The range of set_memory_* is currently restricted to the module address
range because of difficulties in breaking down larger block sizes.
vmalloc maps PAGE_SIZE pages so it is safe to use as well. Update the
function ranges and add a comment explaining why the range is restricted
the way it is.
Suggested-by: Laura Abbott <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <redacted>
---
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
@@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ static int change_memory_common(unsigned long addr, int numpages,unsignedlongend=start+size;intret;structpage_change_datadata;+structvm_struct*area;if(!PAGE_ALIGNED(addr)){start&=PAGE_MASK;
@@ -51,10 +53,23 @@ static int change_memory_common(unsigned long addr, int numpages,WARN_ON_ONCE(1);}-if(start<MODULES_VADDR||start>=MODULES_END)-return-EINVAL;--if(end<MODULES_VADDR||end>=MODULES_END)+/*+*KernelVAmappingsarealwayslive,andsplittinglivesection+*mappingsintopagemappingsmaycauseTLBconflicts.Thismeans+*wehavetoensurethatchangingthepermissionbitsoftherange+*weareoperatingondoesnotresultinsuchsplitting.+*+*Let'srestrictourselvestomappingscreatedbyvmalloc(orvmap).+*Thoseareguaranteedtoconsistentirelyofpagemappings,and+*splittingisneverneeded.+*+*Socheckwhetherthe[addr,addr+size)intervalisentirely+*coveredbypreciselyoneVMareathathastheVM_ALLOCflagset.+*/+area=find_vm_area((void*)addr);+if(!area||+end>(unsignedlong)area->addr+area->size||+!(area->flags&VM_ALLOC))return-EINVAL;data.set_mask=set_mask;
On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 03:01:05PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
The range of set_memory_* is currently restricted to the module address
range because of difficulties in breaking down larger block sizes.
vmalloc maps PAGE_SIZE pages so it is safe to use as well. Update the
function ranges and add a comment explaining why the range is restricted
the way it is.
Suggested-by: Laura Abbott <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <redacted>
Previously we allowed set_memory_* calls on any range in the modules
area (even if that covered multiple VMAs). However, I believe that given
the way vmap area is allocated, no caller can rely on mappings being
adjacent, and thus such calls would be erroneous.
Given that, this looks good to me (with one minor nit below). FWIW:
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
@@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ static int change_memory_common(unsigned long addr, int numpages, unsigned long end = start + size; int ret; struct page_change_data data;+ struct vm_struct *area; if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(addr)) { start &= PAGE_MASK;
@@ -51,10 +53,23 @@ static int change_memory_common(unsigned long addr, int numpages, WARN_ON_ONCE(1); }- if (start < MODULES_VADDR || start >= MODULES_END)- return -EINVAL;-- if (end < MODULES_VADDR || end >= MODULES_END)+ /*+ * Kernel VA mappings are always live, and splitting live section+ * mappings into page mappings may cause TLB conflicts. This means+ * we have to ensure that changing the permission bits of the range+ * we are operating on does not result in such splitting.+ *+ * Let's restrict ourselves to mappings created by vmalloc (or vmap).+ * Those are guaranteed to consist entirely of page mappings, and+ * splitting is never needed.+ *+ * So check whether the [addr, addr + size) interval is entirely+ * covered by precisely one VM area that has the VM_ALLOC flag set.+ */+ area = find_vm_area((void *)addr);+ if (!area ||+ end > (unsigned long)area->addr + area->size ||+ !(area->flags & VM_ALLOC)) return -EINVAL; data.set_mask = set_mask;
From: Will Deacon <hidden> Date: 2016-01-28 15:08:16
On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 03:01:05PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
The range of set_memory_* is currently restricted to the module address
range because of difficulties in breaking down larger block sizes.
vmalloc maps PAGE_SIZE pages so it is safe to use as well. Update the
function ranges and add a comment explaining why the range is restricted
the way it is.
Suggested-by: Laura Abbott <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <redacted>
---
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
What's the user for this? It would be better to apply along with something
that actually needs to change permission for arbitrary vmalloc mappings.
