# \[RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3\] arm64: basic ROP mitigation

- From: Kees Cook \<hidden\>
- Date: 2018-08-06 18:49:34 
- List: linux-arm-kernel
- Page: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-arm-kernel/2018/08/8771968
- Thread: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-arm-kernel/2018/08/8771849/t.md

```text
On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 10:45 AM, Robin Murphy [ref] wrote:
> I guess what I'm getting at is that if the protection mechanism is "always
> return with SP outside TTBR1", there seems little point in going through the
> motions if SP in TTBR0 could still be valid and allow an attack to succeed
> anyway; this is basically just me working through a justification for saying
> the proposed scheme needs "depends on ARM64_PAN || ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN",
> making it that much uglier for v8.0 CPUs...

I think anyone with v8.0 CPUs interested in this mitigation would also
very much want PAN emulation. If a "depends on" isn't desired, what
about "imply" in the Kconfig?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
```
