# Re: \[RFC PATCH\] ptrace: add PTRACE\_GETFD request

- From: Jann Horn \<jannh@google.com\>
- Date: 2019-12-06 19:06:28 
- List: linux-api
- Page: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-api/2019/12/5797487
- Thread: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-api/2019/12/5796810/t.md

```text
On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 8:05 PM Jann Horn [ref] wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 8:03 PM Sargun Dhillon [ref] wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 6:10 AM Tycho Andersen [ref] wrote:
> > > On Thu, Dec 05, 2019 at 11:44:53PM +0000, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> > > > take action on an FD on behalf of the tracee. For example, this
> > > > can be combined with seccomp's user notification feature to extract
> > > > a file descriptor and call privileged syscalls, like binding
> > > > a socket to a privileged port.
> > >
> > > This can already be accomplished via injecting parasite code like CRIU
> > > does; adding a ptrace() command like this makes it much nicer to be
> > > sure, but it is redundant.
> > >
> > How can you do this if the tracee doesn't have privilege? For example,
> > if the tracee doesn't have CAP_SYS_BIND_SERVICE, how could you
> > get it to bind to a port that's privileged without taking the file descriptor
> > and doing it in a process that does have CAP_SYS_BIND_SERVICE?
>
> (You can let the parasite send the fd to the tracer via
> SCM_CREDENTIALS if you have previously set up a unix domain socket for
> this.)

Eh, sorry, of course I meant SCM_RIGHTS.
```
