The UEFI memory map is a bit vague about how to interpret the
EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute when it is combined with EFI_MEMORY_RP and/or
EFI_MEMORY_WP, which have retroactively been redefined as cacheability
attributes rather than permission attributes.
So let's ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP if _RP and/or _WP are also set. In this
case, it is likely that they are being used to describe the capability
of the region (i.e., whether it has the controls to reconfigure it as
non-executable) rather than the nature of the contents of the region
(i.e., whether it contains data that we will never attempt to execute)
Cc: Stephen Boyd <redacted>
Cc: Matt Fleming <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <redacted>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
On 14 September 2017 at 12:31, Ard Biesheuvel [off-list ref] wrote:
The UEFI memory map
*spec*
quoted hunk
is a bit vague about how to interpret the
EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute when it is combined with EFI_MEMORY_RP and/or
EFI_MEMORY_WP, which have retroactively been redefined as cacheability
attributes rather than permission attributes.
So let's ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP if _RP and/or _WP are also set. In this
case, it is likely that they are being used to describe the capability
of the region (i.e., whether it has the controls to reconfigure it as
non-executable) rather than the nature of the contents of the region
(i.e., whether it contains data that we will never attempt to execute)
Cc: Stephen Boyd <redacted>
Cc: Matt Fleming <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <redacted>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
From: Stephen Boyd <hidden> Date: 2017-09-15 18:53:55
On 09/14, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
The UEFI memory map is a bit vague about how to interpret the
EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute when it is combined with EFI_MEMORY_RP and/or
EFI_MEMORY_WP, which have retroactively been redefined as cacheability
attributes rather than permission attributes.
So let's ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP if _RP and/or _WP are also set. In this
case, it is likely that they are being used to describe the capability
of the region (i.e., whether it has the controls to reconfigure it as
non-executable) rather than the nature of the contents of the region
(i.e., whether it contains data that we will never attempt to execute)
Cc: Stephen Boyd <redacted>
Reported-by: Stephen Boyd <redacted>
I will test early next week and provide a tested-by. Thanks.
--
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum,
a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project
On 15 September 2017 at 11:53, Stephen Boyd [off-list ref] wrote:
On 09/14, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
quoted
The UEFI memory map is a bit vague about how to interpret the
EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute when it is combined with EFI_MEMORY_RP and/or
EFI_MEMORY_WP, which have retroactively been redefined as cacheability
attributes rather than permission attributes.
So let's ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP if _RP and/or _WP are also set. In this
case, it is likely that they are being used to describe the capability
of the region (i.e., whether it has the controls to reconfigure it as
non-executable) rather than the nature of the contents of the region
(i.e., whether it contains data that we will never attempt to execute)
Cc: Stephen Boyd <redacted>
Reported-by: Stephen Boyd <redacted>
I will test early next week and provide a tested-by. Thanks.
From: Stephen Boyd <hidden> Date: 2017-09-22 21:57:23
On 09/15, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
On 15 September 2017 at 11:53, Stephen Boyd [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On 09/14, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
quoted
The UEFI memory map is a bit vague about how to interpret the
EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute when it is combined with EFI_MEMORY_RP and/or
EFI_MEMORY_WP, which have retroactively been redefined as cacheability
attributes rather than permission attributes.
So let's ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP if _RP and/or _WP are also set. In this
case, it is likely that they are being used to describe the capability
of the region (i.e., whether it has the controls to reconfigure it as
non-executable) rather than the nature of the contents of the region
(i.e., whether it contains data that we will never attempt to execute)
Cc: Stephen Boyd <redacted>
Reported-by: Stephen Boyd <redacted>
I will test early next week and provide a tested-by. Thanks.
Great, thanks.
Tested-by: Stephen Boyd <redacted>
--
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum,
a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project