel/2021/02/199263.md

```text
On Wed, Feb 03, 2021 at 01:15:58PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Thu 21-01-21 14:27:18, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > +static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
> > +{
> > +	struct file *file = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> > +	struct secretmem_ctx *ctx;
> > +	struct inode *inode;
> > +
> > +	inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb);
> > +	if (IS_ERR(inode))
> > +		return ERR_CAST(inode);
> > +
> > +	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!ctx)
> > +		goto err_free_inode;
> > +
> > +	file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem",
> > +				 O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops);
> > +	if (IS_ERR(file))
> > +		goto err_free_ctx;
> > +
> > +	mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping);
> 
> Btw. you need also mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER) because
> the default is GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE and you do not support migration so
> no pages from movable zones should be allowed.

Ok.

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

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```

## Re: \[PATCH v16 07/11\] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation

- From: Michal Hocko \<mhocko@suse.com\>
- Date: 2021-02-04 13:03:38 
- Message: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-arm-kernel/2021/02/199268.md

```text
On Thu 04-02-21 11:58:55, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 03, 2021 at 10:12:22AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
[...]
> > Wrt to the specific syscall, please document why existing interfaces are
> > not a good fit as well. It would be also great to describe interaction
> > with mlock itself (I assume the two to be incompatible - mlock will fail
> > on and mlockall will ignore it).
> 
> The interaction with mlock() belongs more to the man page, but I don't mind
> adding this to changelog as well.

I would expect this to be explicitly handled in the patch - thus the
changelog rationale.
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

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```