Anyway, with that (and a rebase to -rc2):
Acked-by: Will Deacon <redacted>
Will
On 28 January 2016 at 16:08, Will Deacon [off-list ref] wrote:
On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 03:01:05PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
quoted
The range of set_memory_* is currently restricted to the module address
range because of difficulties in breaking down larger block sizes.
vmalloc maps PAGE_SIZE pages so it is safe to use as well. Update the
function ranges and add a comment explaining why the range is restricted
the way it is.
Suggested-by: Laura Abbott <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <redacted>
---
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
What's the user for this? It would be better to apply along with something
that actually needs to change permission for arbitrary vmalloc mappings.
BPF already uses set_memory_ro() but doesn't bother to check the return value.
Before the patch, I get:
Anyway, with that (and a rebase to -rc2):
Acked-by: Will Deacon <redacted>
Will
On 28 January 2016 at 16:08, Will Deacon [off-list ref] wrote:
On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 03:01:05PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
quoted
The range of set_memory_* is currently restricted to the module address
range because of difficulties in breaking down larger block sizes.
vmalloc maps PAGE_SIZE pages so it is safe to use as well. Update the
function ranges and add a comment explaining why the range is restricted
the way it is.
Suggested-by: Laura Abbott <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <redacted>
---
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
What's the user for this? It would be better to apply along with something
that actually needs to change permission for arbitrary vmalloc mappings.
BPF already uses set_memory_ro() but doesn't bother to check the return value.
Without the patch, I get:
root at ubuntu-arm64:~# grep bpf /proc/vmallocinfo
0xffff000000014000-0xffff000000016000 8192 bpf_prog_alloc+0x3c/0xb8
pages=1 vmalloc
0xffff00000017a000-0xffff00000017c000 8192 bpf_prog_alloc+0x3c/0xb8
pages=1 vmalloc
root at ubuntu-arm64:~# grep -E 0xffff000000014000\|0xffff00000017a000
/sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
0xffff000000014000-0xffff000000015000 4K RW NX SHD AF
UXN MEM/NORMAL
0xffff00000017a000-0xffff00000017b000 4K RW NX SHD AF
UXN MEM/NORMAL
and with:
root at ubuntu-arm64:~# grep bpf /proc/vmallocinfo
0xffff000000014000-0xffff000000016000 8192 bpf_prog_alloc+0x3c/0xb8
pages=1 vmalloc
0xffff00000017a000-0xffff00000017c000 8192 bpf_prog_alloc+0x3c/0xb8
pages=1 vmalloc
root at ubuntu-arm64:~# grep -E 0xffff000000014000\|0xffff00000017a000
/sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
0xffff000000014000-0xffff000000015000 4K ro NX SHD AF
UXN MEM/NORMAL
0xffff00000017a000-0xffff00000017b000 4K ro NX SHD AF
UXN MEM/NORMAL
Anyway, with that (and a rebase to -rc2):
Acked-by: Will Deacon <redacted>
From: Will Deacon <hidden> Date: 2016-01-28 18:10:58
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 05:43:41PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
On 28 January 2016 at 16:08, Will Deacon [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 03:01:05PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
quoted
The range of set_memory_* is currently restricted to the module address
range because of difficulties in breaking down larger block sizes.
vmalloc maps PAGE_SIZE pages so it is safe to use as well. Update the
function ranges and add a comment explaining why the range is restricted
the way it is.
Suggested-by: Laura Abbott <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <redacted>
---
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
What's the user for this? It would be better to apply along with something
that actually needs to change permission for arbitrary vmalloc mappings.
BPF already uses set_memory_ro() but doesn't bother to check the return value.
Urgh :(
Then I can take it as a fix, if you like.
Will
On 28 January 2016 at 19:10, Will Deacon [off-list ref] wrote:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 05:43:41PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
quoted
On 28 January 2016 at 16:08, Will Deacon [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 03:01:05PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
quoted
The range of set_memory_* is currently restricted to the module address
range because of difficulties in breaking down larger block sizes.
vmalloc maps PAGE_SIZE pages so it is safe to use as well. Update the
function ranges and add a comment explaining why the range is restricted
the way it is.
Suggested-by: Laura Abbott <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <redacted>
---
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
What's the user for this? It would be better to apply along with something
that actually needs to change permission for arbitrary vmalloc mappings.
BPF already uses set_memory_ro() but doesn't bother to check the return value.